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Simone Gunzenhauser 
THE ISRAEL-JORDAN BORDERLANDS IN THE ARAVA VALLEY: 
DIFFERENTIAL DEVELOPMENT AND PROSPECTS FOR CO-OPERATION 
ABSTRACT 
The area of study extends from south of the Dead Sea to the 
shores of the Gulf of Aqaba/Eilat. The Arava Valley is 
divided between Jordan and Israel, having a desert 
environment marked by high temperatures and low 
precipitation. The boundary was disputed from 1948 until 
the Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty on the 26th of October 
1994. This border situation led to different settlement 
patterns on either side: the Israeli side was settled with 
Kibbutzim and Moshavim to secure the borders, whereas the 
Jordanian side stayed largely untouched because of the 
extreme conditions. 
Jordan and Israel share a common hydrogeological 
system in the Arava Valley, which has not as yet been fully 
investigated. This will only be possible through 
transboundary co-operation. Further areas of co-operation 
include agriculture, infrastructure, industry and tourism. 
Projects for co-operation in these areas were discussed 
between the two countries at the Casablanca Summit in 
October 1994. Each chapter of this thesis analyses the 
differences and commonalities between the two borderlands 
in the activities mentioned above, and assesses the 
prospects for future co-operation. The conclusion compares 
possibilities for co-operation in the Arava Valley with 
other selected borderlands in the world where transboundary 
co-operation already exists. Most cases seem to show that 
one party is likely to benefit more than the other, at 
least in the short-term. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Figure 1.1 The Israel-Jordan frontier zone near 
Aqaba/Eilat in March 1994 
The 180 km long international boundary in the Arava 
Valley extends from the south of the Dead Sea to the shores 
of the Red Sea . With its adjacent borderlands this is 
probably one of the world 's most interesting cases of how a 
sea l ed boundary can affect the development of its adjacent 
borderlands, and how this development might affect future 
prospects for transboundary co-operation. 
Until the peace treaty between Jordan and Israel on the 
26th of October 1994 the Arava Valley was divided by the 
boundary. The boundary, running along the Arava was sealed, 
and the frontier zone was mined. Crossing the boundary was 
impossible . 
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The decades of closure of the boundary shaped the 
appearance of the borderlands on each side. Today 
the boundary in the Arava Valley represents a sharp line 
between two different political systems, two different 
cultures and two different religions. 
However, with the peace treaty there is the chance, for 
the first time in forty years, for interaction between the 
adjacent borderlands. This interaction might even take the 
form of transboundary co-operation, which could lead to 
positive economic development and, therefore, to long-
lasting peace between the two countries. 
This unique situation in the Arava offers a wide range 
of subjects of interest to social scientists. Not only can 
the appearance of the border landscapes be studied, but also 
all various aspects of borderlands, including their 
inhabitants. In the future the prospects for transboundary 
co-operation might offer a wide field to study. 
However, there have been studies into borderlands in 
the past, with theories about borderlands and the 
development of their study. This chapter will give a short 
overview of borderland studies and the related theory, 
starting with the origin of borderlands. 
Borderlands are dependant on the existence of 
boundaries, which themselves limit the territory of states. 
As Glassner (1993,p.61) remarked, " all modern theories 
about States agree on at least one thing: a State must have 
territory". Over the centuries the limitation of the 
territory was denoted by frontiers. According to Glassner 
(1993,p.72) and Prescott (1987,p.36ff) the first states were 
only separated by 
(1987,p.36) also 
division between 
areas, the so-called frontiers. Prescott 
refers to frontiers as the zone of 
settled and uninhabited parts of one 
country. Then in the last century the world map was divided 
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by lines, the so-called boundaries. The frontier as a zone 
of transition disappeared and was replaced by a boundary, 
which very often became a line of friction. 
However, today states try to diminish the effects of 
the line of separation through transboundary co-operation. 
The boundary is replaced by borderlands, which represent a 
zone rather than a line. Ideally, it represents a zone of 
transition rather than a zone of division such as the 
frontier. 
This development is reflected in the study of 
boundaries: first the demarcation, delimitation and the 
limitation of sovereignty was of interest; then the boundary 
as a conflict generating object was discussed; only after 
the Second World War was the necessity of transboundary co-
operation and the study of borderlands of interest to 
scholars. Considering the long tradition of boundary 
studies, borderland studies are quite a young discipline in 
political geography. As Drysdale (1994,p.21) remarked, 
"traditionally, political geographers who study boundaries 
have focused mainly on their evolution, morphological 
characteristics, and conflict-generating potential." 
However, he also acknowledges that increasingly "some 
have concerned themselves with the functions boundaries 
actually perform, particularly as barriers to spatial 
interaction" (Drysdale,1994,p.21). 
Minghi (199l,p.l7) also notes that "the analysis of 
border landscapes in political geography has generally been 
directly related to the study of boundaries". This has been 
conflict orientated and he argues for a new focus on 
boundary studies, one which will encourage research on the 
more normal situation in boundary landscapes. He argues that 
the change from conflict to harmony is very clearly 
reflected in the evolution of border landscapes. For 
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example, after the last world war, The Alpes Maritime were 
characterised by emigration, separation of whole 
communities, and entire valleys were flooded by France for 
the water needs of the Cote D'Azur, and the Roya Valley 
railway was neglected. There was no co-operation between 
Italy and France, with borderlands being remote from the 
main national centres. Forty years later there is a growing 
economic relationship, a transborder park and a restored 
railway. As Minghi (199l,p.22) wrote, "Scenes of war 
destruction and abandonment from a generation ago are now 
replaced by the evidence of peace and co-operation behind 
the decision to rebuild". 
And as Prescott (1987,p.159) remarked, "political 
geographers are interested in boundaries because they mark 
the limits of political organisation which varies over the 
Earth's surface, and these variations as a result are likely 
to be most clearly seen ln the neighbourhood of the 
boundary". However, he also mentions that only a few 
writers have selected this subject as the focus of their 
study. 
1.1 SPATIAL IDENTIFICATION OF BORDERLANDS 
Adejuyigbe (1989,p.28) ln his discussion of the 
difference between a frontier and a borderland, came to the 
conclusion that "whilst frontier continues to be used for 
the zone of expansion before boundary delimitation, 
borderland should be restricted to the post-boundary". 
Undoubtedly, borderlands are a result of boundary-making as 
already mentioned above. 
Adejuyigbe (1989,p.29) believes that there are three 
ways to identify borderlands: by reference to the frontier 
which existed before boundary delimitation; by reference to 
administrative units close to the boundary; or by treaty. 
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There are various examples in the world where the 
borderlands are delimited by a treaty. The treaty might give 
the right of free movement within the zone or other 
priviliges, such as tax advantage or special concessions to 
company's investing in the borderland. Adejuyigbe gives the 
example of the European Union where the width of a 
borderland is officially 20 km. Another example he gives is 
the borderland between Italy and Yugoslavia. This zone was 
fixed in a treaty, and can be up to 30 km depending on 
changing needs. The width of the U.S.A borderland with 
Mexico was about 240 km, but was limited to about 40 km. In 
this zone Mexicans were apparently allowed to move freely. 
However, Adejuyigbe realises that using a treaty can 
cause difficulties if the zone cuts across a local 
government area or other important administrative units as 
it might cause administrative and planning problems. 
Adejuyigbe claims that the advantage of defining 
borderlands by reference to the frontier as a zone of 
conflict or of cultural competition, 
reality on the ground; it shows 
is that it shows the 
that borderlands are 
transitional areas between the political units concerned. 
He argues that frontiers which existed before boundary 
definition, were usually the result of a zone where there 
were conflicting claims over territory, or a zone where two 
cultures were found in cultural competition. 
1.2 DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF BORDERLANDS 
As already mentioned above studies into borderlands 
are quite a young discipline in geography. As Heller 
(1993,p.l79) noted: " Only since the 1960's the analysis of 
transboundary movement of population, goods, services and 
capital became of interest to researchers". And as Martinez 
(1989,p.397) remarked: "It was historians who continued to 
-6-
dominate the field of borderland studies until the 1960's". 
The borderlands which were previously of most interest 
to researchers were the European and North-American, which 
is reflected in the vast amount of literature produced 
about European transboundary co-operation, the U.S.-Mexican 
borderlands and the U.S.- Canadian borderlands. With the 
political changes in Eastern Europe the borderlands there 
are becoming of greater interest to researchers. 
According to Prescott (1987,p.l61) geographers are 
interested in four main topics concerning border landscapes. 
Firstly, the boundary, its appearance and its function. One 
example would be the boundary between East and West Germany 
which by its physical existence showed the state function 
applied there. 
Secondly, geographers are interested in how the 
boundary influences the landscape of its adjacent 
borderlands and how this may be explained by the political 
systems of the adjacent states. Again the boundary between 
East and West Germany is a good example. On the eastern side 
big fields dominated the landscape because of the 
agricultural system, whereas in the west there were smaller 
fields. Geographers also take interest in the differences of 
population, infrastructure and economic structures of 
borderlands. 
Thirdly, there is an interest by geographers into how 
the boundary influences the inhabitants of the borderlands. 
Finally, they study the influence of the boundary on the 
decision-making process of the state. 
However, despite all the possibilities mentioned above 
of how to study border landscapes, "in most cases the study 
of border landscapes was incidental to larger studies 
dealing with the evolution of the boundary and aimed at 
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understanding its problems" (Prescott,1987,p.173). 
House ( 1982) in his study of the Rio Grande took a 
completely different approach. In his operational model (see 
Fig 1.2) he focused on frontier transactions such as 
migration, smuggling, retailing and tourism. House 
(1982,p.7) points out that three new aspects have been 
developed: setting political geography on a convergent 
course with other sciences, studying frontiers in their 
regional context and looking at the positive aspects of co-
operation across boundaries rather than the negative aspects 
of boundaries as a barrier. That this is already happening 
can be seen by the increasing number of research projects 
into borderlands concentration on tranboundary co-operation, 
as well as conferences about transboundary co-operation. 
Examples of conferences include the International Boundaries 
Research Unit at Durham on the 'Peaceful Management of 
Transboundary Resources' ( 14-17 April 1994), and another 
held in Basle by the IGU on 'Political Boundaries and 
Coexistence' (24-27 May 1994). The conference proceedings 
(Blake,1995; Gallusser,1994) published following the 
conferences illustrate the great variety of research done by 
researchers, especially towards peaceful transboundary co-
operation. 
Adejuyigbe (1989,p.32) also believes that there is the 
possibility to resolve conflicts in borderland areas. He 
suggests two ways to study this peaceful interaction: "study 
the interaction with the core of their respective political 
units, and secondly study the interaction between the two 
borderlands on either side of a particular boundary". He 
also notes that the transitional characteristics of 
borderlands make them the zones to be most affected by 
development in adjacent zones: territorially, culturally and 
economically (1989,p.34). The Alsace is a very good example, 
where people are bilingual and the house-style on each side 
is the mirror-image of the other side. 
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Figure 1.2 The operational model by J.W. House 
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Ajomo (1989,p.41) made a very important observation, 
that a solution to boundary disputes will be necessary to 
reach peace and tranquility which are necessary for the 
successful administration of borderlands. 
Ajomo (1989,p.41) also suggested that transboundary co-
operation has to be taken step by step. In the case of 
Africa he believes it is better to start with bilateral, 
localised, step by step administrative, economic and social 
co-operation between territoral communities or authorities 
across specific frontiers. He also makes it clear that 
Africa is so far not ready for the type of transboundary co-
opeation to be found in Europe. It took decades to develop 
transboundary co-operation in Europe. The Convention on 
Trans-frontier Co-operation signed by the members of the EC 
-9-
in 1980, which is used "as a vehicle for trans-frontier co-
operation between territorial communities or authorities 
within the jurisdication of two or more Contracting Parties" 
(Ajomo,1989, p.41). He also realises that a similar 
convention cannot yet be applied in Africa. 
Momoh (1989,p.52) poses the question: "if two 
communities on the opposite sides of a boundary are not 
culturally, ideologically or ethnically affiliated or 
homogenous, does it make sense to have a meaningful 
borderland in that zone ?" He divides borderlands into 
three zones (see Fig 1.2): minimal, zero, and maximal 
borderlands. Minimal borderlands display neither cultural 
nor ethnic affinity. Zero borderlands are where people on 
the opposite sides of the boundary are diametrically 
opposed, ideologically and even religiously, creating a zone 
of friction. Maximal borderlands are where residents have 
ethnic, cultural, linguistic or even ancestral affinites. 
Figure 1.3 Zero, Minimal and maximal borderlands by c.s. 
Momoh 
Zero Borderland 
Country A. 
Figure 2. Zero Borderland: Borderland is conterminous with boundary. 
Country A and country B are ideologically or religiously opposed. 
Figure 1. Minimal Borderland: No cultural or ethnic affinity between country 
A and country B. Borderland space is minimal. 
Country A. 
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Figure 3. Maximal Borderland: Citizens of both country A and country B have 
ancestral ethnic and linguistic affinities and links spanning millenia. 
source: Mornoh 1 c. s. ( 19 8 9) 1 p. s 4. 
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Martinez ( 1994) suggests several model approaches to 
the study of borderlands. His first approach views the 
borderlands in terms of interaction and is based on Momoh's 
approach. He identifies three types of borderlands (see Fig 
1. 4) alienated, co-existent and interdependent. 
Figure 1. 4 Approach to border analysis by O.J. Martinez 
Figure 1.1 Alienated borderlands 
Tension prevails. Border is functionally 
closed, and cross-border inreracrion is 
roraUy or nearly totally absent. 
Residents of each counrry acr as 
strangers to each other. 
Figure 1.2 Co-exiscem 
borderlands 
Srabiliry is an on and off proposirio:. 
Border remains slightly open, allowi: g 
for rhe developmenr of limited • 
binational interaction. Residenrs oi e.o.:h 
counrry deal wirh each orher as casu.a.i 
acquaintances, bur borderlande" 
develop closer relationships. 
Figure 1-.3 lncerdependem 
borderlands 
Srabiliry prevails mosr of rhe rime. 
Economic and social complemenrariry 
prompt increased cross-border 
inreracrion, leading ro expansion of 
borderlands. Borderlanders carry on 
friendly and cooperative relationships. 
source: Martinez,o.J. (1994) ,p.J. 
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Martinez also advocates the study of borderland 
societies, to ascertain the orientation of borderlanders 
(see Fig 1.5), which could either be orientated to their own 
country, or to the country across the boundary. According to 
this he divides cases into national and transnational 
borderlanders. 
Figure 1.5 National and transnational borderlands by o.J. 
Martinez 
COUNTRY A COUNTRY B 
Prevailing orientation of national borderlanders 
is toward the neartlands of Country A and Country B 
• Prevailing orientation of transnational borderlanders 
•s toward the oinational system that pervades their lives 
source: Martinez,O.J. (1994) ,p.6. 
Finally, 
examining the 
he suggests looking at the border· milieu, 
contributors, such as separateness, ethnic 
conflicts, and international conflict (see Fig 1.6). These 
factors create a special environment to live in, which 
distinguish the borderland from the core area of a country 
and make the border milieu unique compared to the rest of 
the country. 
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Figure 1.6 Major contributors to the border milieu O.J. 
Martinez 
Trans nationalism 
Ethnic Conflict 
Source: Martinez,O.J. (1994),p.8. 
Strassoldo (1989,p.389-390) identifies three models of 
border relations: nation-building, creating a hardening of 
the boundary; co-existence, where boundaries are undisputed 
with controlled exchange; and integration where states are 
willing to devolve their power. He believes that border 
relations have to go through the stages of nation-building 
and co-existence before they can reach the ideal stage of 
integration. Europe only reached integration because, "It 
was in Western Europe that nation-states were first 
invented, and it is only natural that this is where they 
first matured and then decayed" (Strassoldo,p.391) 
Strassoldo also recognises that borderlands are 
usually different from core areas, and have some common 
characteristics with the adjacent borderlands. There is very 
often cultural similarity between the two borderlands, both 
borderlands: are distant from the core, and both of their 
economies depend on the border policy made by the central 
government. There is also a similarity of function (e.g. 
military), economic integration (e.g. cross-border 
commerce), and physical continuity (e.g. joint 
infrastructural planning) to be found in adjacent 
borderlands. 
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As Strassoldo believes that the needs of the population 
in the borderlands are very often not fully recognised by 
the central government, he (1989, p.393) demands that local 
authorities should be granted some autonomous powers to 
guarantee the inhabitants of borderlands the right to 
interact with their neighbours and that their daily lives 
are not hampered by the boundary. "Relations between border 
people should be managed so as to maintain a sense of 
friendliness and common humanity, because borderlands are 
one of the potentials for, or an actual 'foyer' of trans-
national integration, and thus of human solidarity" 
(Strassoldo,1989,p.393) 
Asiwaju illustrates the situation along the Nigerian 
border (1989,p.67) where local authorities across the Niger-
Benin border are like "Siamese twins in every material 
particular of local geography, culture, language, history, 
politics and economy;... where inhabitants interact more 
with one another across the obviously artifical boundary 
than they do with other groups and sub-groups in other parts 
of the nation-state". He prefers the Western European model 
because it is characterized by a gradual but steady 
evolution from the informal relations at the level of the 
border communities, to national governments working together 
in the forum provided by the Council of Europe. 
1.3 THE STUDY OF THE BORDERLANDS IN THE ARAVA VALLEY 
There have been studies into parts of the border 
landscapes of the Arava Valley: the boundary between Aqaba 
and Eilat. Drysdale (1991) looked at the boundary between 
Aqaba/Eilat as well as other countries in the Gulf of 
Aqaba/Eilat, in terms of explaining the existing border 
landscapes by looking at the broader political-geographic 
environment. Again, this approach takes into account the 
border landscape. 
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The possibility of transboundary co-operation in the 
Arava Valley was seen by scholars in Israel in the 1980's. 
Yehuda Gradus and others (Ben Gurian University, Beersheba) 
proposed a joint research project between Israel and Jordan 
co-ordinated by an American University long before the peace 
negotiations became public. Furthermore, he had already made 
concrete suggestions for co-operation projects. Despite the 
suggestions made by Gradus and others, it still leaves the 
question of how to assess and evaluate the prospects for co-
operation. And do the proposals reflect the reality in the 
borderlands ? 
As illustrated above there are many approaches of 
how to study borderlands. In the case of the 
IsraelijJordanian borderlands in the Arava Valley some 
approaches simply cannot be applied because of the 
conditions to be found there. Over the last few decades the 
boundary in the Arava was a line of division. Interchange 
between the two borderlands did not exist. Therefore, taking 
the definition of Martinez (1994) the borderlands in the 
Arava Valley can be assigned to the class of alienated 
borderlands where there is no transboundary interchange. 
Thus House's (1982) study of the Rio Grande, for example, 
cannot be applied due the lack of interaction, but might be 
applicable at some time in the future. But how can the 
prospects for co-operation be studied? The answer to this is 
simple: There is no model or theory which can be applied. 
One major problem which I had to be faced during this 
study of the borderlands in the Arava Valley was that data 
was either not available, or in matters related to 
water resources, it was considered as classified data. 
Furthermore, population data for the Israeli side was 
collected for the Arava Valley, whereas on the Jordanian 
side it was included in the figures of other regions. These 
problems are not unique to my study. As House in his study 
about the Rio Grande (1982,p.265) and Martinez (1989,p.389) 
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have remarked, there is one problem common to all 
transnational studies: there is a lack of comparable data 
for the two countries, concerning range and volume of data, 
as well as the kind of spatial units and the time-intervals 
for which data is available. The same problems confronted 
Jones and Wild (1993,p.262) when researching the border 
between East and West Germany. They remarked that "the 
quality of the data on the eastern side was inadequate for 
any comparative cross-frontier study, and the former East 
German authorities data bases were too narrow in range and 
too suspect in content for confident analysis". 
A more pleasant problem was the political changes in 
the Middle East, especially the signing of the peace treaty 
between Israel and Jordan, the events of which threatened to 
overtake my thesis. 
The approach I have taken is to examine the present 
development of the borderland on each side. Chapter 2 gives 
a physical overview of the study area and of the boundary 
itself, with both the population and settlement being 
discussed. 
Chapters 3 to 7 deal with the major subjects of co-
operation in the Arava Valley: water, tourism, industry, 
agriculture, transporation and infrastructure. Each chapter 
describes the present situation and gives the prospects for 
future co-operation. Chapter 8 examines other cases of 
transboundary co-operation, and situations at recently 
opened boundaries, and how these experiences can be 
beneficially taken into consideration in the Arava Valley. 
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Chapter 2 
THE ARA VA VALLEY 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide basic 
background information about the study area, considering 
topography, climate, soil and vegetation, as well as 
population and settlements. It also deals with the nature 
of the Jordanian/ Israeli boundary in the Arava Valley, 
internal administrative boundaries, and the nature of 
boundary-making in general. 
2.1 TOPOGRAPHY 
The Arava Valley is only a small part of the giant 
Syrian-East African Rift Valley. It runs from the south of 
the Dead Sea to the shores of the Gulf of AqabajEilat (see 
Fig 2.1). Its formation is a result of tectonic movements 
over millions of years. In short, the Arava Valley is 
created by the tearing away of Arabia from Africa, in 
addition to the uplifting and faulting processes. 
Therefore, the Arava Valley shows typical 
features which can also be found in other regions 
world, such as the Rhine Valley. The Arava Valley is 
by rock walls and covered with alluvial and 
Graben 
of the 
hemmed 
gravel 
sedimentation. The rock walls to the west, the Negev Hills, 
rise up to 600 metres, and in the east the Edom Hills are 
up to 1000 metres high (see Fig 2.2). The alluvial fans at 
the floor of the Edom Hills and Negev Hills are a result of 
the flash floods descending into the Arava Valley, carrying 
vast amounts of detritus. The alluvial fans are much larger 
and thicker on the east side than on the west because the 
wadis of the Edom Hills carry more water due to their 
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higher precipitation (see Fig 2. 3) . Furthermore, their 
heights and gradient give the floods greater erosive power. 
Another effect of the powerful floods on the east side is 
that the base level of the Arava Valley, which is the 
stream bed of the Wadi Arava itself, has been pushed 
westwards (Orni,1971,p.31; Karmon,1971,p.292) 
Figure 2.2 East-west section of the Arava Valley 
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Source: Orni,E. (1971),p.31. 
Orni (1971,p.16), Karmon (1971,p.291) and Evenari 
(1971, p.62) divided the Arava Valley into three natural 
subregions (see Fig 2.4). Firstly, there is the southern 
part of the Arav~ which is 77 km long and 5-15 km wide. The 
southern Arava is characterized by its short streams which 
drain into the Red Sea, and do not form a continuous 
drainage pattern. Most of them penetrate into the subsoil, 
especially alluvial fans, before reaching the sea. Then in 
the hot and dry summer the water is drawn up again by 
capillary action and playas of salt flats are formed on the 
surface. The southern Arava contains four playas. On the 
Israeli side there are Eilat, Avrona and the Yotvata 
Playas; on the Jordanian side there is the Sa'idiyin Playa. 
Secondly, there is the central Arava which is 74 km 
long and up to 32 km wide. The Central Arava is formed by 
the confluence of Nahal Paran, Nahal Hiyon and other wadis 
coming from the Negev and Edom Hills. These wadis drain 
Figure 2.1 Location of the Arava Valley 
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Figure 2.3 Precipitation in the region of the Arava Valley in mm 
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into to the Dead Sea. The northern part of the Central 
Arava, unlike the south, is below sea level. 
Figure 2.4 Natural division of the Arava Valley 
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Finally, there is the nothern Arava or the so called 
Sedom salt swamps. Having a length of 14 km, they are 
frequently flooded by waters rushing down the Wadi Arava 
towards the Dead Sea. 
2.2 CLIMATE 
With an average annual rainfall in the Arava Valley of 
25-50 mm/year (see Table 2.1), some parts have even less 
than 8 mm. With high temperatures the Arava clearly belongs 
to the arid zone. It records a pan evaporation of 
approximately 3200 mm/year or 8.8 mm/day (see Table 2.1). 
In August, the hottest month of the year with temperatures 
of up to 38°C, the evaporation can even be up to 15 mm/day 
(see Table 2.1). As a result there is very low humidity. 
Orni (1971,p.150/151) remarked that "the lowest humidity 
values of the country (Israel) are measured in the Arava 
Valley where En Yahav ... has an annual mean of 40%". 
On top of this, in winter there are usually 2 to 3 
nights of frost, to emphasise the extreme climate. Wind 
speeds with an average of 29-30 km/h and peaks up to 76 
km/h are nothing unusual. 
Data collected on the Jordanian side, the eastern side 
of the Arava Valley, shows approximately the same 
temperatures. The temperatures for Ghor Safi coincide more 
or less with those from Quetura, as well as those from 
Aqaba Airport being approximately the same as those 
measured in Eilat (see Fig 2.5). However, rainfall in the 
north of the Arava Valley (Ghor Safi) is significantly 
higher than in the south, where there is hardly any 
rainfall at all (see Fig 2.5) 
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Table 2.1 Climate data for two sites in the Arava Valley 
measured between 1987 and 1991 
NEOT 
QETURA HAKIKAR 
Max/min mean daily 
temperature ( OC) 
August (hottest month) 39/24 39/28 
January (coldest month) 18/7 20/12 
Annual number of days with 
the temperature of: 
35°C or more 125-150 126-150 
10°C or less 1-25 1-25 
Average pan evaporation 
rate (mm/day): 
Hottest month 15 14 
Coldest month 14 5 
Annual pan evaporation rate 
(mm) 3111 3826 
Annual rainfall (mm) 55 39 
source: Nerd 1 A. ( 19 9 3) 1 p. 3 o 7. 
Looking at the Arava Valley, one is clearly faced with 
low precipitation (ten rain days a year), high variations 
in temperatures (hot summers and cold winters), low 
humidity and strong wind. In short, the climate in the 
Arava Valley is hostile to man. 
Figure 2 .5 Climate diagram for Eilat, Aqaba & Ghor Safi - 1992 
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2.3 SOILS AND VEGETATION 
There are four types of soil to be found in the Arava 
Valley: grumusols and alluvial soils, bare rock and 
lithosols, hammada soils, and sand dunes (Fig 2.6). 
Most of the Arava Valley is covered with Hammada soils 
(see Fig 2.6). Only to the west and south of the Dead Sea 
are grumusols and alluvial soils to be found. In the south 
of the Arava Valley sand dunes cover a significant part of 
the valley, but mainly on the Israeli side. In the east and 
south of the Dead Sea bare rock and lithosols are to be 
found. 
According to Orni (1982,p.l72) the Arava Valley, 
except for the salt playas around the Dead Sea and the 
playas in the south of the Arava, belongs to the Sahara-
Arabian Zone. A typical plant for this zone is the Thorny 
Acacia. This tree may remain bare, dry, seemingly dead for 
months or years, until a flood rushes down the wadi in 
spring time. Then the tree comes to life again along with 
its surroundings which may be covered with flower carpets 
(see Fig 2 . 7) . 
This kind of desert vegetation of bushes with 
thickened leaves, such as the Thorny Acacia, are to be 
found in regions with rainfall of less than 200 rom/year and 
high evaporation. The vegetation is also very sparse due to 
the limited water available. Mostly, on average there is 
only one Thorny Acacia per square kilometre, with the trees 
having to root deeply to survive: for one meter of height 
an Acacia roots 3 m deep. 
Figure 2.6 
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Figure 2.7 Acacia with flower carpet in the Arava Valley 
Photograph taken in March 1994 
The salt playas in the Arava Valley belong to the 
halophytic vegetation, with species such the juncus rush, 
the Jordan tamarisk and isolated specimens of the 'doom' 
palm (Orni,1971,p.174; Zohary,1981,p.37). 
2.4 THE BOUNDARY IN THE ARAVA VALLEY 
2.4.1 Boundary-making 
Until 1922 no boundary existed in the Arava Valley . 
Only with the division of British-mandated Palestine in 
1921 into Transjordan, which became an emirate east of the 
Jordan, and Palestine, which stayed under British-mandate 
until 1948, did it become necessary to fix the boundary 
between the two territories. In July and August 1922 a 
confusing correspondence between the Secretary of State 
for the Colonies and the High Commissioner of Jordan 
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erupted in order to define the boundary. In a telegramm 
dated the 15th of August 1922, the Secretary of State 
suggests that the boundary should be drawn as follows: " 
South of Dead Sea a line down the centre of Wadi Araba down 
to Gulf of Akaba should be taken as the Boundary" 
(Toye,1989,p.739). In a telegramm on the 26th of August the 
Secretary of State asked for a clarification of the line. 
On the 27th of August the Commissioner defined the line as, 
" A line commencing from the Gulf of Akaba drawn up through 
centre of Wady Araba, Dead Sea, River Jordan, Beisan and 
following the eastern Boundary of the Administrative sub-
district of Tiberias defines the boundary" 
(Toye,1989,p.744) The Secretary of State again was not 
satisfied with this definition because he did not consider 
it as precise enough. Therefore, he stated that, " An 
accurate geographical definition is required and wherever 
possible you should give approximate longitude or mention 
villages or natural features" (Toye,1989,p.745). On the 
30th of August the following was agreed: " Trans Jordan 
comprises territory lying to the east of a line drawn from 
a point two miles west of the town of Akaba in the Gulf of 
that name up the centre of the Wadi Araba, Dead Sea and 
River Jordan to its junction with the River Yarmuk: hence 
up the centre of that river to the Syrian frontier" 
(Toye,1989,p.745 and 750) 
However, this final definition does not clarify 
whether it is the centre of the Wadi Arava itself, or of 
the Arava Valley or from where to measure the point two 
miles west of Aqaba. Because the correspondence was quite 
confusing, the boundary was always disputed and was never 
demarcated formally. 
Until the peace treaty on October the 26th 1994 it was 
not clear whether in Northern and Central Arava the actual 
streambed represented the border, or the middle of the 
Arava Valley. In the Southern section no clear line could 
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be identified either. In the past the Jordanians a lwa y s 
claimed that the Israelis occupied Jordanian terr i tory both 
in the north and the south of the Arav a Valley. Wi th the 
signing of the peace it became clear that the Is r aeli s d i d 
occupy a vast amount of Jordanian territory in t he Arava 
(Fig 2 . 9) . Altogether the area occupied amounts to 344 
squ are kilometres . Becau se the Israeli s h ad cultiva ted land 
eas t of the Wadi Arav a (Fig 2 . 8) f o r some yea rs, the 
question arose whether they could keep the land or whether 
it would hav e to be re t urned . 
Figure 2.8 View from Jordanian occupied lands in the 
Zofar region to Israeli territory 
(Israeli greenhouses in the foreground are on Jordani a n 
territory, in the middle ground the Wadi Arav a , a nd on 
the other side of the wadi, in the background , I s r a eli 
greenhouses on Israeli territo ry) . 
Photograph taken in March 1994 
Figure 2.9 Jordanian 
the peace 
-32-
occupied lands in 
treaty (coloured in 
the Arava 
red) 
Source: Jordan Media Group (1994). 
before 
-33-
However, in the peace treaty it was agreed that the 
land which was cultivated by Israeli farmers in the Zofar 
region (Northern Arava) could be still used for up to 25 
years, but would be under Jordanian sovereignty (Jordan 
Media Group, 1994) . 
The rest of the territory occupied by the Israelis had 
to be returned, in particular the north of the Arava Valley 
(see Fig 2.10). In Central Arava, as well as in the south, 
land has been exchanged. North of Aqaba the boundary keeps 
its present line, as the boundary line already follows the 
centre of the valley (see Fig 2 .10) . To deal with all 
boundary problems which might occur in the future, as well 
as for demarcation on the ground, a joint boundary 
commission was set up. 
Figure 2.10 
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2.4.2 Nature of the boundary in the past 
The nature of a boundary does not change with a treaty 
neither does its previous function disappear over night. 
The boundary in the Arava was guarded by both sides and no 
crossing point between the two countries existed. 
However, despite the fact that the boundary in the 
Arava was sealed for decades, border crossings did occur. 
After 1968 terrorists tried to cross the border from Jordan 
to Israel many times. It became a great problem for Israeli 
security. However, with the help of the Jordanians these 
incidents were foiled. For example, Jordanians took special 
care to make sure that swimmers could not cross to Eilat 
carrying explosives 
(Garfinkle,1992,p.78). 
meant for Israeli ships 
More recently Palestinian guerillas swam from Jordan 
across the Gulf of Aqaba and then shot to death a security 
guard (New York Times, 31.5.1992). There were also 
incidents of a more harmless nature, for example when King 
Hussein's polo pony swam from Aqaba to Eilat and was sent 
back home (Washington Post, 10.4.1992). However, without 
the effort by both sides and a certain degree of co-
operation these intrusions would have caused great 
problems. 
Instead, these intrusions and even some small border 
disputes in the Arava were settled by discrete, direct 
negotiations. Between 1975 and 1976 a minor border 
demarcation was settled in the Arava area. (Garfinkle, 
1990,92/101) 
During my visit to Israel in March/April 1994 rumours 
occured that Israel and Jordan had agreed to crossing 
points at Aqaba and Eilat to allow tourists from third 
countries to cross from one side to the other. People were 
quite confident that it was only a matter of time and might 
even happen in 1994. 
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On August the 8th it happened. Crown Prince Hassan and 
Prime Minister Rabin inaugurated the first border crossing 
between Jordan and Israel, north of Aqaba (Guardian, 
9. 8 .1994) The crossing was for third-country nationals 
only. 
However, ih the peace treaty it was agreed that the 
crossing points between Jordan and Israel should be opened 
in both directions for Jordanian, Israelis and third 
country nationals (Jordan Media Group,1994). The visa 
regulations and the opening times of the crossing points 
were agreed. Other points such as crossing the border with 
vehicles, have still to be agreed. The boundary in the 
Arava Valley is now more permeable, but still an obstacle 
for the free movement of goods and people. 
2.4.3 Administrative boundaries in the Arava Valley 
The Arava Valley is not only divided by an 
international boundary, there are also administrative 
boundaries which do not effect people's movement or the 
movement of goods, but might affect future transboundary 
co-operation. The Jordanian side of the Arava Valley is 
divided between the following three governorates: Karak, 
Tafiela and Ma'an (see Fig 2.11). On the Israeli side 
there is only the sub-district of Beer-Sheba (see Fig 2.11) 
where all the departments responsible for the planning of 
the Negev have their seat. Apart from these sub-district 
and governorate.boundaries there are many local government 
units in the Arava Valley on both sides of the boundary. 
Unfortunately, a map with the administrative boundary lines 
of the local governments is not available. However, these 
local administr~tive boundaries in the Arava Valley are an 
interesting point to keep in mind when talking about 
transboundary co-operation. 
Figure 2.11 Administrative boundary units in 
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2.5 POPULATION AND SETTLEMENT 
As shown above, the Arava represents a natural 
geographical unit which until August 1994 was divided by a 
sealed boundary. Until the 1950's the Arava was largely 
inhabited by nomads who were sheepherders and goatherders. 
The only permanent settlement in the Valley until this time 
was Aqaba, which in 1943 was described as " a village, 
merely a collection of roughly built huts of granite 
masonry, extending for 800 yards along the shore ... " (Naval 
Intelligence,1943,p.523). In 1954 Aqaba had less than 5000 
inhabitants (Harris,1958,p.24). 
In the following years Aqaba boomed as Jordan's outlet 
to the sea. In 1992 Aqaba (town and localities) had 64,300 
inhabitants (see Fig 2.12), which is expected to increase 
dramatically over the next decade. "By 2000, Aqaba is 
projected to have between 140,000 and 180,000 inhabitants 
completely dwarfing Eilat and all other settlements in the 
Gulf of Aqaba" (Drysdale,1991,p.201). 
Eilat was only founded in 1952. The fact that it has 
quite an isolated location, Beer-Sheba, the next large town 
lies more than 200 km away, did not hamper its development. 
Built as Israel's gateway to the Red Sea and the Indian 
Ocean it attracted more amd more people. Eilat's population 
increased steadily from 500 in 1955 to 33,000 in 1991 (see 
Fig 2. 12) . However, its present population is still only 
half of that of Aqaba. 
The other big settlement in the Arava Valley is Ghor 
Saf i. Saf i' s population development took off with the 
establishment of the Arab Potash Works in the 1980's. Since 
1985 its population has increased steadily, and Safi has a 
population of 14,800. 
With the foundation of the Israeli State the Western 
side of the Arava Valley was settled, with Kibbutzim and 
Figure 2.12 Population development in the Arava Valley 1955-1992 
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Moshavim established. As it can be seen in Fig 2.12 the 
south and the north of the Arava on the Israeli side had an 
increase in population in the 1970's and 1980's, but in the 
90's there has been stagnation. Altogether the population 
of the North and South Arava in 1991 was approximately 
5,000. 
For the Jordanian side there was no population data 
available about the number of people living in the Arava 
Valley, apart from Aqaba or Ghor Safi. Khouri (1981,p.218) 
mentions the number of 793 people who lived in the 
permanent settlements of the Jordanian side of the Arava 
Valley. It can be assumed that this number excludes the 
population of Ghor Safi and Aqaba. However, apart from 
permanent settlers, bedouins are living in the Arava. 
According to unofficial sources their number is estimated 
to be about 8,000 at the present. 
One interesting characteristic is that all settlements 
on the Israeli side are purely Jewish, whereas the ones on 
the Jordanian side are purely Arabic, excluding Aqaba and 
Eilat. 
In general the population of the Arava Valley 
increased over the last few decades. Although the Arava 
Valley cannot be described as densely populated, the two 
main urban centres of Aqaba and Eilat have a considerable 
size and their population is increasing steadily. With the 
peace process and the opening of the border, the resulting 
opportunites will attract more people. The two towns 
together could form an urban conurbation in the near 
future. The boundary between the two towns may even 
disappear. 
As the rural population did not increase significantly 
over the last ten years, the future here seems to be rather 
uncertain. 
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2.6 SUMMARY 
The Arava Valley is a natural geographical unit which 
has been partitioned by a boundary over the last four 
decades. At this boundary two politically, culturally and 
religiously different nations meet. 
monarchy, and Judaism meets Islam. 
Democracy meets 
Despite the political tension along the boundary and 
despite the Arava's hostile environment, settlements were 
founded in the Arava and the population increased steadily, 
especially in the urban towns of Aqaba and Eilat. As the 
boundary between Jordan and Israel is no longer sealed, the 
only obstacle left to hinder transboundary ·co-operation 
seems to be the administrative boundaries. However, it 
should be remembered that some of the development in recent 
decades has been the product of the border and the division 
of the region between two states. 
As the following chapters will show there are other 
obstacles, rooted in the four decades of differential 
development. These obstacles cannot just be removed by just 
opening a border crossing. The obstacles need to be 
overcome through effective transboundary co-operation. 
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Chapter 3 
WATER 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The implication of water shortages are difficult to 
understand for someone living in North-West Europe where 
rainfall is plentiful. Water is taken for granted in such 
countries and has never been a long-term factor limiting the 
socio-economic development. 
However, there are countries in the world where 
rainfall is very low and uneven. Consequently, their water 
resources are scarce. One such region is the Middle East. 
Over the the last decade the share of water per capita in 
the Middle East has been reduced to 1, 750 cubic metres, 
compared to a world average of almost 14,000 cubic metres 
(Feuilherade,1994,p.32). Feuilherade believes that the main 
reasons for this are a growing population and the lack of 
technology to exploit available resources in many regions 
experiencing water shortages. 
As can be seen from Table 3.1 the water availability 
per capita has been decreasing steadily in countries such as 
Egypt, Israel, Jordan and Syria since 1960, and is expected 
to decrease still further in the next 30 years. 
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Table 3.1 Water availability in dry countries, 1960-2025 
(renewable resources per capita - cubic (metres} 
1960 1990 2025 
ISRAEL 1,024 467 311 
JORDAN 529 224 91 
SYRIA 1,196 439 161 
EGYPT 2,251 1,112 645 
Source: MEED (Special Report Water}, 28.1.1994, p.7. 
Even Egypt which is one of the most water-rich 
countries in the Middle East and at one time hoped to export 
water, had a significant decrease from 1960 to 1990. Looking 
at the forecast for these countries for the year 2025 the 
future looks gloomy . Jordan may have less than 100 cubic 
metres per capita of renewable resources available in the 
near future and even Egypt may only have 645 cubic metres 
per capita. Considering Egypt's water situation forecast for 
2025 future water exportation by this country now seems out 
of the question. 
There is no doubt that the water shortage in the Middle 
East is extremely serious. Indeed, remarks such as those by 
Kfiffner (1993,p.33) that "the Middle East probably has the 
most serious water problems in the world", unfortunately, 
seems to be true. 
At this point the question arises of how to resolve the 
water problem. Two major engineering projects have been 
suggested. One is the "El-Arish pipeline" from the Nile to 
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Gaza and the Negev, and the other is the so-called "Turkish 
peace pipeline".· In the case of the "Turkish peace pipeline" 
it is proposed to transport the water by pipeline, large 
tanks or even M~dusa bags. The project was discussed when 
the Turkish Prime Minister visited Israel in 1994. Turkey 
would export approximately 180 million cubic metres of 
water per year for the price of $ 0.45 per cubic metre and 
in return Israel offered its irrigation expertise to assist 
Turkey in a programme to irrigate southeastern Turkey with 
water from the A.taturk Dam (Bodgener,1995,p.11). 
The benefits as well as the prospects for achieving 
such a mega project have been questioned, although they do 
show good prospects for co-operation. Shuval (1992,p.141) 
has doubts about success because of difficulties in 
obtaining agreement of all the countries involved, and also 
because of Israel's serious concern for being dependent on 
water resources which can be cut off at any time. Even if, 
as Wolf (1993b,p.15) mentions, these projects are a 
possibility to meet the needs in the short-term. 
Furthermore, there are too many political and practical 
difficulties involved in realising them. 
There has been a trend of moving away from such big 
projects, this was stressed at the Muscat Water Conference 
held in Oman in April 1994, which included delegations from 
Israel. At this conference smaller projects were seen as 
more favourable,. for example, it was suggested to set up a 
desalination research and technology centre in Muscat. Also, 
the improvement of waste water treatment, the establishment 
of a regional water data bank, and a regional water 
authority were seen as desirable goals. Although these 
proposals are not yet realised, there does seem to be 
thoughts about co-operation over water in the Middle East. 
Hopefully these, thoughts are going to be realised; the 
sooner the better. 
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3.2 THE WATER SITUATION IN ISRAEL AND JORDAN 
Israel and Jordan are both countries with an alarming 
shortage of water. The water resources in both countries are 
relatively scarce and uneven due to the dry climate as well 
as the fluctuating rainfall. The Negev receives less than 
250 mmjyear, and the southern parts of the Negev even less 
than this. Only the regions along the Mediterranean coast 
and the West Bank have a precipitation of 550-700 mmjyear 
and in some parts up to 800 mmjyear (Westermann,p.158). 
In addition there are high levels of evaporation. 
In Jordan only the Northwest receives rainfall of 250-
500 mmjyear. Whereas most regions in Europe have 
precipitation of more than 750 mmjyear and some regions are 
well above 1000 mmjyear or even more than 2000 mmjyear in 
the Alps and parts of Norway (Westermann,p.117). 
The natural water scarcity is aggravated by one factor 
especially: population growth. Although Israel has only an 
annual growth rate of 1.6 % (see Tabel 3.2) the population 
is increasing dramatically because of the constant stream of 
Jewish immigrants. Over the next ten years Israel expects 
another one million Jews from Russia and the former USSR. 
This would bring its current 4.80 million population up to 
a minimum of 6 million by the year 2000 (see Table 3.2). 
In Jordan the situation is even worse due to its 
natural growth rate of 3.5 % a year. Jordan is expected to 
have 4.91 million inhabitants by the year 2000, and about 10 
million by the year 2020 (see Table 3.2). 
Undoubtedly, the present water resources are threatened 
by such a population growth even if, as Kemp (1995,p.8) 
remarked, the water resources are already well managed 
through metering and through relatively high water charges. 
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In short, the present population of Israel and Jordan 
which is at present 8. 4 million, might by the year 2020 
reach 18.6 million inhabitants, all of whom need water to 
survive. 
Table 3.2 
ISRAEL 
1991 
2000 
2020 
JORDAN 
1991 
2000 
2020 
Future water need in Israel and Jordan 
(MCM/year) 
GROWTH POPULATION WATER NEED WATER LOW/HIGHWA 
RATE (milions) 
- NEED - TER 
in % LOW DEMAND HIGH DEFICIT 
(A) DEMAND 
(A) (B) 
1.6 4.80 1800 1800 200/200 
6.44 2000 2000 400/400 
8.85 2200 2200 600/600 
3.5 3.60 870 980 0/110 
4.91 960 1100 90/230 
9.76 1300 1600 430/730 
(A) Projections assume constant demand for agriculture, growth to come 
through technology; low demand assumes urban use grows at current per 
capita usage; high demand allows 100 cubic metres per capita for urban 
use 
(B) Projected deficit equals current annual natural potential minus 
projected demand. 
Source: Wolf,A. (1993a), Natural Resources Journal,p.799. 
Not only will the demand for water rise because of the 
increase in population; another important factor seen by 
Beaumont (1989,p.20) is the increase in the standard of 
living in the Middle East. 
As shown in Table 3.2 the exploitation of the natural 
potential of the water resources in Israel and Jordan are 
already overused, and the future looks very gloomy. Israel 
has an annual water need of 1,800 millions cubic 
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metres/year at present, which exceeds its natural potental 
by 200 millions cubic metres/year. Should the population 
projection come true, both Israel and Jordan would need more 
water. By the year 2000 Israel would need 2,000 MCM/year and 
Jordan a minimum of 1,300 MCM/year. In both cases the demand 
is far beyond their natural potential. 
Even if population growth is the main factor for 
further decreases of water resources, the main consumer of 
water in both countries is agriculture. In Israel 71% of the 
fresh water is used for agriculture (Table 3.3). Industry 
only uses 4% of total water resources. 
The reason for this situation is that agriculture was 
seen as being strategically important to guarantee the 
independence of the Israeli state. Therefore, it seems quite 
natural that water in Israel is managed by the Water 
Commission which is part of the Ministry of Agriculture. 
Brooks (1993,p.36/37) stresses water policy is subordinate 
to an agricultural policy which can be best seen in their 
pricing policy. In Israel farmers only pay$ 0.16 per cubic 
metre whereas domestic users have to pay $ 0.40 per cubic 
metre. However, it is a well-known fact that water used for 
industrial production generates more profit than the same 
amount of water used to grow Jaffa oranges (Beaumont, 1989, 
p.104). There is now a growing awareness in Israel of the 
financial costs and environmental impact of over-exploiting 
the limited water resources (Blair,1995,p.10). However, 
Wolf (1993b,p.14) stresses that moving water away from 
the agricultural sector into the industrial sector would 
undoubtedly clash with national ideologies. 
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Table 3.3 Uses of fresh water in Israel (Millions of cubic 
metres) 
Agriculture 1,450 (71%) 
Thereof: 
Fresh 1,300 
Saline 150 
Domestic and Municipal 500 (24%) 
Industry 100 ( 4%) 
Thereof: 
Fresh 70 
Saline 30 
Total 2,050 
Source: Brooks,D.B. (1993),p.36. 
Braverman (1994,p.34) makes clear that it is necessary 
to improve the water situation through improved waste water 
management, but also stresses that this is not a 
satisfactory solution. He points out that there are only two 
solutions to guarantee Israel's water need for the next 
century: "to import water or opt for the massive 
desalination of sea water." 
In Jordan the situation is similar. In 1990 more than 
two-thirds of the water was used for irrigation. By the year 
2000 Jordan's main water consumer is going to be irrigation 
with 700 MCMjyear, followed by the municipal sector with 400 
MCMjyear (see Table 3.4). 
Jordan has intensively developed its agricultural 
sector. The reason for this, according to Salameh 
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(1992,p.69), is that the agricultural sector was seen as a 
medium to create jobs for Jordanians and refugees with 
relatively inexpensive investment and, therefore, avoid 
poverty and hunger which could lead to social unrest in the 
country. 
However, as in Israel the limits for agricultural 
development are being reached in Jordan. Industry wants its 
share of water. Like in Israel, one option is to take away 
water from the agricultural sector through reducing the area 
under irrigation (Kemp,1995,p.8). The other options that 
Kemp sees for Jordan would be to desalinate water or to 
import it from other countries. 
Table 3.4 Water use for different sectors in Jordan 
(MCM/year) 
Year 
Sector 1:988 1990 1995 2000 
Municipal 164 180 255 340 
Irrigation 535 550 700 720 
Industrial 34 37 45 60 
2005 
400 
745 
85 
Total 733 767 1,000 1,120 1,230 
Source: Al-Mubarak,R. (1993),p.128. 
To meet their water demands in future both Israel and 
Jordan need to cut down their agricultural sector and divert 
the water into the industrial and domestic sector. 
Furthermore, all water resources available need to be used 
and as much as possible must be recycled. Waste water 
management will become of high importance for dealing with 
the water shortage. Two key solutions mentioned for Israel 
and Jordan are desalination and water importation, both of 
which are mega projects. 
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3.3 WATER RESOURCES IN THE ARAVA 
Although the Arava Valley only receives rainfall of 
less than 50 mm/year (see chapter 2), occasional floods 
occur in the Wadi. The peak of water being discharged in 
such a flood, down the Wadi Arava towards the Dead Sea, 
could be more than 21 cubic metres per second (Stern,1986,-
Atlas of the Negev,p.73). Such an event might happen less 
than twice a year but could last more than 26 hours (Stern, 
1986,Atlas of the Negev,p.72). These floods are sometimes so 
strong that the road from Eilat to Jerusalem through the 
Arava Valley may be impassable for hours or even for a day. 
These flooqs come mainly from the Negev and the Edom 
Hills. As Figure 3.1 illustrates the water catchment area of 
the Arava Valley includes nearly the entire Negev and Edom 
Hills. 
However, part of the flood water percolates through the 
alluvial fans into the groundwater. Then the water flow is 
divided between the water basin of the Red Sea and the Dead 
Sea 
well 
(Tsur,1992,p.196). The watershed for the surface, as 
as the sub- surface water, is approximately near 
Gharandel (see Figure 3. 1) . Yet the question of how much 
groundwater there is available in the Arava has not been 
answered. Tsur (1992,p.196) claims that an evaluation of 
the water resources in the Arava Valley is not possible 
because there is not a proper network of hydrological 
observation stations. According to a researcher in Sde 
Boquer, data from the Jordanian side would be necessary as 
the water catchment area of the Arava Valley extends to the 
east side as well as to the west (see Figure 3.1). 
Investigations done by the Jordanians in 1974 suggests 
that the groundwater in the north of the Valley is of better 
quality and higher quantity than that to the south of the 
Arava. It is assumed that the reasons for this lies in the 
Figure 3.1 Water catchment area of the Arava Valley 
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the higher rainfall in the north and because of the 
permeability of the bedrock which is also higher in the 
north. As the rock outcrops in the south are mainly 
granitic, there is little percolation by surface floodwaters 
and most is lost by evaporation. 
Tsur (1989,p.l96/197) identified three water resources 
in the Arava. Firstly the alluvial aquifers. Secondly, the 
limestone aquifers which are situated in the northwest of 
the Arava. Here the water is stored in limestone rocks and 
forms a semi-fossil aquifer which extends westwards under 
the Central Negev. Because of its high salinity (4,000-
6, 000 TDS) this water can only be used for industrial 
purposes. In this case it is largely used for industrial 
purposes in the Dead Sea Works. Finally there is the Nubian 
sandstone aquifer which consists of brackish-fossil water 
extending from the Sinai through Negev down to the Arava 
Valley. Its salinity is between 2000 and 4000 TDS. 
Unfortunately, data about the extent or the exact 
location of the aquifers are not readily available and this 
would require further investigations. However, Tsur (1989, 
p.l97) is of the opinion that the Nubian sandstone aquifer 
provides the only potential for the agricultural and 
industrial development of the Arava Valley. Another 
important area might be the water resources east of the Dead 
Sea. According to Salameh (1992,p.75) "only 8% of the water 
resources of the eastern slopes overlooking the Dead Sea 
are used". 
3.4 WATER DISTRIBUTION AND DEMAND IN THE ARAVA VALLEY 
Unlike the rest of Israel the Arava Valley is not 
connected with the National Water Carrier as its remote 
location would increase construction costs and because it 
is so thinly populated. 
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The Jewish and Jordanian settlements in the Arava 
depend on their local water resources. The water for 
irrigation is also pumped locally. Present data about the 
water demand in the Arava Valley was not available for 
either the Israeli or the Jordanian sides. When asking 
farmers about the availabilty of water in the Arava Valley 
the answer was: "Enough!" Water data are probably amongst 
the best kept secrets in the Middle East. 
However, looking at the water consumed in the Israeli 
part of the Arava in 1976/77, approximately 50% of the water 
was used for industry, 40% for agriculture and 10% for 
domestic use (Survey of Israel, Atlas of Israel,1985,p.36). 
According to these figures industry is the main water 
consumer in the Arava Valley and not, as in the country as 
a whole, agriculture. 
As tourism has increased in Eilat over the last decades 
it can be assumed that the domestic use is higher than 10%. 
When asking how much water the tourism industry in Eilat 
needs, I was several times given the number of 400 cubic 
metres per room/per year, which includes water for the 
swimming-pool, cleaning,etc. The amount of water used by one 
hotel room a year is thus the equivalent of the amount of 
water which was available in 1990 per capita in Israel (see 
Table 3.1). Assuming the number of hotel rooms is at present 
5000 (see chapter 4) this would be 200,000 cubic metres a 
year. Compared to Israel's cotton plantations which are very 
important to the Kibbutzim Industry, and consume some 200 
million cubic metre of waterper year (Israeli Economist, 
1990,p.7) this seems to be negligible. Unfortunately, 
comparable information about the Jordanian side was not 
available at all. 
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Even if the total amount of water used in the Arava is 
unknown, as well as the amount of water available, water in 
the Arava Valley seems to be a problem. The brochure for the 
Casablanca summit, published by the Government of Israel 
(1994), remarks that Eilat and Aqaba are both towns 
suffering from water shortage for domestic use. They further 
stress that the demand for high quality water will increase 
with further expansion of the tourist sector. The amount of 
water available in the Arava seems to be unknown; what is 
known is that the demand for water will increase in the 
future. 
3.5 PROSPECTS FOR CO-OPERATION 
As illustrated above, the Arava Valley presents a 
hydrogeological unit. The amount of water available in the 
Arava Valley can only be assessed with data from both sides. 
Therefore, the answer to whether future demands can be met 
can only be given jointly by Jordan and Israel. The two 
countries, whether they want to or not, share the same 
hydrogeological system in the Arava. With the signing of the 
peace treaty this fact was officially recognised by both 
sides. Furthermore, the framework for co-operation over 
water matters was set down. 
In Article 6 of the peace treaty (Jordan Media Group, 
1994) the two parties agree to search for ways to alleviate 
water shortages and to co-operate in the following fields: 
development of existing and new water resources; increasing 
the water availability, including through co-operation on a 
regional basis; minimizing wastage of water resoures; 
prevention of contamination of water resources; mutual 
assistance in the alleviation of water shortages; transfer 
of information and joint research and development in water-
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related subjects; review of the potentials for enhancement 
of water reources development and use. 
What has been agreed about the Wadi Arava itself so far 
only concerns the use of wells by the Israelis cultivating 
land in Jordanian territory. The wells are under Jordanian 
sovereignty but the Israelis are still allowed to use them 
for the next 20 years. Israel may increase the abstraction 
rate from well sand systems in Jordan by up to 10 million 
cubic metres a year, providing it does not harm existing 
Jordanian usage. 
With the signing of the peace treaty the prospects for 
water co-operation in the Arava Valley can be described as 
having a promising future. Projects for co-operation were 
already brought forward at the Casablanca summit in October 
1994. The Israelis proposed several projects concerning the 
Arava Valley (see Table 3.5). One proposal is to investigate 
the water resources in the Arava Valley to determine the 
underground water potential of flood water and its effect on 
underground water in the Arava Valley. This data would 
enable the Israelis and Jordanians to utilize the flood 
water which mostly ends up in the Dead Sea. The estimated 
cost for this project would be $100 million. 
The Govern; iment of Israel proposes to investigate the 
deep fossil aquifers in the Arava which are underutilised at 
present because of difficulties with their extraction and 
their quality. The Government of Israel has proposed the 
joint regional development of the water resources around the 
Dead Sea which would cost about $ 150 million. 
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Table 3.5 Projects suggested by the Government of Israel 
for the Arava Valley region and the Middle East 
Costs 
PROJECTS SUGGESTED 1994 -2004 
( $) 
Regional monitoring of hydrological 
activities 
(entire Middle East) 
Utilization of flood water along the Arava - 110 million 
joint management.and development of the 
basin 
Utilization of one-time deep aquifers in the 5 million 
Arava 
Joint developm~nt of water resources around 152 million 
the Dead Sea 
Pumping effluent for agricultural purposes 80 million 
in the Aqaba area 
Desalination of seawater in Aqaba/Eilat 150 million 
' 
Transportation of water between countries - sao million 
transporting it from Turkey 
Rain enhancment in the Arava Valley 
TOTAL INVESTMENT UNTIL 2004 997 million 
Source: Information after Government of Israel (1994). 
On top of this agenda is the desalination of seawater 
which, as yet, does not play an important role for either 
country's water supply. The reason for this is that the 
energy needed for d~salination is too expensive, making it 
economically uneconomic. At the moment desalination is only 
important in the Gulf States where energy is cheap. As 
desalination takes enormous quantities of energy it is not 
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surprising that 60% of the world's desalination is located 
in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (Brooks,1993,p.37). Yet 
desalination seems to be becoming more necessary and common 
place with capacity increasing both in the Middle East and 
the US over the last decade (see Table 3.6). In the Gulf 
States 70% of the sweet water is provided by desalination 
(Feuileharde,1994,p.33). 
Table 3.6 The development of world desalination capacity 
(capacities in 1000's cubic metres per day) 
1968 1977 1985 
Middle East 314 1,822 3,785 
U.S.A 234 645 1,135 
Rest of the world 565 1,241 1,892 
TOTAL 1,113 3,708 6,812 
Source: Agnew, C'. (1992), p .17 8. 
Desalination costs range from $3 to $15 per cubic 
metre of water, but experts hope that improved technology 
could cut this to between $1.5 and $2 (Feuileharde,1994, 
p.33). Braverman (1994,p.36) even mentions the figure of 
$0.70 per cubic meter by the year 2000 and believes that 
major research and development could reduce the cost even 
more. This point of view is shared by Agnew (1990,p.184) but 
he stresses that water from desalination plants would only 
be for potable supply outside of the oil producing states. 
Urban and industrial water consumers are more able than 
farmers to pay a higher price for desalinated water 
(Beaumont,1985,p.20). 
Despite these costs the Israeli Government (1994) 
believes that desalination is the only possibility for 
meeting the future water demand of Aqaba and Eilat, with 
regard to the expected increase in tourism (see chapter 7). 
El-Sadek (1992,p.162) 
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takes the same point of view. He remarked that "the strong 
growth of tourism activities along the coastal areas of the 
Red Sea and the Gulf of Aqaba, accompanied by improved 
standards of living of the local population, makes desalting 
groundwater and seawater necessary to satisfy water needs". 
The costs for the joint desalination plant are estimated to 
be $150 million. 
Another project suggested by the Israelis in the Arava 
Valley is rain enhancement, with an estimated cost of $10 
million. Several rain-enhancement 
successfully practiced in various 
techniques are now 
parts of the world. 
Furthermore, two mega-projects are under consideration which 
have been favoured by many people over the last few decades. 
One is the Mediterranean-Dead Sea project and the other is 
the Red Sea-Dead Sea canal. 
The idea of the Mediterranean-Dead Sea canal goes back 
to 1902 when Herzl, based on the ideas of the engineer Max 
Bruckert,saw the possibility of generating·electricity by 
dropping water to the Dead Sea (Harrosh,1992,p.20). With the 
peace process the idea received new impetus. The project 
would need the co-operation of Israel's neighbour Jordan, as 
it would affect the Dead Sea level and, therefore, Jordan's 
potash works and evaporation ponds. Harrosh ( 1992, p. 22) 
sees the Mediterraneai\-Dead Sea Project as "a touchstone for 
the relationship and co-operation between the State of 
Israel and its neighbours". He argues that an integrated 
desalination plant could provide potable water and provide 
jobs for thousands of people. It would also enable the 
Israelis to settle the desert and use the energy and water 
produced by the canal. Finally, the development of 
agriculture and tourism in the region could be tremendously 
extended. However, such a project is seriously questioned by 
others such as Brooks ( 1993, p. 3 7) on economic and 
environmental grounds. 
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The other canal project suggested is the Red Sea-Dead 
Sea canal. Fishelson and Glueckstern (1992) suggested it as 
it "is a true binational project between Israel and Jordan". 
They believe that the canal would not only raise the level 
of the Dead Sea, it would also provide desalinated water and 
electricity. 
Feasibility studies for such a canal in the Arava 
Valley were undertaken by the Jordanians in 1978. The 
suggested route at that time would have been completely in 
Jordanian territory. A smiliar study was undertaken by the 
Israelis for their side. 
The project suggested by Fishel son and Glueckstern 
(1992) would cross the border and run on the Israeli and 
Jordanian side, with the optimal route being chosen through 
transboundary co-operation. However, the most important and 
promising benefits of the Canal Project seen by Glueckstern 
(1992,p.12) "is the desalination of sea water on a large 
scale for the Dead Sea area and southern Arava region". 
The Jordanian proposals presented in their brochure for 
the Casablanca summit are not generally orientated towards 
transboundary co-operation. However, the Jordanians are 
clearly interested in transboundary co-operation in water 
matters. According to an E.I.U report (1995-1996, p.19) 
"water has been seen as a strong motivation behind Jordan's 
enthusiasm for the Arab- Israel peace process" as without a 
settlement in the water matter, Jordan will have growing 
shortages of potable water. This is because it "lacks the 
capital for ambitious investment, either in desalination 
plants or in transporting water to Jordan from rivers beyond 
its frontiers". 
In their prochure for the Casablanca Summit the 
Jordanians, like the Israelis suggest a Red Sea-Dead Sea 
canal to keep the Dead Sea level at its present level. 
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Estimated costs for this project are $3000 millions. 
Furthermore, the Jordanians make clear that they would 
like to develop the area south of the Dead Sea, the so-
called Southern Ghors. At the present this area depends on 
the base flows of the wadis, in particular the Wadi Hasa, 
and on the pump1ng of groundwater. According to the 
Ministry of Planning (1986,p.138) "no further development is 
possible in the area, either agricultural, municipal or 
industrial, without the parallel development of water 
resources". Therefore, the Government (1994; see Fig 3. 7) 
would like to meet the future water demands of tourism 
I 
development of the Dead Sea's east coast by 13 MCM/year. 
Furthermore, they would like to increase the amount of water 
delivered to Amman by 3 MCM/year and supply the Arab Potash 
Company with 14.3 million cubic metres a year. Finally, they 
have already ~6, 000 dunums of land which requires 
irrigation, and would like to develop another 21,000 dunums. 
Table 3.7 Projects proposed by the Jordanians 
Project outline COSTS in $ 
Development of the Water resources south 
of the Dead Sea for further development unknown 
Increase water delivered to Amman by 3 MCM unknown 
Supply the Arav~ Potash Company with 14.3 unknown 
MCM/year 
Meet water demands for present and future 23 million 
irrigation projects in the Arava Valley 
with 9 MCM/year 
Red Sea-Dead Sea Canal 3000 million 
Source: infor.m~tion after Ministry of Planning, 1994. 
The second important project mentioned by the 
Government of Joidan (1994) would be the irrigation of the 
Wadi Arava which was already mentioned in the Five Year 
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Figure 3 . 2 Small darn on the Israeli side to store runoff 
water so that it can percolate into the 
groundwater 
Photograph taken in March 1994 
Furthermore, water quality could also be jointly 
controlled. Wastewater may not be a problem as yet, but with 
the increase of industry and tourism it may soon become so. 
Brooks (1993,p . 35) pointed out that "much of the region's 
(Middle East)water is polluted by industrial and 
agricultural wastes, and in some cases by human sewage " . For 
example, in the neighbourhood of the Ar a va Valley, in the 
Jordan Valley (Jordanian side) the per hectare use of 
pesticides and fertilizer is the highest in the world . "The 
water in the King Talal reservoir in Jordan i s so heavily 
loaded with organic material that , in most years, i t is 
unsuitable for agricultural use " (Brooks , l993 , p . 38) . 
Although industrial contamination of surface and groundwater 
is not a danger so far i n the Arava Valley precautions for 
the future need to be taken . Therefore , treatment plants for 
wastewater should be erected along the Arava which should 
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be planned and used jointly by both sides. 
The water network could be connected across the 
boundary in the Arava Valley, thus integrating regional 
supply for water in the Arava Valley. Ktiffern (1993,p.33) 
raised the idea that the water supply network should be 
connected across national borders in the Middle East. He 
gives the example of Lesotho and South Africa where a 
treaty between the two countries allowed the construction of 
the Lesotho Highlands Water Transfer despite the fact that 
there were serious conflicts between them. This would also 
have the advantage (Ktiffner,p.33) that an "internationally 
connected large distribution systems would be less 
vulnerable to interruptions through hostile actions and 
natural disaster than large-scale water transfer schemes". 
Also, additonal water could be fed into the network. This 
would underline the need for joint water quality control, 
and a redesign of the trunk and distribution lines. An 
internationally connected distribution system could be 
started in the Arava Valley which could become a model for 
the whole Middle East. 
The Arava Valley as a region clearly needs its own 
regional water management. Water demand should be met as far 
as possible by resources from within the Arava and its 
region. One possibility to achieve this would be the solar 
desalination plants on a regional scale suggested by Issar 
(1982,p.24/25). He thinks of using water whose salinity is 
just above the threshold where it can be used without 
treatment for agriculture, by mixing it with distilled water 
from solar distillations. He believes that the application 
of solar distillation thus appears promising in the Arava 
and along the Dead Sea coast where the special climatic 
conditions are ideal. Issar calculates that such water would 
have a marginal benefit value of $1 per cubic meter of water 
for winter vegetables. One major water source which could 
be tapped is the 'large underground aquifers rich with saline 
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water. So far these are not greatly used, but with proper 
treatment this source could be used on a vast scale 
(Issar,1982,p.33). 
The projects mentioned above give an idea of what may 
be possible in the Arava Region. Apart from the two big 
projects, desalination plants and Red Sea-Dead-Sea Canal, 
there are many smaller projects to start transboundary co-
operation. However, the basis for everything would be to 
start a water commission with its seat in Aqaba/Eilat which 
would be in charge of the common water resources and their 
planning. Furthermore, a research unit could be established 
in the Arava Valley with Israeli and Jordanian scientists to 
explore the resources. Transboundary co-operation over water 
resources should start in the Arava Valley where the water 
is located, and with the people whose lives depend on it 
being involved. It should not be undertaken solely by a 
government department in Amman. 
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Chapter 4 
AGRICULTURE 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
The conditions for agriculture in the Arava Valley are 
not optimal. Extreme maximum and minimum temperatures, 
rainfall of less than 50 mm/year, limited ground-water 
resources of high salinity and relatively poor soils (see 
chapters 2 and 3), provide every conceivable obstacle~ for 
cultivating land. One might even say that the Arava is 
hostile to man and his livelihood. 
Despite all these obstacles the Arava was cultivated in 
the past. Remnants of ancient settlements, used by farming 
societies, extend from the Middle Bronze (2100 -1900 BC) to 
Roman-Byzantine times (Evenari,1959, p.231). 
There are also impressive water and irrigation networks 
and chain well systems to be found in the Wadi Arava 
(Khouri,1981,p.21). These chain well systems found on both 
the West and East sides of the Valley are witness to the 
agricultural past and to the innovation of man. According to 
Hillel (1982,p.177), "their importance derives from the fact 
that the oases they served were situated on the highroad 
linking the Red Sea port of Elat, via the Negev, with the 
populated regions to the north and northwest". 
Of all the chain well systems in the Negev, those in 
the Arava Valley, at Yotvata, Ein Evrona and Ein Zureib, are 
the most intricate in construction (Hillel,1982,p.174; 
Evenari,1959,p.223). 
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The chain well system described by Evenari ( 1959, 
pp. 223ff) belongs to the "Horizontal" type, known as a 
quanat (see Fig 4. 1) . These quanats are "long, nearly 
horizontal underground tunnels designed to tap the 
groundwater at some higher elevation and lead it to the 
outlet in the valley" (Hillel, 1982, p.174; see fig 4.1). 
Quanats are believed to have been invented by the Persians 
about 3000 years ago (Barrow,1987,p.248). 
Figure 4.1 cross section of quanat 
Water-intake 
source: Barrow,c. (1987),p.248. 
In the past the Negev had periods when it was not 
settled. Archaeological evidence suggests that from the 6th 
to the 3rd century BC, for example, there were no 
settlements in the reg ion. Only with the start of the 
Nabatean-Roman-Byzantine time at the end of the 3rd century 
did the~egev flourish again, with permanent settlements. 
During the next centuries the settlement of the Negev 
changed depending on the political situation. When the Negev 
fell into the hands of the Arabs between 637 and 641 AD, 
most settlers abandoned their homes. As Evenari wrote, for 
the next 1300 years the Bedouin became the masters of the 
Negev (Evenari,1972,p.27). 
With the decline of the ancient cultures the 
Arava lost all significance. The agricultural past of the 
Valley fell into oblivion, and over the last centuries the 
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Arava Valley was only inhabited by bedouins and nomads. 
With the foundation of the Israeli State, agricultural 
developments in the Arava received a new impetus. Travelling 
through the Arava nowadays green islands in the desert catch 
the eye of the observer. Agriculture in the Wadi Arava has 
been revived. 
Although the conditions for agriculture are virtually 
the same on the Israeli and Jordanian sides of the valley, 
agriculture developed differently on each side. The reasons 
for this lay in the political and social systems. There are 
three main variations to be noticed: contrasting stages of 
agricultural development; the different type of agricultural 
settlement; and the different products and marketing. The 
following chapter is designed to elaborate these differences 
and their implications for future co-operation. 
4.2. THE DEVELOPMENT OF AGRICULTURAL SETTLEMENT IN THE 
ARAVA SINCE THE 1950's 
The agricultural development in the Wadi Arava was 
started by the Israelis in the late 1950's, with the first 
steps undertaken to establish agricultural settlements. The 
Jordanians did not make settlement efforts until the 
beginning of the 1980's. 
4.2.1 The case of Israel 
The settling of the Arava Valley was initiated for two 
reasons. The major reason for the Israelis to settle the 
Arava was geopolitical. The distribution of population and 
rural settlements along frontiers is seen as being of major 
national importance to protect Israel's borders and 
territory. Therefore, the development of the Arava was seen 
as a barrier against Jordanian expansion, and above all 
illegal infiltration (Hochman,1985,p.259; R&D,1990,p.1}. As 
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a consequence great effort was put into the development of 
the Arava Valley. Planners, scientists and farmers worked in 
co-operation from the very beginning to fullfil this aim 
(R&D,1990,p.1). 
The other reason for settling the Arava lies in the 
ideology of the foundation of the Israeli state. 
"Agriculture was the focus of ideological interest in the 
pre-state period; the goal of recreating a Jewish working 
class and reclaiming the Land of Israel from the desert both 
dominated and was manifested in the establishment of 
kibbutzim" (Rivlin,1992,p.76). 
At the start there were only pre-settlements 
established to control the area. The nature of these 
settlements were semi-military and therefore farming was 
only secondary. The first civilian settlement to be founded 
was in the 1950's, (Stern,1986,Atlas of the Negev,p.18) in 
the Arava Valley was Kibbutz Elot which started as a 
fisherman's collective on the shores of the Red Sea. Others 
were founded the following years such as En Yahav (1959) and 
Yotvata (1957) . After the first successes in producing 
winter vegetables in the salty soil of En Yahav and Neot 
Hakkikar, plans were made to establish more settlements in 
the Arava (Hochman,1985,p.261). Thus in the 1960's several 
Moshavim and Kibbutzim were established (see Stern, 
1986,p.18) such as Hazeva and Gerofit, and more settlements 
were established after 1973 (see Fig 4. 2) . The following 
years proved the possibility of agriculture, and more effort 
was put into its development. The last thirty years have 
seen a constant growth of agriculture in the Arava. 
Hochman (1985,pp.267ff) identified four stages of 
Figure 4.2 Rural settlements in the Arava Valley 
established before and after 1973 
Source: After Dover,S (1985), p.152. 
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development: firstly the preliminary search when suitable 
technologies had to be found. It is marked by the 
establishment of pre-settlements in the 1950's and at the 
beginning of the 1960's. The second stage from 1969-1973 was 
a period of consolidation, when Yotvata and En Yahav became 
settlement centres and drip irrigation was applied 
successfully. The third period from 1973 to 1979/1980 was a 
phase of rapid expansion: infrastructure was built and new 
settlements were established (see Fig 4. 2) . By this time 
arid zone agricultural technology had developed far, and 
was exported to countries such as Morocco and Spain. The 
last stage mentioned by Hochman is the period of stagnation 
in the 1980's caused by the increasing competition with 
other regions and the general agricultural crisis in the 
1980's. 
In the late 1980's the income of farmers fell because 
of the fall in international prices of seed products, such 
as maize and cotton, and as a result of the green revolution 
in South-east Asia. "Those countries reduced their imports, 
causing international prices to fall by up to one-third in 
the late 1980's and early 1990's" (Rivlin,1992,p.78). 
Regarding the 1990's, a fifth period could be 
identified: new innovations and highly developed agro-
technology enables the Arava to compete with other regions. 
Reasons for this and the know-how involved will be discussed 
later. This stage is an outcome of 30 years effort and 
innovation of man. 
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4.2.2 The case of Jordan 
The agricultural development on the Jordanian side 
of the Arava went very differently. In contrast to the 
attention paid by the Israelis in the Arava, the Jordanian 
side did rather badly, remaining almost untouched until 
1976. For the Jordanians the development of the Jordan River 
Valley was of greater national importance than the 
development of the Southern Ghors and the Arava following 
the 1967 war, as the Jordan Valley provided greater 
opportunities. The Southern Ghors is the area south of the 
Dead Sea around the town of Safi. 
The declaration of the Arava as a Jordanian military 
zone and its remote location from the rest of the country 
did not encourage the development of the isolated area. 
Also, the hostile environment did not help the establishment 
of settlements. The inhabitants of the Wadi Arava fell 
victim to malaria attacks well into the late 1960's, and 
lacked a paved road until the end of the 1970's 
(Khouri,198l,p.216). The Wadi Arava was cut off from the 
rest of the country, and even nowadays is one of the most 
remote regions in Jordan. It is still necessary to obtain 
special permission from the military to visit the area. 
In the Southern Ghors, south of the Dead Sea, the 
situation was slightly different. There, the tomato farmers 
took advantage of higher rainfall and better conditons to 
produce the earliest harvest in the country. Whereas "the 
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nomadic bedouins of Wadi Arava scraped a bare living from 
the earth by tending to their herds of goats, sheeps and 
camels" (Khouri,1981,p.216). Only when the Jordan Valley 
Authority (JVA) started to be interested in the Wadi Arava 
were the first hydrogeological investigations undertaken in 
1977. As a next step small development schemes were set up 
in Rhama, Arisha and Ummitla at the beginning of the 1980's. 
These settlements were selected because of their location 
along the main road from Aqaba to the Dead Sea, their 
availability of ground water, and their availability of 
agricultural land. The aim of the settlements is to improve 
the standard of living of the bedouins in the Wadi Arava. In 
his socio-economic study of the Wadi Arava Dajani 
(1979,pp.16ff) described the living as basic and people as 
being extremely poor; farmers in the Arava Valley belong to 
the poorest of the country. 
Applying the stages of development identified for the 
Israeli side by Hochman (1985) to the Jordanian side two 
stages can be identified: in 1976 premliminary research was 
undertaken, and at the beginning of the 1980's the first 
attempts were made to establish settlements. The second 
stage is the consolidation process which the Arava projects 
are undergoing q.t the present. Further settlements are 
planned to be built between now and 1997. At the end of the 
century 20,000 nomads will be settled in the Arava Valley. 
The development of the Arava settlements differs on 
each side in the following ways, the settlements on the 
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Israeli side were established for different reasons, while 
the development on the Jordanian side is twenty years behind 
the Israeli side. 
4.3 TYPE OF AGRICULTURAL SETTLEMENT IN THE ARAVA 
Israel and Jordan support different types of 
agricultural settlement in the Arava, which need some 
comment with regard to future prospects for co-operation. 
There are three types of settlements to be found in the 
Arava; two types are found on the Israeli side, the Kibbutz 
and Moshav. The Kibbutzim are located largely in the south 
of the Arava and the Moshavim in the north (see Fig 4.3). On 
the Jordanian side there are the third type, the recently 
established Arabic settlements. 
4.3.1 Kibbutz 
Israeli rural settlements such as the Kibbutz are 
established by the Department of Rural Settlement which is 
part of the Jewish Agency. "The lands of the kibbutz and the 
moshav are nationally owned, any sale or alienation being 
publicly controlled" (Weintraub,1969,p.283). To obtain 
public funding and land, these co-operatives are liable to 
certain rules. One of the most important rules is that, in 
theory at least, no hired labour is allowed. 
Figure 4.3 IDistribution of settlements in the Arava Valley 
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-79-
The ideological background of both Kibbutzim and 
Moshavim are tha~ agriculture is seen as the essential part 
of their economy. This, according to Rivlin (1992,p.76) has 
changed in recent years as more and more Kibbutzim have been 
I 
industrializing.' 
The kibbutz is a collective settlement within a 
democratic framework where the emphasis lies on the social 
and economic component, so that production and consumption 
are collective. ~lso, decisions are taken collectively in an 
assembly which is the highest authority in a Kibbutz. 
Managing bodies and office holders are elected from this 
general assembly. The general assembly is the highest 
authority on socfal and municipal issues, issues concerning 
the village and its residents, investment plans and of all 
other kinds. 
Another interesting aspect is the roots of the 
establishment of either Kibbutz or Moshav. The initial group 
of founders of a new co-operative settlement is called the 
nucleus. In most cases a nucleus is formed by the graduates 
of a Zionist youth movement in Israel. After the nucleus has 
been formed, the group joins the army. Whilst doing their 
military service they will spend time in a Kibbutz to be 
trained in agriculture and experience Kibbutz life. After 
military service the nucleus is allocated an area of land on 
which to pioneer a new settlement. 
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The founders of Kibbutzim or Moshaviam were farmers 
with a powerful ideological background and these forms of 
settlement proved to be ideal in difficult and dangerous 
places, especially along Israel's borders. They were 
therefore instrumental in settling the Arava Valley in a way 
no other settlement type could have been. 
4.3.2 Moshav 
In contrast to the Kibbutz, the Moshav is a co-
operative settlement of small-holders. The individual farmer 
co-operates with other farmers of his/her settlement in most 
service activities, as well as social and economic aspects, 
especially marketing. The rules for public funding mentioned 
above also apply to the Moshav. Moshavim usually adopt the 
self -labour principal, but this principal is not always 
applied. Guest workers from Thailand are today seen on the 
Moshav fields because, compared to Israeli workers, they are 
much cheaper and are willing to do the hard work on the 
fields. The workers from Thailand have temporary working 
permission for about five years. Although there is a high 
demand by the farmers for more guest workers, the government 
is not willing to give more work permits because of the high 
unemployement rate in Israel. 
Other characteristics of the Moshav are quite similar 
to the Kibbutz. There is, for example, a universal voting 
right in the general meeting and participation in the 
village institutions is granted to every family member who 
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lives and works in the Moshav and is older than 18 years. 
Completely equal rights are formally granted to both men and 
women, regarding both membership and implied rights and 
duties. 
4.3.3. ARAB SETTLEMENTS 
Similar ideological reasons for the establishment of 
Arab settlements do not exist. The actual ini tati ve to 
establish settlements came from the Jordan Valley Authority 
because it saw the necessity to improve living conditions of 
the bedouin population of the Arava. Therefore, settlements 
and infrastructure were built, with land distributed to the 
bedouin. Although most of them do not have a farming 
background, according to unofficial sources at the Jordanian 
Ministry of Water and Irrigation, there was a fairly 
positive response. 
Farming is done individually, however share-cropping as 
it is practiced in the Jordan Valley (Aresvik,1976,p.257), 
is also common practice in the Wadi Arava. Share-cropping 
means that the farmer provides the labour and the landlord 
the equipment and the land. At the end of the year the land-
owner receives two-third of the revenue and the farmer one-
third. Apparently, 80% of the land in the Safi area is owned 
by a small number of absent landlords, and the vast majority 
of the farmers are sharecroppers (Dajani, 1979,p.14). The 
marketing of the products is done either by the landlord or 
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his agent. In general, the farmer depends on the land owner 
and as Dajani (1979,p.l6) remarked, they cannot seek 
alternative services. 
The Jordanian agricultural sector is characterised by 
a low rate of landowner participation, a rise in the ratio 
of non-resident landlords and an increasing dependency on 
non-Jordanian labour (Ministry of Planning, 1985,p.535). 
This, it can be assumed, also applies to the Arava Valley. 
On the Jordanian side there is an agricultural system 
fairly typical of the Arab World, this is in stark contrast 
to the Israeli side. The type of agriculturual settlements 
in the Arava Valley could not be more different, 
ideologically and socially they are the complete opposite. 
Looking at the prospects for future co-operation, the 
democratic as well as the ideological component of the 
Israeli settlements has to be taken into account. The two 
kinds of settlements on the Israeli side are undoubtedly 
distinct from the Arab settlements, and direct inter-
settlement collaboration in whatever form, may prove very 
difficult. On the other hand, the necessity for settlement-
to-settlement activities is unlikely to be crucial to Arava 
Valley co-operation. 
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4.4 AGRICULTURE IN THE ARAVA 
Whilst conditons for agriculture are not optimal, 
Israelis settle in the Arava and live quite well on 
agriculture. Therefore there must be some advantages which 
make this type of farming attractive. Amiran (1993, p.109) 
suggested the main reasons is the Arava's mild climate in 
winter which enables out-of-season farming. Farmers do not 
have to compete for land with other potential users such as 
industry. Another advantage is the remote and isolated 
location of the Arava which leads to less plant and animal 
diseases. If these advantages are combined with technical 
know-how, and great effort is made in undertaking research 
to solve problems in an arid environment, the Arava can be 
successfully used for agriculture (Richmond,1985; Schechter, 
1985; Amiran,1993). 
Richmond (1985,p.170) suggested further research into 
the selection and improvement of new plant crops that 
tolerate drought and saline water; new biotechnologies for 
growing plants and aquatic animals ; expanded utilization of 
brackish ground water; and the wider use of drip irrigation. 
Many of the points mentioned above are already pursued on 
the Israeli side. 
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4.4.1. Agricultural products 
The products to be found in the Arava are drip 
irrigated with brackish water, because fresh water is not 
available on either side. The soils used for cultivation in 
the greenhouses on the Israeli side are partly from sand 
dunes in the area. This modern intensive agriculture on sand 
dune soil has been developed in recent years in Israel. As 
it requires considerable capital investment it is only 
economically feasible when compensatory crops with a high 
market value are produced, such as off-season crops that can 
be exported (Tsoar,l985,p.l95). 
A wide range of agriculturual products are to be found 
on the Israeli side of the Arava: paprica, pepper, melons, 
tomatoes and aubergine (see Fig 4.4) which have all been 
bred especially for the conditons in the Arava. They are 
mainly produced for the domestic market and for export to 
the European Union countries. As the vegetables are grown in 
the winter season, they have the advantage that they are 
grown for the out-of-season in Europe. 
Other Israeli exports are cut flower and pot plants 
(see Fig 4.4). There are also fruits such as dates, mangoes 
and grapes which are again sold for the out-of-season 
market. Another key feature of the Arava Valley are the 
dairy farms which are concentrated in the Kibbutzim of the 
South. Dairy products from Yotvata, which has its own dairy 
processing plant, are famous throughout Israel (Neffe, 
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1988,p.115). 
Altogether, an amazing range of agricultural products 
can be found in the Arava which provide a surprisingly high 
income. The total income of the Moshavim in the Arava Valley 
during 1993 was, according to a Moshavim farmer, about $24 
millions. 
Hardly any information was available for the Jordanian 
side about the present products of their farms, but they are 
thought to include grains, animal feed and vegetables. 
Apparently, the1 bedouins only produce for their own 
personal use and for their livestock. 
The situation in Ghor Safi, south of the Dead Sea, is 
I 
slightly differe~t. There the main product are tomatoes and 
other vegetables: which are sold on the market in Amman or 
Karak. 
' Looking at 'the Jordanian side the agriculture in the 
Wadi Arava is negligible. Compared to the wide range of 
products and export-orientated agriculture on the Israeli 
side, the Jordanian range is very limited. 
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Figure 4 . 4 Agricultural products of the Arava Valley 
(Israeli side ) 
Grapes 
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Melons 
Date plantation 
Source: Photographs taken in March 1994 
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4.4.2 Special products 
The special activities and products described in this 
section are only to be found in Israel. 
Fish farming (see Fig 4. 5) is a rather remarkable 
activity for the Arava. Fish need warm water and sun to 
grow fast, and have been especially bred to cope with high 
salinity. The Arava Valley with its higl} radiation, high 
temperature and ; availability of geothermal water is well 
suited to fish culture. Currently there is only one fish 
farm, in En Yahav, which cultivates a special breed of fish 
in controlled growth tanks (see fig 4.5). As the equipment 
is quite expensive and a certain expertise is necessary, the 
introduction of further fish farms is limited. 
Ornamental fish (see fig 4.5) are another interesting 
fish variety bred for sale. Reasonable investments with 
relatively little labour can yield high profits. Typically 
fish are sold for $1, which makes it a financially 
attractive busin~ss. 
Another modern product in the Arava is algae culture in 
closed systems. Seen in Schechter (1985,p.304) and Richmond 
{1981,61ff) as a
1 
future project, it is now a reality. In 
1987 research started to introduce algae into the Arava 
{Cohen,1987,p.2), initiated by biochemists. Biotechnology is 
concerned with utilization of biological processes, 
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Figure 4.5 Fish farming in the Arava Valley (Israeli side) 
Tanks with ornamental fish 
Source: Photographs taken in March 1994 
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biological systems or living organism for agricultural and 
industrial purposes. For example, a yellow pigment used as 
pro-vitamin A, ~hich is extracted from an algae from the 
Dead Sea, currently sells for over $ 1000 per kg (R&D, 
1990) Dried and;pressed into tablets, they are sold in us-
health food shops (Neffe,1988,p.115). Algae can also be 
' 
utilized in other ways: it can be incorporated as a protein 
supplement in other food; and can be mixed into animal 
feed (Schechter,1985,p.304). 
4.4.3 MARKETING 
The marketing of these products is an important issue. 
Without proper marketing the best products can remain 
unsold. On the Jordanian side the products are mainly for 
the local markets, so marketing seems to be less important. 
However, author~ such as Taquieddin (1986,p.120) realise 
that to improve Jordan's performance, "farmers should be 
advised of crop~ing patterns and production methods which 
are consistent with an overall marketing policy for domestic 
and export markets". He suggests that advice should be given 
on quality standards and optimal timing, especially for the 
profitable European export markets. Furthermore, new crops 
and varieties which are in demand in export markets should 
be introduced. 
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The Israelis have established a quality and marketing 
center, and are ~able to compete in export markets. All the 
products are chapnelled through the marketing center, from 
where they are sent to their final destination. When leaving 
Israel they have already been sold on the market. All the 
exports are sent from the Lod airport near Tel-Aviv because 
the local airport (Eilat) is not suitable for cargo planes. 
As old market ~ethods are seen as being inefficent, new 
methods are tested. The Arava marketing center is constantly 
looking for new.markets and new products to improve their 
market position. To compete with the Mediterranean countries 
they constantly have to develop new products. However, this 
seems to be threatened as budgets for research and 
development are being cut in Israel (Rivlin,l992,p.78). 
Having mild winters is no longer enough to compete on the 
world market. Marketing is just another example of how 
efficent the Israelis are in managing the Arava. 
4.5 PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE CO-OPERATION 
The Government of Israel (1994) suggested several joint 
projects concerning agriculture. These include border passes 
for those involved in farming, with trade networks being 
established which could supply services to farmers, such as 
packaging centres for agricultural exports. 
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Israel and Jordan could also work together on plant 
protection. According to Garfinkle ( 1990, p. 63) they have 
already done so, 'claiming that emergency measures have been 
co-ordinated in ~he past in respons to plagues of locusts 
and mosquitos in the Arava Valley. 
The Governm$nt of Israel (1994) also suggested that the 
parties could jointly breed livestock and crops adapted to 
regional conditions. Another important opportunity might be 
the aquaculture sector, as described earlier on. In the case 
of the Arava Valley this would be particularly interesting 
in respect of the revenue which could be expected. At the 
moment only 100 tons of fish are caught in the Gulf of 
Aqaba; another 50 tons in Jordan's rivers, while a total of 
1650 tons is imported each year by Jordan. There is no doubt 
that there is a huge potential market for fish bred in water 
tanks. According: to Aresvik (1976,p.209) the demand for 
fresh, chilled, or frozen fish is expected to increase in 
Jordan in the coming years. The Israelis suggested a jointly 
operated R&D Center for marine aquacul tural development 
which could take advantage of an existing agriculture 
development center for aquaculture in Eilat, which is 
situated along the IsraelijJordanian border. 
As can be seen, there are many suggestions by the 
Israelis. However, are they all realistic ? In sectors such 
as plant and livestock breeding, as well as marine 
agriculture, the Israelis are world leaders. In the past the 
Israelis exported their agricultural developments indirectly 
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to Jordan through the West Bank. Are the Jordanians capable 
of becoming an' equal partner for joint developments? 
According to the Ministry of Planning (1994) the agricutural 
sector suffers from low levels of marketing efficency, and 
inadequacy of activities geared to research in developing 
agricultural pro~uction. 
In the short-term I cannot see any realistic prospects 
for co-operation~because the differences in the agricultural 
organisation, the range of products, and the market 
orientations are too significant to be overcome without 
great efforts from both sides. Undoubtedly the Israelis 
could provide the know-how to improve Jordanian agriculture 
in the Arava Valley. Theoretically this would be possible, 
providing the Istaelis give their knowledge for free and the 
pride of the Jordanians would allow them to accept. After 
talking to officials at the Office for Regional Development 
in Beer Sheba it is my belief that the Israelis are not too 
willing to give ~heir knowledge for freei they would rather 
let the Jordanians pay for it. 
However, there are many common problems in the Arava 
Valley, which could be addressed together. Unfortunately the 
Israelis have already found the answer to many of them. 
Because of the ~igh salinity of the water special plants 
need to be bred. iThis is constantly done by the Israelis in 
the Arava Valley and as illustrated above, is very 
successful (see Fig 4.4). Their production is export-
orientated as the production costs in the Arava are high due 
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to the water and the greenhouses which are expensive to buy. 
The advanced nature of Israel's agriculture in the Arava is 
well illustrated by their solution to the problems of their 
greenhouses. Storms in winter cause damage and because of 
the high salinity of the water, rust is a problem. This has 
been solved by developing a new type of greenhouse which is 
kept up by air, like a ballon. Another type of greenhouse 
which has been developed is for closed system agriculture 
(Gale,198l,pp.8lff) Here, solar energy is stored during the 
day and released at night. The system has several 
advantages: extremes of temperature during the day and night 
would be prevented arid the cost of energy for heating and 
cooling would be much reduced, giving optimal growing 
conditions throughout the year. Furthermore there would be 
no wind damage to the plants and no sand abrasion, with easy 
control of pests and disease. These greenhouses are already 
used on the Israeli side, and are one reason for the success 
of agriculture in such a harsh environment. 
Jordanian and Israeli scientists could work hand in 
hand to solve the commmon problems which agriculture faces 
in the Arava in the future. Furthermore, the Jordanians 
could use the Israeli marketing system to improve their 
network. An agricultural school could be established where 
farmers from both side could be trained jointly. Their 
mutual problems could be discussed and views exchanged. 
To integrate the agriculture of both sides is going to 
be a great challenge which can only be judged in the long-
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term. Co-operation concerning agriculture has to be seen as 
a small plant which needs great care and time to grow. 
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Chapter 5 
TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Both sides of the Arava Valley are far away from the 
core areas of their respective countries. The distance from 
Amman to Aqaba is approximately 280 km as the crow flies, 
Eilat to Jerusalem is approximately the same distance, and 
from Eilat to Beer-Sheba it is about 200 km. The area is 
also thinly populated (see chapter 2) . Therefore, the 
investment per person spent on transportation is high 
compared to the rest of the country. For example, the road 
from Eilat to Jerusalem along the Arava Valley needs to be 
repaired regula~ly because of the floods. The same applies 
to the Jordanian side. 
However, the population needs a transportation 
infrastructure for economic activities such as agriculture, 
tourism and industry. There are many possibilities as to the 
type of transportation which might be provided. There are 
airports, ports, roads and railways. The type of 
infrastructure provided undoubtedly depends on the density 
of population, economic activity and the money available for 
investment. 
So far there are three types of transportation to be 
found in the Arava Valley: ports, airports and roads. 
Because of the political situation both sides developed 
their transporation network independently. A link between 
the two networks did not exist. 
With the opening of the crossing point between Aqaba and 
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Eilat on the Bth; of August 1994 by the Israeli prime 
minister, Yitzhak Rabin, and Crown Prince Hassan of Jordan, 
the first direct link between Israel and Jordan was 
established. Unt;il then, there was only an indirect link, 
the Allenby Bridge north of the Dead Sea, which connects 
Israel through the West Bank with Jordan. But in the Arava 
Valley itself no road connected the two countries, and no 
ship crossed from Aqaba to Eilat or vice versa; an east-west 
connection did nbt exist at all. 
In the pasti during a number of historical periods, the 
Negev desert and:the Arava Valley served as a passageway for 
international tr~ffic. As Gradus (1977,p.29) remarked "the 
location of Israel on the eastern shores of the 
Mediterranean Sea, bordering at once the continents of 
Europe, Asia and,Africa, puts it in a geographically unique 
position." Because of this, the Negev served over and over 
again as a land ~ridge. 
In ancient times, when Solomon (970-930 BC) developed 
the copper mines north of Eilat,he also constructed the port 
of Etzion Geber bn the Red Sea, from which he traded with 
Africa, Arabia apd even India (Evenari,1971,p.17). At this 
time a route from Eilat through the Arava ran to Jerusalem 
to the center of his kingdom; the city of Eilat was the key 
port for his kingdom. 
Another important time was the flourishing period 
beginning at the :end of the Jrd century BC with the Nabatean 
Roman-Byzantine ~ra, when the main road from Arabia Felix to 
I 
Gaza went over Petra and crossed the Arava Valley (fig 5.1). 
At that time, as today, changing political situations in the 
region influence~ the decision as to which trade route had 
to be taken. With the rise of the Romans in the region the 
caravan highways declined because the Romans developed a new 
trade route in 'order to weaken the Nabateans ( Evenari, 
1971,p.21). Good9 were then transported to the Egyptian 
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coast, from there by land to the Nile, and then by boat to 
Alexandria. 
Figure 5.1 The Nabatean trade routes 
100 200 lOO t.OO 500 SOOllm 
w w w 
0 50 "OOkm 
Source: Evenari,M. (1971), p.19. 
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From Alexandria the goods could take their final destination 
to Rome. 
Eilat became important again when the land-route to the 
Far East was closed because of continuous war with the 
Persians (260-240 AD) . During the Byzantine period (3rd-6th 
centuries) Eilat once again functioned as a gateway to East 
Africa and the Far East, but fell into disuse from the 
period of the Crusades (11th century) until recent times. 
As can be seen, the importance of the Arava Valley as 
part of the east-west trade route strongly depended on the 
political situation in the region; its fortunes changed from 
one century to the next. 
With the peace process in the Middle East the role of 
the Arava and its transportation infrastructure might again 
play an important role in linking east and west. Instead of 
camels, lorries might in future cross the Arava Valley from 
east to west and vice-versa. 
Looking at the transportation infrastructure of the 
Arava Valley today, one side of the Arava seems to be a 
mirror image of the other. Roads run parallel to the border 
on each side and there are airports in Eilat and Aqaba only 
a few kilometres away from each other. However, 46 years of 
independent development marked the transportation 
infrastructure on each side, which have been designed for 
local and national needs, and their integration into an 
international system will be a difficult task. 
5.2 ROAD TRANSPORTATION IN THE ARAVA 
As described in chapter 2 until the 1950's the Arava 
Valley was only inhabited by bedouins. There were no 
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permanent settlements, except Aqaba. Therefore, roads did 
not seem to be necessary. The roads existing until the 
1950's ran along the Arava Valley in a north-south direction 
and there were also some east-west connections. The roads 
were all unpaved and could only be used with desert 
vehicles. 
The establishment of the boundary between Israel and 
Jordan has put many roads out of use and new roads had to be 
build to replace them (Orni,197l,p.353), especially in the 
north. In the Arava itself only the road running along the 
coast from Aqaba ·to Eilat and the few desert tracks were put 
out of use. 
With the development of settlements and increasing 
economic activity over the last forty years, it became 
necessary to build the appropriate transportation 
infrastructure for goods and people. Today there are 
sufficent roads on both sides. 
5.2.1 The Jordanian side 
The Jordanian side of the Arava Valley lacked a paved 
road until the late 1960's (Khouri,1981,p.216). The reason 
for this was, undoubtedly, that there was no economic 
activity on the Jordanian side until then. As only bedouins 
lived there the cost of building a motorway would not have 
been justified. Only when the Arab Potash Company decided to 
open a factory in Safi did a highway need to be built to 
guarantee the transport facilites for the exports of Potash 
through Aqaba. So in 1977 a two-lane paved rnotorway linking 
Safi with Aqaba was built; the Potash Plant started 
operation in 1982/1983. Today the route is mainly used by 
the Potash company, the military and occasionally by a few 
tourists travell~ng through the Arava to the Dead Sea or 
from the Dead Sea to Aqaba. 
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The main traffic junction is Aqaba where all the 
Jordanian routes end. It is the terminus of the Iraqi-Aqaba 
highway and the road from Safi. The number of cars and 
trucks going to and from Aqaba Port (see Table 5 .1), is 
causing severe congestion problems. 
Table 5.1 Total number of trucks per year to and from Aqaba 
port, 1985-1991 
No. of 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
trucks in 
thousands 
To the 185 200 270 242 181 174 
port (1) 
From the 219 222 248 236 208 188 
port 
Total 405 423 519 477 389 362 
(1) 1nclud1ng phosphate to the fert1l1zer plant. 
Source: Delegation of the Commission of the European 
Community (1993),p.3/13. 
1991 
130 
172 
302 
Until the embargo against Iraq, most of Iraqi goods 
during the war with Iran were transported by a joint 
Jordanian- Iraqi Company from Aqaba Port. Only with the 
embargo against Iraq in 1989 did the number of trucks 
through Aqaba decrease significantly. During the Iran-Iraq 
war the Israelis apparently once complained about the clouds 
of dust that the trucks were causing. In 1991 only 302,000 
trucks, compared to 477,000 in 1988, went to Aqaba port. 
Even with this smaller number of trucks passing through the 
small coastal corridor the pollution from the traffic, 
especially from exhaust gases, is still significant. 
The traffic pollution in Aqaba because of heavy traffic 
led to the construction of a backroad a few years ago 
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This backroad has already been damaged by the heavy trucks 
us i ng the road, and the f l oods descending from the 
surrounding mountains . 
Because of its industry and the fact that Aqaba port 1s 
the on l y outlet that Jordan has to the sea , Aqaba has to 
handle heavy traffic . As the coasta l strip is very narrow , 
t here is only very limited space available for building new 
roads or to use alternative routes (see Fi g 5 . 2) . The 
backroad had to be carv ed into the rock of the surrounding 
mountains . The road from Aqaba to Saudi Arabia has to run 
along the coast parallel to the beach (see Fig 5.3), hemmed 
to the west by the sea and to the east by the mountains (see 
Fig5.2) . 
Figure 5 . 2 Aqaba and it s costal str ip 
Pho t ograph t a ke n in March 1994 
Figure 5.3 Spatial distribution of the infrastructure in Aqaba 
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5.2.2 The Israeli side 
On the Israeli side the development of the 
transportation infrastructure has been mainly influenced by 
political rather than economic factors. The roads in the 
Arava Valley were build for national security reasons and to 
enable the establishment of the settlements (see chapter 4) . 
The southern half of the Eilat-Jerusalem road in the Arava 
Valley was build between 1948-1957 (Stern,1985,Atlas of the 
Negev) because the first Kibbutzim were built in the south. 
In the period 1958-1974 the road to Timna, the northern half 
of the road in the Arava Valley and the roads along the Dead 
Sea were built. The roads along the Dead Sea were built to 
serve the Potash Company. Today the road along the Arava 
serves as a corridor to the Dead Sea and Jerusalem, and for 
the Potash Company to transport its products to the port of 
Eilat. 
Eilat is, like Aqaba, a traffic junction. The roads 
from Beer-Sheba and Jerusalem end there, and all the traffic 
to the port which is situated south of the town, has to go 
through it (see Fig 5.4). According to Feitelson 
(1991,p.362) the traffic to the port causes considerable 
safety problems because the road severs the city from the 
north shore resort area and the beach. 
5.2.3 Summary and prospects for future co-operation 
The road network on both sides is well developed and 
they both have similar problems. The roads along the Arava 
are mainly used for transit from the Red Sea to the north or 
vice-versa. Their use for local transport is negligible as 
the Arava Valley is thinly populated.The traffic in Eilat 
and Aqaba causes pollution and noise. 
What are the prospects for co-operation? Following the 
Figure 5.4 Spatial distribution of the infrastructure in Eilat 
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peace the structure of the road network has to change 
completely if it is to fulfill new and different tasks. 
Firstly, it needs to be designed for the forthcoming 
transborder traffic. Secondly, the east-west connections 
need to be linked with the existing road network on each 
side. 
At the Casablanca summit in 1994 the Government of 
Israel proposed links between Egypt, Israel and Jordan. The 
suggested international road would go from Cairo over Suez 
to Eilat, then to Aqaba and lead on to Saudi Arabia (see Fig 
5. 5) . Another route suggested is an east-west connection 
south of the Dead Sea (see Fig 5.5). It would go from the 
north Sinai through the Negev to Safi and Karak; connecting 
the nothern parts of the three adjacent countries. 
Furthermore, the Israeli road along the Arava Valley would 
be upgraded to serve as an international road (see Fig 5.5). 
The function of the Arava Valley as a land bridge would be 
restored. 
The Jordanian proposals at the Casablanca summit were 
not orientated towards transboundary co-operation. The 
Ministry of Planning ( 1994) would like to upgrade the 
existing backroad in Aqaba. It also suggested to upgrade the 
road leading from Maan to Aqaba to a highway, also the road 
leading along the coast to Saudi-Arabia, and the road to the 
Aqaba airport. 
In ancient times camels were used as a medium of 
transport, not cars, which cause pollution. The question to 
be asked is: Can the existing roads cope with the increasing 
traffic until the new ones are built, and are international 
roads compatible with the environment and the tourism in the 
region? Also, could Aqaba and Eilat cope with more traffic 
and is there enough space to build bypasses? 
In the short-term the road network offers the 
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possiblity of linking the countries without a great deal of 
money, with the remote borderlands of the Arava becoming a 
land bridge between east and west again. The Arava would 
become a transit valley, but it has to be questioned however 
whether this is desirable. 
There is no doubt that something needs to be done to 
connect the two road networks. East-west connections could 
be created by building local, rather than international 
roads. The increase of traffic should not be encouraged by 
building international highways. There are other more 
environmentally friendly solutions which are more compatible 
with tourism, such as building railways. 
The planning of the future road network needs to be 
undertaken jointly by planners from both sides. The present 
traffic should be investigated and future estimations need 
to be done before any decisions are taken. The future of 
tourism might depend on this decision. A tourist town with 
traffic jams and air pollution does not appeal very much. 
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Figure 5.5 Peace roads network 
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5.3 AIR TRANSPORTATION 
5.3.1 Eilat Airport 
Eilat's airport is situated in the middle of the town 
next to the tourist area (see Fig 5.4). The departure and 
landing of aeroplanes is visible and audible from the hotel 
area, as weli as from the beach. As the airfield is very 
small and only small aeroplanes can use it, all exports from 
the Moshavim and Kibbutzim have to go to Lodz near Tel Aviv, 
also tourists from abroad going to Eilat have to stop at 
Ben-Gurion. There they have to change to smaller aeroplanes, 
used by the state-owned airline company "ARKIA" to serve the 
domestic routes. 
The number of passengers arriving at Eilat airport in 
1990 was approximately 42,000, which was nearly equivalent 
to the number of departures of 46,314. In 1991 there was a 
significant decrease of arrivals and departures at Eilat 
airport because of the outbreak of the Gulf War. The 
following year the number of passengers arriving and 
departing increased significantly. In 1993 69,054 passengers 
arrived in Eilat airport and 69,096 departed, (see table 
5.2) which is higher than the number in 1990. 
Table 5.2 Passengers arriving and departing at Eilat 
airport 1975-1993 
1993 1991 1990 1985 
Arriving 69,054 16,610 42,572 40,555 
Departing 69,096 13,842 46,314 37,904 
Source: Statistical Yearbook 1994, Jerusalem. 
1975 
554 
387 
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Eilat's airport capacity is very limited. As tourist 
numbers are expected to increase constantly in the near 
future, it will become exhausted. Therefore, the "Airport 
Authority" decided in 1989 to build a new airport 11km north 
of Eilat (Federal Statistical Office,p.93). This has been 
approved by the governement, but has not been started as 
yet. 
5.3.2 Aqaba Airport 
Aqaba Airport is the second largest airport in Jordan. 
It has a capacity of one million passengers a year. Besides 
the airport in Amman it is the only international airport in 
the country. With only 4,500 arrivals and 18,000 departures 
in 1992 (Statistical Yearbook 1992) the airport does not 
seem to work to full capacity. However, as the numbers given 
above only include the number of arrivals and departures 
entering of leaving the country from the airport, the actual 
number of people using the airport for inland flights is 
unknown. The fact that the Aqaba-Amman route is subsidized 
by the state (Federal Statistical Office,1992,p.77) might 
give the idea that the Aqaba Airport is underutilized, and 
even if the actual number of passengers is higher, this is 
still probably the case. 
5.3.3 Prospects for future co-operation 
Instead of building a new airport north of Eilat the 
Israelis could use Aqaba Airport, which has enough spare 
capacity, and which the Jordanians plan to upgrade in the 
near future. In this case both sides would gain. Aqaba 
Airport would no longer to be subsidized, and Israel could 
save by not building a new one. Furthermore the Israelis 
could export their goods from Aqaba and tourists could fly 
directly to Eilat's holiday resort. 
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Should this not be sufficent in future the Jordanians and 
Israelis could build a joint airport in the Arava as the 
Israelis suggest in their brochure for the Casablanca summit 
(Government of Israel, 1994). This joint airport, adjacent 
to the existing Aqaba airfields could have many faces. There 
could be a common terminal between the two countries with 
one exit to Isr.ael and one to Jordan. A similar airport 
exists in Mulhou~e (near Basel), where the airport is built 
along the bound!ary; passengers travelling to Germany or 
France use seperate exits, and passengers to Switzerland use 
the exit for the Swiss side. Another possibilty would be two 
terminals connected by an international passage. There could 
be joint air control and co-ordination, and a common runway. 
The variety of. the model for the joint airport seems 
endless. 
The project suggested by the Isreli Government bears an 
encouraging message for transboundary co-operation, but 
because of the costs and planning involved it seems to be 
rather unrealistic. Smaller projects can be seen as the 
foundation for bigger projects, such as the joint airport. 
5.4 RAIL TRANSPORTATION 
5.4.1 Present and past plans 
At present there lS no railway in the Arava 
itself. There is only a stretch of railway in Aqaba, where 
the Amman-Aqaba railway ends, which is only used for the 
transportation of Phosphate from Wadi Hasa and Shidiya (see 
Fig. 5.6). The nearest railway to the Arava Valley on the 
Israeli side is ~he Oron-Dimona (see Fig 5.6), which is also 
used for the transportation of Phosphate. 
There have been plans on both sides, to build a railway 
in the Arava, but due to the high building costs and that it 
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would have been underutilized, they were never realized. 
5.4.2 Prospects for future co-operation 
The future of the Arava Valley in terms of railways 
depends on the transboundary co-operation of its adjacent 
neighbours which was already recognized more than 20 years 
ago. Then Prime Minister Meir proposed the joint 
construction and ownership of a railroad from the Dead Sea 
area to the Eilat/Aqaba terminus on the Red Sea in a meeting 
between her and King Hussein (Garfinkle,1991,p.72). 
The railway in the Arava Valley is only feasible if the 
Suez-Nakhl-Eilat-Aqaba railway is built, because heavy cargo 
could then be transported over the Sinai by train which is 
cheaper than road or sea transport (Tal, 19 8 8, p. 8) . This 
railway could also be used by tourists and Egyptians 
travelling to Israel or Jordan, and solve the road traffic 
problem for Aqaba and Eilat, providing that there were also 
facilities to transport cars by rail. 
In the proposals made by the Government of Israel 
(1994), the Ministry of Planning (1994), and the proposal 
made by Tal (1988,p.l2) to link Safi with the existing Oron-
Dimona railway is reflected (see Fig 5. 6) . This would 
connect Safi and Sedom with the Mediterranean ports by rail. 
Jordan could export its goods to the west through one of the 
Mediterranean ports, rather than through Aqaba and the Suez 
Canal. Also, Israel could use rail instead of road which is 
faster and probably more economic than using the windy and 
steep road from Sedom over Hazeva to Oron/Dimona. Another 
suggestion made by the Government of Israel is to build a 
railway line from Hazeva to Eilat, and to connect Aqaba via 
Eilat with the Israeli system. This would bring great 
opportunities to the region. Potash, Phosphate and other 
heavy goods could be transported by rail to one of the ports 
at the Red Sea, or to one of the Mediterranean ports. 
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Figure 5.6 Proposed regional rail network 
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This would diminish air pollution caused by road traffic. 
Furthermore, the rail-link could be used by tourists 
travelling from Jordan to Israel; there is no doubt that 
desert railways have always fascinated travellers. If the 
railway is connected with Egypt through the Sinai and Saudi-
Arabia, not only tourist but also the people in the region 
would profit from it. Travelling times from Jordan to Egypt 
through Eilat and the Sinai could be shortened by hours. 
5.5. PORTS 
Aqaba's port and Eilat's port are situated less than 6 
km from each other, port activities on the other side being 
observed without using binoculars. Despite their common 
geographical loG:ation at the head of the Red Sea, they 
differ in characteristics and importance for their 
respective countries. 
5.5.1 Development of the ports since 1950's 
5.5.1.1 Eilat's port 
Eilat's po~t, Israel's only outlet to the Red Sea, is 
situated south of the city (see Fig 5.4). With the changing 
political situation in the region its importance has changed 
constantly over ·the last last 40 years. It was only after 
the Sinai Campaign in 1957 that the port was opened. Until 
then, shipping lanes to Eilat were blocked by Egypt at the 
Straits of Tiran. In 1965 the port was inaugurated because 
the economic relationship between Israel and countries in 
Eilat' s foreland, Asia, Australia, and East Africa were 
increasing (Feit,elson,1991,p.358). After Egypt blocked the 
Straits of Tiran again in 1967, war broke out. The outcome 
of it was the cl9sure of the Suez Canal to all shipping; the 
Egyptians had sunk ships to block the Suez Canal. As a 
result a land br~dge connecting Eilat with the 
Figure 5.7 Freight loaded and unloaded in Aqaba,Eilat, Haifa and 
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Mediterranean Sea was established in December 1969. In 
addition, an oil. pipeline was built to Ashkelon. Until the 
end of the 1970's Eilat used to be Israel's main oil 
harbour; 
pipeline 
it was connected with Haifa and Ashkelon by 
(Lapid,oth,1982,p.48). However, in 1979 when 
Khomeini refused to sell oil to Israel, Eilat lost its 
importance as an oil harbour. 
Another factor which destabilised the position of 
Eilat was the re-opening of the Suez Canal after 1973 as a 
consequence of the Israeli-Egyptian peace accord. For the 
first time Eilat was in competition with Haifa and Ashdod, 
"This competiticm and the dramatic reduction in trade 
between Israel and Iran following the fall of the Shah of 
Iran in 1979 reduced the demand for Eilat's port services" 
(Feitelson,199l,p.358). The cargo traffic through Eilat's 
port decreased from over 1.2 million tons in 1979 to less 
less than a million tons by 1983. In 1991 it had the same 
amount as in 1983 (see Fig 5.7). As Lapidoth (1982,p.48) 
remarked, "instead of unloading at Eilat, many ships have 
preferred to pass through the Suez Canal and unload at the 
Mediterranean ports of Ashdod of Haifa, which are much 
nearer to the center of the country and its industrial 
areas". Compared with Ashdod and Haifa the quantity of 
freight loaded a~d unloaded at Eilat seem to be negligible, 
and compared to Aqaba it is even insignificant (see Fig 
50 7) 
Looking at Potash and Phosphate export through Eilat 
Port, a similar picture can be seen. Exports through Eilat 
Port are far smaller than that through Aqaba. The fact that 
just 200 vessels called at Eilat in 1992 (see Fig 5. 8) 
confirms the impression that the port is underutilized. 
Without being subsidized by the state it would already have 
been closed. 
Figure 5.8 Number of ships calling at Aqaba,Eilat,Haifa and Ashdod -
1990, 1991 and 1993 
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follows: the port is a major threat to Eilat's coral reef in 
the south (see Fig 5.4); it is located between the hotel 
area (the town's economic base) in the north of Eilat and 
the coral reef (the region's major natural resource 
attraction) ; the road leading to the port through Eilat 
causes safety problems; and it occupies a considerable 
amount of Israel's 11 km long Red Sea waterfront. 
Eilat's port only flourished when the Suez Canal was 
closed and the Negev was used as a land bridge. The present 
port activites are negligible, with the port somewhat 
inhibiting the tourism industry. Taking everything together 
it seems to be reasonable that local planners would like the 
port to disappear. Therefore, a proposal has been made to 
build a new port at Israel's north shore of the Gulf of 
Aqaba/Eilat (see Fig 5.9). The project has not been realised 
so far as the costs are too high and the port might threaten 
the expansion of the existing hotel resort on the north 
shore. 
5.5.1.2 Aqaba's port 
Aqaba's port lS Jordan's only outlet to the sea. It 
was built in the 1950's partly because Jordan could not use 
Ashdod and Haifa, situated on the Mediterranean Sea, for its 
freight anymore. Before 1950 most of the freight went 
through these ports or Beirut. Beirut offered many 
advantages compared to Aqaba: firstly it is nearer to Amman, 
and secondly the freight rates to Europe were cheaper. For 
these reasons at the beginning of the 1950's Aqaba was not 
an ideal alternative to Beirut (Drysdale,1984,p.91). 
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Figure 5.9 Location of the Northern Port including proposed 
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With the closure of the Syrian border, Beirut could 
not be used anymore, therefore Aqaba became of great 
importance to Jordan. In the 1970's Aqaba experienced 
explosive growth for a number of reasons .. In the 1970's 
political problems arose in Lebanon and syria with the 
overland route to Beirut being cut-off, with Aqaba becoming 
Jordan's only outlet to the sea. Another impetus came in the 
1980's when the route through Aqaba became one of Iraq's few 
lifelines to the outside world during the war with Iran 
(Chapin,1991p.157; Mostyn,1982,p.10}. By 1981 some 62% of 
incoming shipments were destined for Iraq. By 1982 Aqaba 
even had one of the biggest container ports in the Middle 
East (Mostyn,1982,p.10}. The route to Iraq through Aqaba 
increased over the following years and reached a peak in 
1988 (see Table 5. 3) . With the embargo against Iraq the 
transit decreased significantly. In 1992 only 1.96 million 
tons compared to 4.46 million tons in 1988, went to Iraq 
(see Table 5.3). The amount of freights loaded and unloaded 
of tons at Aqaba port decreased constantly from 1990 to 1994 
(see fig 5.6). 
Table 5.3 Imported and Exported Volumes through Aqaba Port, 
1985-1992 (in million tons). 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Exports 8.18 9.70 11.27 10.95 9.99 8.87 7.68 7.36 
Imports: 6.37 7.15 8.74 9.14 8.69 6.16 5.55 6.02 
To Jordan 2.36 2.69 2.80 2.21 2.53 2.93 4.02 3.92 
Transit 4.01 4.46 5.94 6.93 6.16 3.23 1. 52 1. 96 
to Iraq 
Source: statistical Yearbook 1992 of the Hashemite Kingdom 
of Jordan, and data presented in the report of the 
Delegation of the European Community. 
-124-
Another important factor for the expansion of Aqaba 
port is the Phosphate and Potash exports, with more than 
half of the goods exported through Aqaba port being 
Phosphates (see Table 5.4). 
Another important port activity is the Aqaba-Nuweiba 
ferry which was established in 1985. In 1992 more than 1.2 
million people arrived and departed at Aqaba port (see Fig 
5.9), with the number of people using this service 
increasing steadily since then. Most of the people using the 
ferry are Egyptian guest workers travelling to Jordan or 
home to Egypt. "The service has cut transit time between Al 
Aqabah and Cairo in half, to about nine hours" (Metz, 1991, 
p.157). 
Table 5.4 Major kinds of exported goods through Aqaba Port 
during 1988-1992 (in million tons) . 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Total 10.95 9.99 8.87 7.68 7.36 
Thereof: 
Fertilizers 0.60 0.57 0.67 0.66 0.55 
Phosphates 5.81 6.41 4.87 4.25 4.26 
Potash 1.29 1.24 1.39 1.27 1.23 
Transit to 2.92 1.15 0.35 0.04 0.04 
other 
countries 
Jordanian 0.30 0.48 1.46 1.39 1.14 
Goods 
Source: Statistical Yearbook 1992 of the Hashemite Kingdom 
of Jordan. 
Aqaba's present importance for Jordan is as an outcome 
of the political situation in the Middle East. Drysdale 
(1986/87,p.91) remarked that "if Aqaba had competed freely 
with Beirut, and the northern overland route had been more 
reliable, the new port might never have flourished". The 
main goods exported through its facilities are Phosphate and 
Figure 5 .10 Numbers of passengers arriving and departing at Aqaba port 
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Potash, but as the amount carried to Iraq is decreasing 
steadily in the 1990's, the port has spare capacity. 
5.5.2 Summary and prospects for future co-operation. 
Looking at the present situation of the two ports, both 
Eilat and Aqaba have spare capacity. Therefore, as Gradus 
(1994,p.316) suggested, Jordan could use Eilat's port 
facilities, which would give the port new impetus. On the 
other hand it has to be seen that Eilat could buy services 
from Aqaba port. It could be argued that Aqaba is more 
orientated towards port activities than Eilat, and therefore 
has the better facilities. Also, with the Iraq embargo 
capacity is available in Aqaba, with the Jordanians 
intending to expand the port facilities in the near future 
(Ministry of Planning, 1994). In that case Eilat port could 
be closed down and the area be used for tourism. This 
would, in the short-term, be the cheapest possiblity and 
both sides would benefit. Eilat would also solve its traffic 
problems with its port. As already mentioned above, planners 
in Eilat would prefer the port to disappear completely. 
Another possibility is a joint Aqaba/Eilat Port 11 km 
north (see Fig 5.8) of Eilat, which was suggested by Raz 
(1989,pp.327ff) and the Government of Israel (1994), having 
the following advantages: it would provide a location for 
a coal-fuel water-cooled power plant, which would offer the 
possiblility to desalinate water, which could then be used 
for aquaculture (see agriculture chapter) ; Aqaba and Eilat 
could reach their potential for tourism; and future oil-
spills could be limited to the harbour area. But as already 
mentioned, the port might interfere with the expansion of 
the hotel resort on the north shore. 
An Aqaba/Eilat port would provide the opportunity for 
developing a land bridge from the Far East to Europe as an 
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alternative to the Suez Canal, which would give an economic 
impetus to the region. However, this might not happen for 
the following reasons: the Negev land bridge established 
after the closure of the Suez Canal did not survive the 
1970's. Gradus (1977,p.31/32) gave several reasons for 
this, of which two still might apply today. Firstly, by 
using larger ships and tankers to round Africa, the costs 
for the longer distance were adjusted. Secondly, the mixed 
sea-land-sea route discouraged many shippers. Above all, it 
has to be taken into account that Aqaba and Eilat ports 
might have to compete with the northern overland route 
again, or even Beirut port. 
Instead of expanding the present port facilities, they 
could be changed into tourism facilities. Yacht harbours 
could be built and the waterfront could be confined to 
tourism. Furthermore, repair facilities for yachts could be 
established. According to Israeli sources, there are no 
repair facilites available for yachts in Eilat and only 
limited facilites in Aqaba. The future of both ports seems 
to be uncertain as far as their role as commercial harbours 
is concerned, and only transboundary co-operation will 
guarantee their survival, or at least one of them. 
5.6 THE FUTURE OF THE TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE 
ARAVA VALLEY 
There is common agreement that economic development is a 
condition for long-lasting peace in the Middle East. There 
is also no doubt that the economic development in the region 
depends on a well developed transportation infrastructure 
which allows goods and people to move from one country to 
the other without any problems. As Tal (1989) remarked:" The 
existence and development of a transportation infrastructure 
is an obvious precondition for the development of bilateral 
and ... multilateral co-operation. 
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Furthermore, the transportation infrastructure required for 
regional co-operation in trade, tourism, or joint economic 
and technological ventures is, at the same time, a function 
of the intensity of such relations." 
However, as shown above, the existing transportation 
in the Arava Valley is sufficent for the local and national 
needs, 
network 
but in terms of international traffic the road 
needs to be extended and railways need to be 
constructed. 
Previously, many plans have been made independently by 
Jordan and Israel to improve the infrastructure in the Arava 
Valley, but because the costs were too high and the 
political situation unstable they were never realised. 
Following the peace all the joint projects which have been 
suggested now seem to be within reach. The planners of the 
parties involved need to make both short and long-term plans 
which will decide the future of the Arava Valley. 
Undoubtedly, all kinds of conflicts of interest might arise. 
For example, Jordan might say that the joint port brings 
more advantages for Israel, and would prefer to extend its 
own port facilities instead of building a new joint port. 
Furthermore, national interests might interfere with local 
interests. For example, the development of the joint port 
might be of national interest for the whole country but 
might bring less profit to the people in the local area. 
The development of the transportation infrastructure 
through transboundary co-operation in the Arava Valley and 
its adjacent area will be vi tal for the socio-economic 
development of the region. 
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Chapter 6 
INDUSTRY 
6.1 THE ISRAELI AND JORDANIAN ECONOMY COMPARED 
When talking about the prospects of transboundary co-
operation in industry in the Arava Valley it is important 
to consider the economic conditions in the two neighbouring 
countries. 
The Gross 'National Product (GNP) is considered to be 
a good measure to assess the economic performance of an 
economy or to compare it with other economies. With a GNP 
of $13,220 per capita per year (see table 6.1) Israel's 
economy can compare itself with Western European Countries 
such as Spain.· Jordan on the other hand with a GNP of 
$1, 120 ranges far behind Portugal, the poorest European 
Community member, with a GNP of $7,450 per capita. Compared 
to other Middle Eastern countries such as Syria with a GNP 
I 
of $1, 170 Jordan does not look too bad. Its neighbour 
Saudi-Arabia only achieved its high GNP of $6,200 because 
of its oil revenue. Comparing Saudi-Arabia's GNP with 
Israel's, Israel's GNP is double that of Saudi -Arabia 
(Album,1995,p.30). Comparing Israel with Jordan, Israel's 
GNP is more than ten times higher. Israel belongs to the 
countries with a high income1 whereas Jordan finds itself 
at the bottom of the medium income category. 
1 The Worldbank divides countries into three categories 
according to their GNP per capita: 
1. Countries with low income (up to 650 US-$) 
2. Countries with medium income 
a) 6~0 to 2520 US-$ 
b) 2520 to sooo us-s 
3. Countries with high income 
-132-
Table 6.1 GNP per capita of selected countries in 1992 
USA $23,240 SAUDI-ARABIA $ 7,010 
GREAT BRITAIN $17,790 TURKEY $ 1,980 
SPAIN $13,920 SYRIA (1990) $ 1,170 
ISRAEL $13,220 JORDAN $ 1,120 
PORTUGAL $ 7,450 EGYPT $ 
Source: Der Fischer Weltalmanach (1995),pp.31-42. 
Between 1980 and 1992, Jordan's GNP decreased by 5.4 %, 
whereas Israel's increased by 1.9 ~ 0 (Fischer 
Weltalmanach,1995,p.31-36). 
Another i~portant factor to consider when assessing 
the performance of an economy lS to see which sectors 
contribute to the Gross Domestic Product (GOP) or Net 
Domestic Product (NDP) . Looking at the origins of the NDP 
in Israel in 1993 (see Table 6.2) it shows that industry 
with 21.5%, together with the private and public services 
(26.8 %) are the main contributors. These are followed by 
banking with 18.6 %. It is quite remarkable that Israel's 
agriculturual sector only contributes 2. 4 % 
negligible compared to the other sectors. 
which is 
Looking at the Jordanian GOP the main contributor is 
government services, but the second most important 
contributor is the restaurant and hotel sector (see Table 
6.3). Jordan's manufacturing sector only contributes 12.9 
%. Industry contributes significantly to Israel's GOP, 
which is considered to be important for having a strong 
economy. Agriculture plays a more important role for 
Jordan than for Israel. 
640 
-133-
Table 6.2 Origins of the Israeli net domestic product in 
1993 
origins of net domestic product 
% of total 
Agriculture 2.4 
Industry 21.5 
construction 8.9 
Transport, storage & communications 7.6 
Commerce & hotels 11.6 
ownership of qwellings 7.3 
Financial services 18.6 
Public & private services 26.8 
Imputed bank charges & subsidies -4.1 
Total (incl others) 100.0 
Source: E.I.U Country Report Israel 4th quarter 1994,p.4. 
Table 6.3 Origin of the Gross Domestic product in Jordan 
in 1993 
Origin of gro~s domestic product (% of total;current 
prices) 
Agriculture, forestry § fishing 6.3 
Mining & quarrying 2.6 
Manufacturing 12.9 
Electricity & water 1.4 
Construction 12.2 
Wholesale & retail trade, 16.8 
restaurants & hotels 
Transport & communications 13.0 
Financing, real estate & business services 16.0 
Community, social & personal services 2.1 
Government services 17.3 
other services 1.4 
Imputed bank service charge -2.1 
Total 100.0 
source: E.I.U. country Prof1le Jordan 1994-1995,p.15. 
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Whilst looking at the exports and imports of the two 
countries further differences can be noticed. Firstly 
Jordan's exports and imports are of a smaller scale than 
Israel's (see table 6.4 and 6.5). Besides the export of 
chemicals, manufactured goods, potash and phosphate the 
trade in food • and live animals is very important for 
Jordan. 
Table 6.4 Jord~n's principal exports and imports 1993 
Exports ($ millions} Imports($ millions} 
' 
food & live animals 202.1 food & 628.1 
live animals 
phosphates 141.3 crude oil 341.8 
potash 124.2 chemicals 358.8 
chemicals 282.1 manufactured 
goods 731.4 
manufactured goods, machinery & 
machinery & transport 
transport equipment 
equipment 227.4 953.9 
Miscellaneous 
manufactured 
articles 217.6 
Source: after E•.I.U. Country Profile 1994-1995, p. 32. 
Israel's principal export goods are industrial 
products such as machinery and electronics, as well as 
diamonds and chemicals (see Table 6.5 ) . 
Looking at the destination of exports and the main 
origins of imports, further differences can be noticed (see 
Fig 6. 1 and Table 6. 6, 6. 7) . The main export market for 
Israel is the U.S. and the members of the EU 
(Wolffsohn,1987,p.259; Razin,1993,p.177). For Jordan the 
main markets are Middle Eastern Countries such as Saudi-
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Arabia and Ira~, as well as India and other Asian 
countries. For imports both countries have similar 
patterns. For both countries the U.S. and Western European 
countries are ~he main trading partners. 
Table 6.5 Israel's principal exports and imports 1993 
Exports ($ millions) Imports ($ millions) 
Metal, machinery Investment goods 
& electronics 5,080 3,577 
Diamonds (worked) Diamonds (net) 
3,352 
2,990 
Chemical goods 1,871 Consumer 
non-durables 2,258 
Textiles, clothing Fuel 
& leather 932 1,742 
Agricultural goods Consumer durables 
558 1,268 
Food Other production 
543 inputs 9,109 
source: After E.I.U. Country Report Israel 4th quarter 
1994,p.4. 
Table 6.6 Israel's main export destinations and main 
origins of imports 1993 
Main destinations Main origins 
of exports s,_. 0 of total of imports % of total 
U.S.A. 30.9 u.s.A. 17.7 
U.K. Belgium-
5.5 Luxembourg 17.2 
Belgium- Germany 
Luxembourg 5.4 10.4 
Germany 5.3 U.K. 8.6 
Japan 5.2 Switzerland 7.4 
France 3.9 Italy 7.3 
Source: After E.I.U. country Report Israel 4th quarter 
1994,p.4. 
Figure 6.1 Geographical distribution of exports and imports 1994 
ISRAEL 
Expor ts Imports 
Others EFTA Others EFTA America 15% 2% 11% 7% 
America 
35% 
EC Asia 
29% 10% 
Asia EC 
19% 53% 
JORDAN 
Exports Imports 
Others Others 
38% EC Japan 29% 
4% 
0 Arab 
9"/o 
Japan ACM India EC 
2% 19% 33% 
0 Arab 10% ACM 
24% 16% 
Source : Own draft . 
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Table 6.7 Jordan's main export destinations and main 
origins of imports 1993 
Main destinations Main origins 
of exports % of total of imports % of total 
India 9.5 Iraq 12.5 
saudi Arabia 11.6 u.s.A. 12.7 
Iraq 11.2 Germany 8.3 
Indonesia 5.4 Japan 5.0 
U.A.E. 4.4 Italy 5.5 
Russia 3.7 U.K. 5.2 
Source: After E .. r.u. Country Profile Jordan 1994-95, p.32. 
There are two types of industrial companies to be 
found in Jordan: the privately owned ones which produce 
mainly food products, clothing and consumer goods, and are 
mostly located in Amman; and there are large scale 
companies, partly owned by the state, producing chemicals, 
petrochemicals, fertilizers and mineral products. The main 
characteristic of Jordan's industrial sector is that "much 
manufacturing activity is related to exploitation of 
natural resources and to the mining sector" 
(Metz,1991,p.1~7). 
In Israel .the situation is different. Over the last 
decade the importance of electronic exports has increased, 
whereas tradi~ional industries such as textiles have 
decreased (Riviin,1992,p.63). The electronic industry is 
one of the main contributors to the internationalisation of 
the economy (Ri Vlin 1 1992 1 p. 66) 1 "gradUally transforming the 
pattern of the country's exports and is likely to be an 
important factor in future economic growth "(Ozanne,1995, 
p.20). Because of the highly qualified workforce Microsoft, 
IBM and other computer manufacturerers have opened 
factories or research centres in Israel. According to 
Ozanne (1995,p.20) "Israeli electronic companies such as 
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Scitex, Indigo, Lannet, ECI, Telecomm and Elscint are at 
the cutting edge of research and development and are world 
leaders in their field". However, this kind of high-tech 
industry is con8entrated along the Mediterranean Coast and, 
unfortunately, not in the Arava Valley. 
As Hausman (1993,p.52) remarked, "Israel has developed 
a relatively modern industrial sector, with a considerable 
technological capacity, a substantial reliance on capital 
markets and a heavy reliance on exports"; whereas "Jordan 
includes an industrial sector characterized on the whole by 
smaller plants with a lower level of technology and a 
higher degree of family ownership and financing". 
Israel with its high GNP belongs to the developed 
countries in the world, whereas Jordan belongs to the less 
developed. Also Israel's manufacturing industry is high-
tech orientated, whereas Jordan's is orientated towards 
consumer goods or related to natural resources. In Israel 
the unemployment rate in 1992 was 11.2% compared to Jordan 
with 25%. 
6.2 INDUSTRY IN THE ARAVA VALLEY 
How important is the industry located in the Arava 
Valley in the national context? In Israel there is a 
concentration of industrial towns with Arad, Dimona and 
Oron in the Negev. The development of these industries is 
undoubtedly linked with the natural resources of the Negev, 
such as the minerals of the Dead Sea and the phosphate 
mines such as at Har'zin. However, the main concentration 
of industry is to be found along the Mediterranean Coast. 
Looking at Jordan a different situation is to be 
found. Three out of the five big Jordanian companies have 
plants in Safi br Aqaba. There is the Jordan Phosphate 
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Mines Company and the Jordan Fertilizer Industries in 
Aqaba, and the Arab Potash Company in Safi. The equivalent 
to Dimona and Arad is Aqaba. In Aqaba the natural resources 
are processed, because it is the only outlet to the sea 
which offers the appropriate transportation. Aqaba is one 
of the most important industrial towns in Jordan, besides 
Safi and Amman. The potash extraction from the Dead Sea, 
phosphates, and the phosphate based fertilizer production 
in Aqaba, together with medicaments, and detergents, 
account for around 60 % of Jordan's total exports (World 
Bank,1994,p.22). Furthermore, "about 70% of total 
manufacturing output was closely linked to the mining and 
extracting sector" (Metz,199l,p.l49). 
The mining and extraction sector of the Arava Valley 
region, as well. as the related industry in Aqaba, is vital 
for Jordan's economy. Looking at Israel, the minerals of 
the Dead Sea and the phosphates of the area are important 
for the industry of the Negev, but the mining industry does 
not account for such a high degree for exports as in 
Jordan. The Jordanian industry ln the Arava Valley is vital 
for Jordan's exports, whereas it is not for Israel's. 
Looking at the spatial distribution of industry in the 
Arava Valley three main locations can be identified: 
Firstly, there is Sodom, where the Israeli Dead Sea Works 
are located. Secondly, there is Safi with the Arab Potash 
Company, which is the Jordanian equivalent to the Israeli 
Dead Sea Works.· Thirdly, there is the chemical industry in 
Aqaba. Industry in all three locations is linked with the 
mining and extracting sector of the Dead Sea and the 
phosphate mines in the area. 
Apart from these three main locations there is the 
Kibbutzim indu~try in the south of the Arava Valley, which 
mainly processes food such as dairy products. There is some 
light industry :in Eilat which produces electrical and 
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mechanical products (see Atlas of the Negev,1985,p.42/43). 
In 1975 Timna, with an estimated 20 million tons of 
lowgrade copper ore, had a total copper production of 8000 
tons. In 1976 the copper mine was closed because of the 
rapid decline of copper prices on the world market (Europa 
Publications,1994,p.538). 
6.2.1 Dead Sea resources 
The Dead Sea is one of the world's richest areas in 
potash, bromide magnesium and other minerals. These 
minerals are used in the production of pharmaceuticals, 
insecticides and fertilizer. Biger (1995,p.112) remarks 
that "the estimated mineral reserves of the Dead Sea are 22 
billion tons of magnesium chloride, 12 billion tons of 
sodium chloride, 6 billions of calcium chloride and 1 
billion ton of magnesium bromide". 
The particular feature of the Dead Sea resources is 
that they are extracted by evaporating Dead Sea water in 
large evaporation ponds, utilizing solar energy. The annual 
Israeli production of potash requires evaporation of about 
150 million cubic metres of sea water, and only the use of 
solar energy makes the extraction economically feasible; 
using conventional energy would be too expensive (Energy 
1991,p.59). 
Over the last decade problems have started to arise at 
the Dead Sea. As Israel and Jordan began using the water of 
the Jordan and the Yarmuk rivers, as well as that of Lake 
Tiberias and the inlets to the Dead Sea for agriculture and 
other applications, the water level of the Dead sea began 
to fall rapidly (Biger,1995,p.111). To raise the level of 
their evaporation ponds south of the Dead Sea the Israeli's 
pumped water from the northern part into the the large pans 
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at the south of the Dead Sea, lowering the water level of 
the northern part of the Dead Sea considerably. 
6.2.1.1 The Israeli Dead Sea Works 
After obtaining an unlimited licence for exploiting 
the Dead Sea resources in 1929, British and Jewish-
Palestinian partners founded the Palestinian Potash Company 
which in the 1950's changed its name and became known as 
the "Dead Sea 
Works". The company started its extraction at the northern 
end of the Dead Sea, in Kallia. In 1937 the company added 
another plant at Sodom at the southern end of the Dead Sea 
because there was more space available for evaporation 
pans. Then in 1948, during the War of Independence, the 
plant at Kallia was destroyed and the site remained in 
Jordanian territory. Sodom became the major site for the 
Israelis to exploit the minerals of the Dead Sea. Following 
re-partition, production started in 1952. In 1955 the 
Bromide Company was founded and built its factory near the 
Sodom Potash works. Soon afterwards the two companies were 
integrated into the Dead Sea Works. Today the Israeli's 
produce about 2 million tons of Potash a year (see Fig 
6.2). $122.5 million out of the total of $296.2 million 
earned in mining and quarrying is exported to the EU. (see 
Table 5.8), $40.2 million to the U.S.A., $26 million to 
Brazil and $19.5 million to China. The main countries of 
export in the EU for Potash and Phosphates are the 
Netherlands, France and Italy. 
Figure 6.2 Potash and phosphate production in Israel and Jordan -
1990- 1994 
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Table 6.8 Exports, mining & quarrying by main country of 
destination in 1991/1992 $ million (Israel) 
Country of destination 1992 1991 
Grand total 303.6 299.7 
E.U. 138.5 148.7 
Thereof: 
Italy 22.3 26.1 
Netherlands 51.6 52.8 
France 39.3 45.3 
E.F.T.A. 6.9 7.1 
Other main countries 92.4 132.2 
Thereof: 
U.S.A. 25.8 27.4 
Brazil 23.1 19.2 
south Africa 14.2 13.6 
Hong Kong 0.4 15.6 
Other countries 65.8 20.7 
Source: statistical Abstract (1993),p.271. 
6.2.1.2 Arab Potash Company 
The Arab Potash Company, the equivalent to the Dead 
Sea Works, only started production in the winter of 1982 -
1983, although the project to build a plant was already 
initiated in the mid-1950's. The plan was to extract 1.2 
million tons of potash a year from the Dead Sea. This aim 
was reached at the beginning of the 1990's. In expectation 
of a further rise in the demand for potash, and being 
confident that they can sell what they produce, future 
plans have been drawn up to raise the present production of 
1.5 million tons (1994) to about 2 millions tons in the 
next four years, by adding another carnallite pan with an 
estimated cost of about $70 million (MEED January 
27.,1995,p.20). This considerable investment shows that the 
Jordanians are very interested in increasing their potash 
production. 
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Future projects are intended to extract non-potash 
mineral reserves in the Dead Sea (MEED,January 27,1995, 
p.20). Furthermore, they would like to develop an Al Safi 
Industrial Workshop complex (Ministry of Planning, 1994) . 
The workshop is. designed to meet rquirements of the local 
industrial companies such as the Arab Potash company and 
the Jordan Phospates Mining Company. This project is 
expected to develop the southern region of Jordan and to 
create new jobs. Another aim of the workshop is to save 
repair time and foreign currency (Ministry of 
Planning,l994). As the Arab Potash Company is expanding, 
as well as the industry related to it, Safi is becoming 
more and more industrial. 
The main market for Jordan's potash products lies in 
Asia and the Orient. More than 85 per cent of the company's 
production has been exported to Asia and the Orient (see 
' 
Table 5. 9) . In 1994 Jordan sold about 500, 000 tons of 
Potash to India which is its biggest customer (MEED,January 
27, 1995,p.20). 
Table 6.9 Sales of phosphates by geographical areas 
(in~luding quantities delivered to 
industrial complex in Aqaba) - 1991/1992 in 
million tons (Jordan) 
Year Industri Asia& Western Easter Other Total 
-al Orient Europe n Countr-
Complex, Europe ies 
1991 0.91 3.29 0.26 0.67 0.03 5.16 
1992 0.93 3.25 0.36 0.54 0.12 5.20 
Source: Statist~cal Yearbook 1992, Amman, p.148. 
6.2.1.3 Prospects for co-operation 
Despite the advantage of using solar 
energy,extractirtg the Dead Sea resources is not cheap. The 
maintenance of the evaporation ponds, as well as the 
-145-
construction of new ones, are expensive undertakings. 
Therefore, the proposals by the Israelis {Government of 
Israel, 1994) to erect joint darns to safeguard against 
floods, and to build joint evaporation ponds for the 
production of potash solution, would save considerable 
amounts of money for both sides. 
Furthermore the Government of Israel {1994) suggests 
a joint conveyor for transporting potash from the Jordanian 
and Israeli plants to the ports of Aqaba and Eilat. In 1974 
the Director General of the Israel Chemicals Company 
already acknowledged that the joint exploitation of the 
Dead Sea would bring mutual benefit to both sides and that 
a joint venture had been discussed with the Jordanians, 
since the foundation of Israel (Krankovsky, 1976, p .142). 
Moreover, transit rights to and from Israel's Mediterranean 
ports could be given to the Jordanians, although until now 
Jordan has had to send all its potash and phosphate exports 
via Aqaba. 
The Israelis even go so far as to think of joint 
marketing of these products and co-operation in developing 
new products and cosmetics based on the mineral and natural 
reserves of the Dead Sea. 
The Israeli proposals would undoubtedly bring great 
benefit to both companies. As Biger {1995,p.115) remarked, 
"at the present, two totally separate establishments are 
working with the same procedures in the same area, 
producing the sq.rne products". 
However, to co-operate to such an extent unlirni ted 
trust between the two partners is necessary. Also, at the 
present the companies are competitors on the world market. 
On top of this the Israelis are ahead in the technology 
relevant for exploration. Rivlin (1992,p 63/61) remarked 
that "Israel's success in the international potash market 
-146-
is a function of its abundant and high-quality raw 
materials, modern technology, successful management and 
marketing strategy". Apparently the Arab Potash company 
consulted the Israelis about their know-how for the 
production of bromide (Government of Israel,1994) 
There is potential for transboundary co-operation in 
the long-term, but in the short-term the Dead Sea Works and 
the Arab Potash Company are two separate companies 
competing with the same products on the World Market. This 
is illustrated by the fact that the Israeli's entered the 
Indian phosphate market, squeezing Jordanian's exports to 
India. This ha~pened because the state subsidies and the 
changed political circumstances allowed Israel to do so 
(E.I.U., Country Report Jordan, 3rd quarter 1994,p.16). The 
same might happen to the potash market. 
6.3 THE KIBBUTZ INDUSTRY 
The Arava Valley cannot be considered as 
industrialised, but there are small plants with between 1 
and 25 employees in various Kibbutzim. In the North, Ein 
Gedi produces cosmetics, rubber and plastics. The 
Kibbutzim in the south of the valley produce food and 
beverages. Yotvata, for example, runs a dairy whose 
products are well-known in Israel. 
As the agricultural sector has reached its limits in 
I 
creating jobs, industrialisation is the future of the 
Kibbutz and the Moshav. Manufacturing products such as 
agricultural supply equipment, and systems designed to 
maximize agricultural production under extreme conditions, 
which very oft.en have been developed in the Moshavim or 
Kibbutzim, would be one possiblity to do so. The 
agrotechnology developed in the Arava Valley could be 
manufactured there. 
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6.3.1 Prospects for co-operation 
The Israelis are thinking of joint ventures with 
Jordan in manufacturing the agro-technology in the Arava 
Valley. In that case the Israelis provide the know-how and 
the management :and the Jordanians the labour. This would 
bring jobs to the Arava Valley. Dr Collette Serruya (Jewish 
Agency) could even imagine the production of high-tech 
equipment such as computers in the Arava Valley. To draw 
parallels to t~e Silicon Valley seems to be exaggerated, 
but it has to' be given a thought because of Israel's 
success in the ~lectronics industry. According to Albrecht 
(1994, p.59) "the region's growth in information technology 
' 
is projected to: expand over the next five year at almost 14 
per cent" . The development of the industry could be re-
enforced by a joint research center between Jordan and 
Israel. 
6.4. THE RED S~A (AQABA/EILAT) 
Eilat is not an industrial town, but depends 
primarily on the tourist industry (see chapter 7) . However, 
there is some electrical, metal and food producing industry 
to be found, which is of minor importance. 
Compared to Eilat, Aqaba is highly industrialised. 
With its strate.gic position by the sea, Aqaba has benefited 
from the extensive transport needs of heavy industry. The 
fertilizer production in Aqaba is run by the Jordan 
Phosphate Mining Company. Dimmonium phosphate is produced 
from raw phosphate, imported sulphur and water. Since 1994 
production has reached about 740, 000 tons as production 
capacity has increased. Almost all of the fertilizer 
produced is ex~orted through the port. A new plant with a 
production capacity of 300,000 tones per year is planned as 
a joint venture with Japan, starting production this year. 
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There is a feasiblitity study into the building of a 
sugar refinery in Aqaba in connection with establishing 
sugar plantations in the Jordan Valley, which will be a 
joint venture with the Cuban government (MEED, January 27, 
1995,p.20). 
Aqaba's industry is based on the mineral resources of 
the Dead Sea and the phosphate mines. Jordanians are 
interested in further development of the industrial sector, 
but to what extent is unknown. The amount of heavy industry 
in Aqaba is considerable. As the only outlet to the sea it 
is an important industrial town, with the Jordanians 
interested in further development. They are particularly 
interested in joint ventures with foreign partners who 
would provide investment funds and long-term export markets 
(E.I.U,Country Profile 1994-95,1944,p.22) 
6.4.1 Prospects for co-operation 
Prospects for industrial co-operation are basically 
non-existant as far as the Red Sea is concerned. It has to 
be seen that Eilat is not interested in developing heavy 
industry . They are interested in developing tourism. The 
preservation of their side of the Valley for tourism is 
their major concern. 
An ideal compromise between the development of tourism 
and industry, would be a free trade zone at the Red Sea 
which was suggested by the Israelis (Government of Israel, 
1994) . This would include a free port industrial zone, 
"off- shore banking, tourism and shipping centers 
providing investment and employment opportunities". 
Furthermore, research centres and clean industry such as 
the high-tech industry would be ideal as the Middle Eastern 
markets are expected to grow, and the Arava Valley is a 
land bridge between the east and the west, making it an 
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ideal location. 
6.5 CO-OPERATION IN TRADE 
Another area for co-operation would be trade. 
Krankovsky (1976,p.141) mentioned the possibility of trade 
agreements between Jordan and Israel which would allow 
Israel to export industrial products "which Jordan neither 
produces nor has plans to produce in the near future, and 
Israel might permit the importation of certain agricultural 
as well as some industrial products". He also saw that the 
trade between the two countries would not pick up in the 
near future and that they have to seek markets outside the 
region, but he saw possibilities for technical co-operation 
and co-ordination of export. 
According to Rabban (1987,p.6) Israel could export 
metal, manufactured goods and clothing. However, the World 
Bank (1994,p.27/28) considers the current potential trade 
diversion from Jordan to Israel as rather poor. The reasons 
given are the different capita income levels in the two 
countries and the consequent difference in consumption 
patterns. There are few current Jordanian consumer products 
that would have a large market in Israel. "The most 
important potential exports are likely to be intermediate 
industrial goods and some consumer products that can be 
sold in niche markets by Israeli exporters of final 
products" (World Bank (1994, p.27). 
However, they do see several benefits Jordan would 
gain from trading with Israel. Firstly there could be a 
technology transfer from Israel to Jordan. Secondly, the 
Jordanians could use the network that Israeli firms have 
built up during the last 35 years through their extensive 
exporting. "These and other forms of interactions with 
other economies stemming from co-operation with Israeli 
firm could provide significant benefits and cooperation 
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could develop out of it" (World Bank,1994,p.28) 
The Government of Israel (1994) suggested a free trade 
zone in the Safi region. They believe that free trade zones 
along border terminals with freight transport~on and 
storage facilities would encourage industrial enterprises 
to settle in the area. 
There are possibilites to co-operate in trade, but the 
development in ·that field depends on the potential of the 
markets in adjacent countries. However, of symbolic 
importance, trade between Jordan and Israel was opened when 
the first sample of Jordanian tomatoes were exported by the 
local Jordanian River Company to Israel (MEED, Volume 38 
(48) 1 p.32) • 
6.6 SUMMARY AND PROSPECTS FOR CO-OPERATION 
The prospects for co-operation in industry and trade 
in the Arava Valley seem to be mixed. Co-operation in 
potash production seems sensible. Whereas in the 
Aqaba/Eilat area the kind of industry which should dominate 
seems to clash. Is tourism or heavy industry the future? In 
the Arava Valley itself there is no major industrial 
development so far. The future as far as industrial 
development is concerned is uncertain, but might be a field 
for joint ventures between the two countries. 
The structure of a joint venture should not be that 
one country provides the know-how, and the other the 
labour. There should be real co-operation, with both sides 
working together to develop the Arava Valley into the 
Silicon Valley of the Middle East. 
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Unfortunately, Jordan has only its work force to 
offer, which is not as highly skilled as the Israeli 
workforce. This could be changed by establishing joint 
research and training centres in Aqaba and Eilat. The Arava 
Valley as the production centre, with the research center 
in Aqaba/Eilat, could be the industrial future of the 
region. 
As the Israelis remarked, " economic integration would 
be incomplete without extensive bilateral ties between 
private firms, not only in commerce but production as well" 
(Government of Israel, 1994). However, is economic 
integration between the two countries possible or is it an 
illusion? The overall economic welfare of both countries 
can be increased by trade between the two. David Ricardo's 
comparative cost theory of international trade (1817) 
asserts that trade between two countries can take place to 
their mutual advantage, even if one country has an absolute 
cost advantage in the production of all goods, provided 
that it has a comparative advantage in the production of 
some compared to others (Seldon, 1975,p.66/67). Fishelson 
believes (1989,p.347) that this would overcome the 
localized absolute shortage of resources in either country. 
However, despite the economic theory there seems to be the 
fear of Israeli economic dominance following the peace 
because of Israel's level of technological development and 
international contacts (Scudder,1994,p.23). 
The propspects for co-operation seem to depend on 
removing the psychological barriers and apprehension. But 
trade and economic benefit are good reasons to overcome 
barriers. 
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Chapter 7 
TOURISM 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
Krakover (1985,p.272) remarked that "a desert 
environment that can offer not only rock formation, myths 
and folklore, but also tours to significant historical and 
archaeological remains, combined with some sort of water-
related leisure activity, has the potential of emerging as 
a major destination for international tourism". The Arava 
Valley with its unique physical conditions of the Dead Sea 
in the north, the Red Sea with its crystal clear water and 
coral reefs in the south, archaeological attractions such 
as Masada and Petra, offers the whole range (see Fig 7.1) 
of attractions a holiday resort can dream off. 
Before the peace treaty between Jordan and Israel the 
tourism potential of the Arava Valley was restricted by the 
boundary. The idyll of the peacful and ideal holiday resort 
was disturbed by the barbed wired fence running across the 
AqabajEilat shore. Tourists staying in Israel could not 
visit Jordan or the other way round. With the peace 
everything changed. On the 8th of August 1994 the first 
border crossing between Jordan and Israel, 3 km north of 
AqabajEilat, was opened. Soon afterwards the first tours 
including Israel and Jordan were advertised in the British 
Press (Scudder,1994,p.23). Tour operators now offer trips 
starting off in Amman, then crossing the River Jordan into 
the Holy Land to visit Capernaum, Nazareth, and Caesarea on 
the Mediteranean Coast, then returning to Jordan to visit 
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Petra and finishing the whole tour with a bathing holiday 
in Aqaba. At the beginning the border crossing was for 
third-country nationals only, but since the beginning of 
1995 many Israelis can ful.·~ fiL their long•:·: held dream of 
visiting Petra. \ 
The free movement of tourists is the present, but the 
future seems to be the joint development of the tourism 
potential of the "Arava Valley Region" (see fig Fig 7.1) 
through intense co-operation between Israel and Jordan. The 
will to co-operate has already been expressed in Article 17 
of the peace treaty. 
Although the will for tourist co-operation has been 
expressed, future co-operation might face some difficulties 
as both countries developed their tourism independently 
over the last few decades. The present stage of 
development, as well as future development plans, differ 
significantly in each country. 
7.2 TOURISM IN THE ARAVA VALLEY 
Tourism activity in the Arava Valley and its area is 
at present concentrated at three sites: the Dead Sea, the 
Red Sea and Petra. 
7.2.1 Dead Sea 
Tourism development at the Dead Sea was started by 
the settlers of the Kibbutz Ein Gedi, which was established 
in 1953, by offering field trips in the region and then by 
opening a youth hostel in 1969. 
In the 1970's and 1980's the site of En Boqeq, the 
major Israeli hotel area by the Dead Sea was developed. 
People mainly visit the Dead Sea resort because of its high 
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concentration of salts, and with the air screening the 
sun's UVB rays it enables people suffering from rheumatic 
and skin ailments to find relief in a spa. 
Apart from the Dead Sea, there are other major 
attractions such as the fortress at Masada. This national 
Israeli monument stands for the fight of the Jewish people 
against the Romans in the years between 66-73 AD. After a 
one year siege by the Romans the inhabitants of Masada 
committed suicide; Masada fell into Roman hands in 73 AD. 
Since then Masada has stood for the fight of freedom of the 
Jewish people. Masada, which can be reached by foot or by 
cable railway attracted more than 500,000 visitors in 1992 
(see Fig 7.2). Another attraction is the Ein Gedi nature 
reserve which has more than 250,000 visitors a year. 
Furthermore, there are several biblical places in the 
region such as Khirbit Qumran where the Dead Sea Scrolls 
were found between 1947 and 1956. The sporting activities 
in the region include hang-gliding over the Dead Sea or 
hiking in the Judean Desert. 
In 1993 there were about 1635 rooms in the Dead Sea 
area in 9 hotels of which 1,500 rooms are high grade (see 
Fig 7.4). The room occupancy rate was 73.6% (see Fig 7.3), 
which is one of the highest in the whole country. There are 
also several camping sites along the Dead Sea and two youth 
hostels at Masada and Ein Gedi, with about 400 beds 
altogether. 
The Jordanians only started to develop their side of 
the Dead Sea for tourism in the last decade. The 
development so far only includes one hotel, which does not 
have any telephone lines (World Bank,1994,p.33). Despite 
the fact that the Jordanian side is in some ways more 
attractive than the Israeli, it stayed more or less 
untouched until now. 
Figure 7.2 Visitors in the main tourist sites of south Jordan and Israel-
1992 
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Petra Karak Ell at Dead Sea Massad a 
Source: After Gradus,Y ( 1994), The Israel Jordan Rift Valley, Basel Conference . 
Figure 7.3 Room occupancy rate in the main tourist sites of Jordan and 
Israel - 1993 
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Further tourism development on both sides face several 
problems. The Israeli side of the Dead Sea may have 
reached its limit for development for several reasons. 
Firstly, there is the problem with the Dead Sea Works. The 
Dead Sea Hotels have to share their fossil and brackish 
water, which are in short supply, with the Dead Sea Works. 
Therefore, for further development addi tiona! water 
resources would be necessary. One possibility would be to 
transport it from other regions, but that would be very 
expensive. Apart from this the Dead Sea works cause another 
problem: as they pump water from the north of the Dead Sea 
to the south the water level in the north is constantly 
lowered, whereas it is rising in the south, which threatens 
the foundations of the hotels in Ein Boker. According to 
unoffical sources in Neve Zohar, this particular problem 
with the Dead Sea works has apparently been settled 
recently. Details about the settlement were, unfortunately, 
not available. 
There are other problems to be faced. One of them is 
a shortage of labour. As the region had not been populated 
by Israel until the 1950's, there has always been an 
housing shortage. Therefore, "the inhabitants of Newe 
Zohar, together with other tourist-lobbying pressure 
groups, are trying to obtain government recognition for the 
expansion of their settlement to the size of a small urban 
centre, providing housing and services to people employed 
1n developing tourist resorts in the Dead Sea area" 
(Krakover,1985,p.283). The second problem is that fewer and 
fewer Israelis are willing to work in the tourism industry. 
The Israeli side of the Dead Sea faces serious 
problems which hamper further development of their Dead Sea 
resorts. There are also interests wishing to stop further 
development. The Nature Protection Society already saw the 
limit for further development of tourism reached in the 
1980's and therefore, demanded a limitation of visitors to 
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the En Gedi nature reserve (Krakover,1985, p.283}. 
On the Jordanian side different kinds of problems 
occur. The Jordanians face the problem of a serious lack of 
infrastructure, meaning that the development will initially 
be very expensive for the government as the infrastructure 
is not yet developed enough to attract investors (World 
Bank, 1994,p.33). 
There are major differences in the stages of 
development of tourism in the Dead Sea area. The Jordanian 
side is underdeveloped and the Israeli side has arguably 
reached its limits for development. 
7.2.2 Red Sea 
7.2.2.1 Eilat 
Eilat, Israel's tourist resort at the Red Sea, is 
currently the largest tourist resort in the Gulf of 
Aqaba/Eilat. It is also Israel's only tourist resort along 
the Red Sea coast, which, considering that the entire 
length of Israel's Red Sea coast is only 11 km is not 
surprising. 
The main attraction of Eilat is undoubtedly its 
beaches, the coral reefs, the underwater observatory which 
offers trips in a glass-bottomed boat to experience the 
fascinating underwater world of the Red Sea, and the diving 
centre. Diving, swimming, snorkelling and scuba-diving can 
also be enjoyed at the Red Sea. There are also sailing 
trips on offer. Eilat offers good services, such as 
restaurants and souvenir shops. In short, Eilat's tourism 
is leisure orientated. 
There are further attractions in the surrounding area. 
Firstly, there is the bird watching centre. The Rift Valley 
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is the most important migratory route for birds in the 
world: as they make their way from Europe to Africa and 
back, the birds fly over the Rift making it a prime bird 
watching site. Secondly, there is Timna, the ancient copper 
mines which can be visited for a day trip. Then there is 
the possibility to visit the Sinai with the famous 
st.Catherine's monastery. There is also the possibility of 
visiting one of the Kibbutzim. 
Eilat is a sea resort with a great variety of local 
attractions. However, according to unofficial sources at 
the tour ism authority in Beer-Sheba, there are too many 
hotel rooms in relation to attractions, which means people 
do not stay for very long. In 1993 there were about 23 
hotels with 5,000 rooms in Eilat, mainly located on the 
north shore (see Fig 7.3 and 7.5). In the year 2000 Eilat 
is expected to have 12, 000 rooms In 1993 just over 1 
million tourists visited Eilat. Its room occupany rate was 
nearly 80% (see Fig 7. 3) , this being the highest room 
occupancy rate in the country. 
The development of tourism in Eilat faces many 
problems. One of the main problems is the land use conflict 
with the port. As all the traffic goes through the town 
there is a considerable amount of noise and pollution which 
is increased by the airport situated close to the middle of 
Eilat (see chapter 5). As already mentioned, Eilat is not 
poor in attractions, but too poor in attractions to attract 
people for a longer stay. Also, the pressure on the coast 
increases as the coastal strip is very narrow, with 
mountains in the east and west rising up steeply (see Fig 
7.6). The space for building hotels is very limited. As 
Beeston (1994, FT, October 13) remarked, "the city is 
already over-developed and running out of coastline". 
The pollution of the sea is one outcome of the dense 
population along the shores around the Gulf of EilatjAqaba. 
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Environmentalists already protested successfully against 
the construction of further hotels, with planners now 
paying attention to the environmental problems caused by 
the development of tourism. As the coast south of the port 
is going to be developed great attention is given to 
environmental protection (Bar-On,l993 , p . 3 ) . For example, 
the lights along the promenade to Taba will not face the 
sea, so the fish will not be affected and irritated. 
Figure 7 . 5 Eilat ' s hotel area at the north shore 
Source: Photograph taken in March 1994 
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Figure 7.6 Israel's coastal strip south of Eilat- in the 
background Eilat port, in the middleground the 
hotel area, and in the foreground on the left 
is the road to Taba 
Sour ce: Photograph taken in March 1994. 
7.2.2.2 Aqaba 
Aqaba itself is not a tourist resort like Eilat. 
Although it has a diving centre, Marine Science Station 
Aquarium, a small museum and Wadi Rum only a half an hour 
drive away, as well as Petra, it needs more attractions and 
infrastructure. There are only 1, 356 classified hotel 
rooms in Aqaba (see Fig 7 . 4), mainly situated in the center 
or at the north shore (see chapter 5 Fig 5.4 ). The room 
occupancy rate was just above 40% in 1993. Most of the 
hotel rooms are only three star or less. A five star hotel 
does not exist so far, despite the fact that there is an 
increasing demand for the 5-star class (World 
Bank , 1994,p.33 ). 
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Figure 7.7 Hotels near the north shore of Aqaba 
Source: Photograph taken in March 1994 
The tourism industry 1n Aqaba 1s not only 
underdeveloped, it is also in conflict with industry, which 
until now has dominated the town's development. Tourism and 
industry have to fight over the limited space available in 
Aqaba because of the surrounding mountains and limited 
coast line (see chapter 5). However, compared to Eilat 
there is a considerable amount of land available along the 
north shore (see Fig 7.8), which is still in its natural 
condition. 
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Figure 7.8 North shore of Aqaba 
Source: Photograph taken in March 1994 
A plan published in 1987 by the Aqaba Region Authority 
proposes a large tourist village south of Aqaba (see 
chapter 5, Fig 5.3) . The plan is aimed at both 
in t ernational and domestic tourism, with a maximum capacity 
of about 2,000 hotel beds and 1,000 chalets (Delegation of 
the Commission,1993,p . 3.17). So far the construction has 
not been started, but the report makes clear that with a 
break- through in the Middle East peace process and the 
expected improvement in Jordan's economy which will make 
the tourist zone profitable, the development could start by 
the year 2000 (Delegation of the Commission,1993,p.5 . 9 ). 
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7.2.3 Petra 
Jordan's most famous attraction, Petra, is about 100 
km away from Aqaba and about 262 km south of Amman. There 
are tombs, houses and temples carved into the multi-
coloured sandstone cliffs (see Fig 7.9). 
Figure 7.9 Petra 
Source: Photograph taken in March 1994 
Before the Gulf War in 1990 the number of visitors to 
Petra was just over 100,000. In 1991 with the Gulf War the 
number fell dramatically to about 40,000 . Since 1991 the 
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number has increased steadily. In 1992 117,000 visitors 
came to see Petra, and in 1993 the number reached nearly 
140,000 (see Table 7.1). Most of the visitors to the site 
were foreigners (see Table 7.1). There is already fear that 
a further inc~ease in tourist numbers might seriously 
damage the site:. 
Table 7.1 Numb,er of visitors to Petra during 1989-1993 
YEAR FOREIGN ARAB CHILDREN TOTAL 
1989 96,600 17,309 6,429 120,338 
1990 83,150 13,624 5,377 102,151 
1991 24,375 12,708 3,806 40,889 
1992 93,496 19,067 4,784 117,347 
1993 110,255 22,275 6,029 138,559 
% SHARE 93 79.57% 16.08% 4.35% 100% 
Source: Department of Antiquities/Ministry of Tourism 
(1994), Amman. 
With only four classified hotels, with a total of 163 
rooms, the accommodation facilites in Petra could be 
considered as rather poor. To improve this, several hotels 
are under construction to increase the number of hotel 
rooms (see Fig 7.9). The room occupancy rate in 1993 was 
61.01%. 
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Source: Photograph taken in March 1994. 
7.3 FUTURE PLANS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE "ARAVA VALLEY 
REGION". 
7.3.1 Proposals by Israel 
Looking at the present stage of dev e lopment o f 
tourism in Eilat, and at t he Dead Sea, i t seems t ha t Is r a e l 
has reached its limit for developing them furthe r. They are 
running out of coast line and resources, such as wa ter . 
Further increases in the tourism potent ial could only be 
reached by increasing the attractions . One major i dea i s to 
transform Timna, the ancient copper mine , into a c omp l ex o f 
casinos and a hotel at an estimated cost of $5 00 million 
(Scudder,1994,p.14). 
Another possiblity to increase the amount of 
attractions is to include attrac t ions ac r oss the 
international boundary . In their brochure fo r the 
Casablanca Summit the Israelis b r ought up t h e i dea of a n 
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Arava Valley Region. This region would include both the 
ea~t and west side of the Arava Valley (see fig 7.1). The 
map (see Fig 7 .1) produced by the Israelis is literally 
cluttered with ideas, and was apparently included in a 
brochure published by the Ministry of Tourism two years ago 
to attract foreign investors. 
The Government of Israel suggests eight crossing 
points south of the Dead Sea which would enable tourists to 
cross into Jordan. Three of the crossing points seem aimed 
to give access to Petra. Jordan and Israel would thus 
present one region, where every single potential for 
tourism would be exploited fully, as the map illustrates 
quite well. It also shows that there is abundant tourism 
potential. However, with its arrows crossing into Jordan it 
somehow gives the feeling of infiltration. 
Also in the Israeli brochure for the Casablanca 
summit, they suggest to punctuate the shores surrounding 
the Dead Sea with a collection of various types of spas 
and health centres which offer natural and alternative 
medicine, such as beauty and diet and anti-stress holidays, 
with sites offering services for outdoor sports and desert 
safaris (Government of Israel,1994). They also recommend 
developing a string of attractions along a scenic route 
encompassing the Dead Sea, each of which is a point of 
interest. Furthermore they suggest an exchange of know-how 
and co-ordinated planning to implement and manage joint 
tourist ventures, which would include the creation of a 
joint data-base for research and study subjects unique to 
the Dead Sea. The Israelis even go so far as to suggest 
co-operation in the management and marketing of hotels and 
other accomodation in the area. Other projects are the 
construc~on of an exhibition center and commercial center 
highlighting products from the area, such as locally 
produced beauty and cosmetics products, herbs and related 
health products, organic fruits and vegetables. 
-173-
As the Arava Valley itself has not been developed for 
tourism so far the Israelis are also interested in 
developing its potentials. Therefore they would like to 
reconstruct the ancient spice route which crosses the Arava 
Valley. The spice route would include desert inns of a high 
standard, hospitality tents, overnight camping grounds and 
toilets. Other routes presented on the map such as the 
nature and the pilgrim route, demonstrate the potential 
embodied in the connection between sites on both sides of 
the Israeli-Jordanian border (see Fig 7.1). Also along the 
length of these routes it will be possible to develop a 
range of desert activities such as: walking tours to become 
acquainted with geology, animals and plants; cliff gliding; 
donkey trips; hot air ballooning; air flights landing on 
various sites on either side of the border; stations for 
research into desert animal and plant life including open 
exhibitions for tourists, and the possibility of observing 
animals in the wild. 
For the Red Sea the Israelis suggest a common marina, 
the development of a promenade and the creation of an 
underwater park to preserve the coral reefs. 
The Israelis already have concrete ideas about the 
transboundary development of tourism. The region's tourism 
potential seems to have been fully assessed by the 
Israelis. 
7.3.2 Proposals by the Jordanians 
The proposals by the Jordanians at the Casablanca 
summit basically reflect their Five Year Socio-Economic 
Plan 1986-1990 which outlined the following constraints 
that the Jordanian tourist industry has to overcome: 
improvement of the basic infrastructure; conservation and 
restoration of further sites; environmental protection of 
all fragile resources; basic infrastructure facilities; 
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appropriate human resource development and training; 
appropriate marketing schemes; effective institutions and 
efficient management and information systems (Ministry of 
Planning,1985). 
According to the Ministry of Planning (1994) it is 
planned to develop the tourist capacity in Aqaba, 
especially in the higher quality hotels. Another 3, 000 
rooms will be constructed as well as further sport and 
recreational facilities. In Petra the construction of new 
hotels with a total capacity of 1,000 rooms is planned, and 
at the Dead Sea the construction of a new hotel with total 
capacity of 150 rooms is planned, along with new 
therapeutical clinic facilites. 
The government's efforts towards developing tourism is 
focused on prominent tourist sites such as Aqaba, the Dead 
Sea and Petra. However, transboundary co-operation with 
Israel is not mentioned in the Casablanca report. 
7 . 3 • 3 Summary 
Ash (1994,p.2) remarked that "for Jordan the 
priority is domestic development; whereas Israel is looking 
at wider horizons". Projects by the Jordanians are laid out 
in detail and are carefully cos ted; many of them are 
already at the advanced planning stage. However, as an 
outcome of the Casablanca conference and following the 
peace treaty joint projects are under consideration 
(Ash,1994,p.4) in the Red Sea Riviera, which is the joint 
development of the resort facilities in Aqaba and Eilat. 
For example, the two towns would be linked by a promenade. 
Also, a transnational underwater coral reef park is planned 
in the Gulf of Aqaba/Eilat; the lowest park on earth 
situated around the Dead Sea. This park would include 
hotels, exhibition sites and health centres. 
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7.4 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF TOURISM 
IN THE "ARAVA VALLEY REGION" 
7.4.1 The economic importance of tourism 
The importance of developing tourism for Israel 
and Jordan should not be underestimated. As both countries 
are confronted with strong population growth, Israel 
through immigration and Jordan through a birth rate which 
is over 3 % per annum, economic growth is the basis for 
economic and social development. Without economic and 
social development the two countries could face political 
instability. Already tourism is a very important source of 
income for them. Israel earns about $2 billion annually 
which is the equivalent to about one sixth of its 
industrial exports; in 1992, it amounted to about twice the 
current deficit of the balance of payments 
(Carney,1992,FT,7 December,p.13). Jordan's tourism industry 
is smaller only earning an estimated$ 546 million in 1993, 
coming second in earnings to other export inflows. However, 
as Burkart (1981,p.66) remarked, tourism may provide a 
stabilizing influence on the country's export earnings. 
As it is generally agreed that tourism pushes the 
economic development of countries very fast, it is seen as 
an agent of economic development (Burkart,1981,p.65; 
Lea,1988,p.50; Shaw,1994,p.116). Therefore, it would be the 
ideal medium for stimulating economic growth in Israel and 
Jordan. The tourism industry is already an important part 
of the national economy but its importance might increase 
tremendously in the future. 
Looking at the importance of tourism at a regional 
level, its importance for economic development might even 
be more significant. There are several examples of the 
development of tourism in Europe, especially in the 
Mediterranean, where the tourism industry helped to 
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develop regions lacking in infrastructure. Mathieson 
(1982) and Burkart (1987) agree that the impact of tourism 
on the development of an area can be very rapid. One of the 
most 
famous examples is probably the Spanish coast. Furthermore, 
they mentioned some other interesting characteristics of 
tourism: traditionally tourism is concentrated in less 
urbanised areas; tourism can be developed in a short time-
span, and with only moderate levels of investment; tourism 
is also a major source of employment at the local level. 
Tourism is a very "labour intensive industry, 
particularly valuable in areas with surplus 
labour" (Burkart 1987,p.65). 
which is 
unskilled 
Taking all this into consideration it seems very 
understandable that governments invest huge amounts of 
money to develop tourism. The Israeli government is, 
therefore, channeling considerable investment into tourism, 
targeted mainly at three main locations: Jerusalem, the 
Dead Sea and Eilat on the Red Sea (Carnegy,1992,FT,7 
December,p.13). It is also interested in transboundary co-
operation. 
7.4.2 The social,economic and environmental impact of 
tourism 
Looking at the social and economic impacts of tourism 
on the Arava Valley region there is no doubt that tourism 
will change the life of the people living there. People 
will get involved with tourism through working in the 
sector, or because at least one person in the family earns 
their living from tourism. Tourism will certainly change 
the life of the bedouins in Petra and in the Arava Valley. 
What 1s left of their traditional lifestyles will be 
destroyed. People will work in the tourism industry 
learning the values of the visitors. This process has 
happened in other resort areas around the world 
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(Mathieson,l982,pp.l43ff). Therefore, there is the demand 
that peripherial destinations should plan a sensitive and 
broad-spectrum .process of tourism development, to reduce 
the trade-off social costs (Bar-On,1993,p.25). 
Furthermore, the waste created by tourists, the 
traffic and all the other outcomes might destroy the area. 
Mass tourism i$ well-known for destroying the environment. 
As Shaw (1994,p.184) remarked "large numbers of tourists in 
small areas creates intense environmental pressures". 
The Mediterranean coast or the nearby Red Sea Resort of 
Egypt (Nuweiba) are probably the best examples. In Nuweiba 
the waste already causes serious problems (Key, 
1994,p.38/39). ·Also, there are studies by the Israeli 
Antiquities Authority about the potential ecological 
disaster of a tourist boom in the southern Negev. 
The coral reefs south of Eilat and Aqaba are already 
threatened with harm. On the Israeli side, the coral reefs 
are threatened because of the tourism development along 
the southern part of the coast. The Jordanian side is 
threatened because the area south of the Marine Science 
Station, where the coral reefs are situated, is proposed as 
a tourist area. Further along the coast industrial and 
military developments are planned. The fertilizer plant at 
the border to Saudi-Arabia, the port activities as well as 
the oil terminal with possible oil-spills, all threaten the 
coral reefs in the Gulf of Aqaba/Eilat 
(Wells, 1988,p.l39/147). 
Despite all these disadvantages, tourism will bring 
economic development, with wealth coming to the 
inhabitants of the area. However, there will only be a 
long-term wealth if the tourism potential is exploited 
carefully, and providing that the environment is still 
intact. As the report by the Delegation of the European 
Commission (1994,p.5.4) made clear, to attract tourists 
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clean water is necessary, intact coral reefs and high air 
quality. 
7.5 PROSPECTS F,OR CO-OPERATION 
The fact that the protection of the environment is 
essential for further development of tourism in the Arava 
Valley has bee~ recognised by both Jordan and Israel. The 
peace treaty outlined co-operation in the environmental 
management of the Gulf of Aqaba/Eilat. 
Projects for protecting the environment discussed at 
the Casablanca Summit include, as already mentioned, 
international nature reserves, both above and below water, 
which will provide the framework for co-ordinating action 
concerning the development and preservation ot the area. As 
Bar-On (1993,p.24) stresses, that for optimal development 
of the Coral Nature Reserve increased co-operation with 
Israel's Red S~a neighbours is required. 
The present two marine parks could be extended to 
cover the ~ntire Gulf of Aqaba/Eilat. This park on the 
borderline could mark the beginning of fruitfull co-
operation, and have the functions and values defined by 
McNeil (1990,p.25) for an international park: 11 the 
promotion of p~ace; protection and management of resources 
and environemnts; preservation and enhancement of cultural 
values, especia:lly the protection of transboundary people 11 • 
There are, according to Thorsdell (1990,p.5), many examples 
where parks on the borderline, in their own small way, can 
stimulate co-operation among nations. There are border 
parks all around the world: there is a border park between 
Panama and Costa Rica, Buthan and India, Italy and France; 
but there is n¢t one in the Middle East. A border park in 
the Arava Valley and an underwater park in the Gulf of 
Aqaba/Eilat would be the first two borderparks in the 
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Middle East. 
In the case of the Arava Valley and Petra, the 
cultural values' of the bedouins would need to be protected. 
Furthermore, the migratory birds which use the Arava Valley 
on their way to or from Europe also need to be protected, 
as well as other wildlife of the Arava Valley and the Red 
Sea. 
Ceballa se~s eco-tourism as one option to fullfill the 
function and values McNeil defines. He defines eco-tourism 
(1990,p.54) as; 11 tourism that consists of travelling to 
relatively undisturbed or uncontaminated natural areas with 
the specific P¥rpose of studying, admiring, and enjoying 
the scenery ... as well as any existing cultural 
manifestations 'located in these areas 11 • He also sees a 
considerable ~otential in eco-tourism for generating 
foreign exchange. One example where an interntional border 
park has been' created is La Ruta Maya, which covers 
Mexico,Guatema~a, Belize and Honduras. This park includes 
archaeological isites, beaches and wildlife. However, until 
now only preliminary work has been done and there is still 
a long way to go to realise transboundary eco-tourism. 
However, the ba:sic idea of La Ruta Maya could be applied to 
the Arava Valley Area or at least be considered as a 
sustainable alternative to mass tourism. 
Through co-operation it will be possible to identify 
and create a framework for development which will enable 
the region to compete successfully with holiday resorts 
around the wo:uld. The problems mentioned above such as 
water shortages and pollution could be addressed jointly. 
This would also include common management of the social and 
environmental impact of tourism in the area, which is 
already an urgent matter because of the number of tourists 
from Europe and the US to Jordan, which rose from 160,400 
in 1992 to 203,00 in 1993 as a result of the peace process. 
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With the prospe~t of further increases in the coming years, 
a greater environmental impact on the sites can be 
expected, especially around Petra where 2,000 extra hotel 
beds are going: to be created in the next two years. The 
problems arising from this such as the provision of 
adequate water :supplies or traffic management are already 
taken up at cabinet level in Jordan (Dougherty,1994,p.14). 
This shows that the pressure of tourism on Petra already 
increased befo~e the opening of the border, but now with 
the open border:s and the increasing number of day tourists 
from Israel, the situation seems to be critical. 
For Petra to survive, and in order to protect this 
unique attraction the Israelis and Jordanians must co-
operate. For example, quotas for day tourists coming from 
Israel could be agreed. Conservationists from both 
countries could work together to guarantee the protection 
of Petra. Plahs by the Israelis to make Petra more 
accessible by building some travelling routes for desert 
vehicles (see Fig 6.1) should be abandoned, because of the 
environmental impacts on Petra and the desert environment. 
Scenarios of thousands of desert vehicles arriving in Petra 
every day are rather frightening. 
The prospects for co-operation and the projects 
mentioned above seem to be promising, if there were not the 
worries by the Jordanians that they are being left behind 
by their neighbour's tourist boom (Carnegy, 1992, FT, 12 
November,p.36), Before the peace treaty there was the fear 
that Jordan was becoming litte more than a day trip from 
the Israeli Re? Sea resort of Eilat and the neighbouring 
Egyptian resort of Taba. However, Krankover rather sees the 
Jordanians gaining from open borders; he remarked 
(1976,p.l37) "it requires no stretch of the imagination to 
conclude that open borders allowing and encouraging tourism 
from Israel would increase Jordan's tourist income very 
significantly": However, only nine 
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months after the signing of the peace treaty the fear of 
the Jordanians i seems to have come true. "The boom in 
Israeli tourism has meant little more than Israelis making 
I 
a dash to P~tra, taking their own f~od with them 
I 
"(Economist,4 March,1995). 
This is ~ainly because of Israel's better hotel 
facilities. Jo~danians and Palestinians know that only by 
co-operation w~ll the tourism in the region increase 
significantly .. However, at the moment it seems that the 
Israelis are a~ead in planning and the Jordanians seem to 
be nervous abotit it. As Helm (1994,p.14) put it: "knowing 
that Israel and· its business backers are ahead of the game, 
they are nervous about a takeover." One proof that 
justifies thei~ fears is probably the Casablanca brochure. 
The Israeli brochure for the Middle East and North 
Africa Economi~ Summit was orientated towards regional co-
operation (see, Fig 6 .1). The Negev Tourism Development 
Administration had already printed "The Negev Peace tourism 
Potential" in July 1993 and "The plan for the Negev 
Development of :Tourism in the Negev 1992-1997" in November 
1993, a brochure which was sent to potential foreign 
investors. Whereas the Jordanian brochure on the other hand 
only stuck to their Five Year Economic Plan 1986-1990. It 
leaves a feeling that the Israelis are ahead, but what is 
needed is co-operation, not a take over. 
There are prospects for future co-operation, though 
the question which has to be answered now is: Which way to 
take? Should the potential of the "Arava Valley Region" as 
I 
an internation~l tourism destination be developed to its 
full extent, or should other alternative forms be 
considered such as ecotourism ? As Butler ( 1993, p. 46) 
argued, "to achieve successful tourism development of a 
type and seal~ appropriate to a frontier region, it is 
necessary to ensure that certain basic issues are 
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involved''. First of all the nature of tourism needs to be 
understood by all parties: local residents and decision 
makers. Secondly, the type and scale of tourism should be 
compatible with the frontier region. Thirdly, the limits of 
the physical and socio-econmic environments should be taken 
into account. Fourthly, control must be maintained on the 
development of tourism. 
Altogether, "integration with existing land uses and 
the resource base is essential for the long-term well-
being of tourism and other economic activities in the 
Therefore, tourism 
carefully, with the 
Only by the joint 
frontier regions" (Butler,1993,p.46). 
development should be considered 
profits staying in the region. 
development of the potential where 
will transboundary co-operation be 
both sides are equal, 
successful. Otherwise 
there will be a tourism boom with the peace, but as the 
World Bank (1994,p.33/34) suggested, the most likely 
scenario is that Jordan will have a limited share of it. 
Jordan may be confined to day trips, to visit the 
recreational and archaeological sites. Furthermore, the 
environmental impacts mentioned above might come true. 
Under these circumstances the prospects for a fruitfull 
transboundary co-operation in terms of tourism are not 
encouraging. 
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Chapter 8 
CONCLUSION 
The Arava Valley is a single natural unit, yet it has 
been separated by 40 years of differential development. The 
180 km long international boundary led to the development 
of two contrasting borderlands. The Israeli side is mainly 
populated by Jews, concentrated in Eilat or in the 
Kibbutzim or Moshavim in the Arava Valley. Their 
agriculture is highly developed and provides a high 
standard of living; the tourist sector is the main industry 
in Eilat and in the Dead Sea region, apart from the 
important Dead Sea Works. 
The Jordanian side is inhabited by Arabs, concentrated 
largely in Aqaba or Safi. There are also bedouin living in 
the Arava Valley. Some of them are living in recently 
established villages in the Arava Valley itself, earning 
their living from farming. The Arab farmers in the Arava 
Valley are some of the poorest in Jordan. Heavy industry is 
to be found iq Safi and Aqaba. Aqaba's main economic 
activity is the port and the fertilizer industry. Tourism, 
apart from the famous site at Petra, plays a minor role on 
the Jordanian side of the Arava Valley. 
However, there are common features between the two 
borderlands. Both sides of the Arava Valley are thinly 
populated, with the exception of the Red Sea Coast (Eilat 
and Aqaba) and Safi. Both sides of the Arava Valley are 
also far away from the core areas of their countries. The 
development of Eilat and Aqaba have been strongly 
influenced by the geopolitical situation at the head of the 
Red Sea and in the Middle East. 
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With the signing of the peace treaty on October the 26th 
1994 the need for transboundary co-operation has officially 
been recognised by both countries. Projects for co-operation 
have been suggested and are under consideration. Indeed there 
is evidence that informal discussions have been under way for 
some years. Altogether the prospects for future transboundary 
co-operation seem to be promising, although in some sectors 
the problems may have been under-estimated. 
The prospects for transboundary co-operation in water 
are good, as there are no alternatives to a shared water 
system. Jordan and Israel have either to co-operate or 
they will both lose more than they can afford. 
Investigations to assess the amount of water available in 
the Arava Valley will have to be done jointly. As a first 
step, a joint water authority in Aqaba/Eilat 
should be established which would be in charge of the 
distribution of the common water resources across the 
boundary. 
Transboundary co-operation in agriculture depends on 
the generosity of the Israelis as well as on the pride of 
the Jordanians. Are the Israelis willing to give their 
knowledge for free, and if not, what is the price? Are the 
Jordanians too proud to admit that their agriculture is far 
less developed than the one on the Israeli side? Prospects 
for co-operation in agriculture exist, but if the projects 
suggested are going to be realised much will depend on the 
general development of agriculture and water availability. 
However, a first step towards transboundary co-operation 
has been made already. With the return of Jordanian 
territory the question emerged what would happen to the al-
Ghamr far~, which was seized by the Israelis between 1968 
and 1970 and the land occupied by them in the Arava Valley. 
In the peace treaty it was agreed that Israel has to return 
the land, but "as a gesture of goodwill towards Israel, it 
was agreed that the Israelis could continue to use it 
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conditionally for up to 25 years under 
sovereignty" (Jordan Media Group, 1994). 
Jordanian 
Transportation infrastructure is, together with water, 
one of the most important areas for transboundary co-
operation. At present the systems duplicate each other, and 
are costly to maintain. The integration of the two 
transportation system would save both countries 
considerable investments. It would also lay the foundation 
for developing an inter-regional and international 
transporation system in the Arava Valley, which would 
connect Egypt with Jordan and Saudi-Arabia, via Israel. 
The 
industry 
prospects 
are less 
for transboundary co-operation in 
certain. The two countries are 
competitors on the world market for potash and phosphate; 
and no competitor gives away its market advantage, but some 
rationalisation may be possible. 
The tourist sector has already profited from open 
borders. Unfortunately until now the Israelis seem to have 
gained most from it. It is is no wonder that the Jordanians 
are apprehensive about transboundary co-operation on the 
basis of this experience. 
There have been many projects suggested for co-
operation by the Government of Israel but few by Jordan, 
although it needs more than political will to realise them. 
Transboundary co-operation requires the will of the people 
living in the borderlands. They are the ones who have to 
live with these projects and with the political reality, 
and the commitm~nt of local people especially in Jordan, 
must be questioned. 
In the case of the Israeli-Jordanian borderlands the 
politicans in Jerusalem and Amman took the decision to co-
operate. For the Jordanians the peace was a big surprise. 
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According to an article in the Economist (4 March 1995) the 
Jordanians are not particular happy about the terms of the 
peace agreement, negotiated by King Hussein without much 
consultation wi.th anybody else. Also, they do not like the 
idea that Jordanian territory has been leased indefinitely 
to Israeli farmers who were cultivating it in the past, 
and that there. has not been a significant increase in 
Jordanian touri1sm since the peace, unlike in Israel. 
The Israel:i government departments had already worked 
out the plans for transboundary co-operation long before 
the Jordanians had contemplated peace. The events have 
overtaken the Jordanians and that is one reason why they 
are not geared up for co-operation. There is even an 
underestimated ,fear in Jordan that they will lose-out with 
the open borde~s. 
The phenomenon that one country fears to lose because 
of open border,:s is wide-spread. Matar (1994,p.28), for 
example, argues' that open borders between Israel and Jordan 
would be a finapcial disaster for Lebanon as its economy is 
much weaker than Israel's and the goods produced in Lebanon 
could not stand up to the competition. However, to prevent 
this, efficent transboundary co-operation is even more 
essential. Theie is no doubt that to achieve successful co-
operation both sides need to profit from it, because only 
then will people believe in transboundary co-operation. 
I 
Anderson (1994) gives the example of transboundary 
co-operation between Northern Ireland and the Irish 
Republic. There, as in the Arava Valley, a duplication of 
transportation • infrastructure is to be found. With the 
peace process the sharing of integrated facilities is on 
the agenda. Instead of happiness about sharing, there is 
now competition about where the shared facilities are going 
to be located, in Northern Ireland or in the Irish 
Republic. Derry and Letterkenny, for example, are 
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competitors for the location of a North-West regional 
airport. Anderson {1994,p.61) stresses the point that "any 
general rationalisation programme for Ireland as a whole, 
would involve conflict over closures and job losses as 
well as competition for the location of new facilites, new 
investments and new jobs". Even in agriculture where the 
co-operation between the two countries is relatively 
advanced, there are fears of competition from the Irish 
Republic as they possess a recently restructured dairy 
sector and larger food-processing conglomerates 
(Anderson,p.61). The case of Northern Ireland and the Irish 
Republic illustrates how difficult it is to integrate 
transportation infrastructure as national interests are 
still considered to be more important than transboundary 
co-operation. As Anderson (1994, p.61) put it: "integration 
is a 'two-edged sword' strengthening Irish competitiveness 
against external competitors, but increasing competition as 
well as cooperation between North a~South, and producing 
losers as well as winners". This might well also apply to 
the Arava Valley. 
Another interesting case is the German-Hungarian 
border illustrated by Lopow {1994). The prosperity gradient 
between Germany and Hungary led to German citizens going to 
Hungary to get their teeth fixed, or to go to the 
hairdresser or to buy goods, which are extremely cheap 
compared to Germany; Sopron, a Hungarian border town, has 
an unusually high percentage of dentists and hairdressers. 
The market and the service industry is used by thousands of 
German tourists daily, who take advantage of the prosperity 
gradient (Loppow, 1994, p.43). 
A similar case is the border between Poland and 
Germany. The two border cities of Leknica (Poland) and Bad 
Muskau {Germany) are connected by a brid·:ge over the NeiBe. 
After the reunion of East and West Germany Leknica became 
the biggest trading centre at the gateway of the EU. 
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Leknica has a market with a labyrinth of kilometres of 
stands. In 1993 11 million border crossings were counted 
and the market has a turnover of more than 400,000 Pounds 
Sterling on a good week-end (Gaserow, 1994, p. 28ff) . The 
problem is that the market in Poland is booming, whereas 
the markets in Bad Muskau are declining. People in Bad 
Muskau complain that they get the traffic and the 
pollution. They would like the Polish market to disappear. 
Any attempts to work together to solve the transboundary 
traffic and the flow of shoppers to Poland has been 
unsuccessful for several reasons. First of all, the Polish 
people are not interested in stopping the markets as it 
means prosperity for them. Secondly, the co-operation 
between the two administrations is difficult as the 
structure is different, and because of the language 
barrier. Another reason is financial; on the German side 
money for the German-Polish understanding is provided by 
the government and by EU sources, whereas on the Polish 
side there is no money available for transboundary co-
operation (Gaserow,1994,p.31). 
The examples given so far are all along boundaries 
which have been opened recently, or became more open. They 
all illustrate that the integration of two different 
economies can cause problems. Very often it brings 
advantages for one side and only disadvantages for the 
other side. In all the cases mentioned above transboundary 
co-operation is evolving. In some cases, such as the 
Northern Ireland and Irish Republic, the EU funds are of 
additional help to assist transboundary co-operation. 
The early stage is always the most difficult part. 
With the right start the situation in these borderlands may 
normalize over time. There is no doubt that in the long-
term there could be advantages for both sides in the Arava 
Valley. Klemencic (1982, p.66ff) remarked that 11 We live at 
a time when we can speak about the need to co-ordinate the 
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cross-border planning and the development of border regions 
as determined by the wish to satisfy the needs of the 
population on both sides of the border" . Transboundary co-
operation in Western Europe and in North America are the 
best proof. 
The borderlands in Western Europe and North America 
are not economically disadvantaged anymore. Hansen (1986) 
stresses that by peaceful international political relations 
and increasing international integration the situation in 
the borderlands improves. He remarks that "the 
·interdependent development of neighboring border regions 
requires local and regional transborder cooperation in 
order to add~ess effectively social, economic, and 
environmental problems that spill over international 
boundaries" (1986,p.31). He gives the example of the 
Alsace. Twenty years ago the French literature about co-
operation saw more disadvantage in transboundary co-
operation than advantages, as the Alsatian economy is the 
weakest in the region; Germany and Switzerland are 
economicially stronger. However, in reality the Alsace 
benefitted from' the economic proximity to these areas. 
Today it is one of the most prosperous parts of France. 
These positive developments in the Western European 
and North American borderlands took time. The transboundary 
co-operation between the USA and Canada started a hundred 
years ago, although the boundary is much older and there 
have always been strong cultural links between the two 
countries. However, today this is one of the most 
outstanding types of co-operation in the world. The most 
important interactions are not between the national 
governments but between sub-national government units, 
private organizations, and individuals (Alper,p.121). The 
State of Maine has established an Office of Canadian 
Affairs. The institutional structures for handling 
relations with neighboring provinces in both the executive 
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and legislative fields has the advantage that sub-national 
government units have access to each other, and can solve 
transboundary matters without the national government. 
In Europe the importance of transboundary co-operation 
between border communities has been officially recognised 
by the Western European goverments by signing the European 
Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation. 
Therefore, it now seems to be natural that there is 
institutionalised transboundary co-operation between many 
countries in Western Europe. 
There is for example, the "Euregio Mass-Rhein" 
transboundary working group. The region includes parts of 
southern Netherlands, parts of Germany and Belgium. Their 
aim is to co-ordinate the transboundary co-operation on the 
regional and local level, solving the transboundary 
problems concerning the environment, the infrastructure and 
the economy in the region. Another example is the Saar-Lor-
Lux-Region, between the Bundesland Saarland, Lorraine 
(France), Luxemburg and the parts of the Bundesland 
Rheinland-Pfalz. 
One of the best examples for transboundary co-
operation is the Regio Basiliensis. The Regio Basiliensis 
started off in 1963. There were metropolitan co-ordinating 
and planning bodies involved, also industry, three local 
universities, and the local governments took part. At the 
beginning conferences were held where planners, politicans 
and scientists discussed regional planning models (Briner, 
1986, p.47). The transfrontier co-operation which developed 
over the last few decades is as follows (see fig 8 .1). 
There are working groups, consisting of people from France, 
Germany and Switzerland, concerned with tourism, energy and 
other subjects which are of concern for the region. For 
example, transportation is a problem for the region as 
there is a great number of commuters. There needs to be 
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sufficent transporation infrastructure to meet this need. 
The Commission at the top takes the results of these 
working groups into consideration to develop 
recommendations. The Commission is also able to prepare 
draft agreements. A significant amount of work is done at 
the periodical international meetings which are held up to 
seven times a year and attended by representativees of the 
local planning regions. It can be seen that people from all 
levels are involved and the decisions about what is going 
to happen in the region are carried out jointly. Briner 
(1986, p.53) stresses that "up to the present time a 
genuine three-sided willingness to undertake a true 
partnership in the regulation of conflicts in the Basel 
Region has been missing at the national level - at least in 
matters such as environmental and energy issues; the 
initative for cross-border co-operation therefore tends to 
come mostly from the regions themselves". 
Could this model be applied in the Arava Valley? The 
Regie Basiliensis has some common characteristics with the 
Arava, but so do the US-Mexico borderlands. For example, 
the US-Mexico borderlands and the Regie Basiliensi are 
characterised by the following (Hansen 1986, pp.38ff): 
reflection of past conquests and diplomatic arrangements 
more than of natural geophysical barriers; zones of actual 
or potential m~litary conflict throughout much of the 19th 
and 20th century; within their national settings, the 
border regions are relatively distant from their respective 
capital. These characteristics probably apply to 90% of 
Europe's boundaries. However, 50 years after the Second 
World War transboundary co-operation has replaced these old 
conflicts. 
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Figure 8.1 The Regio Basiliensis - a model of 
institutionalised transboundary co-operation 
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However, the Arava Valley borderlands do represent a 
sharp demarcation between border area cultures. Also, the 
degree of disparity in living standards is very 
significant, like the one between Mexico and the United 
States. Martinez {1986, p.201ff) believes that disparity in 
living standards causes the major problems between the US 
and Mexico and believes this is why they have been unable 
to tackle problems effectively. Americans feel threatened 
by the immigrants, and as long as the economic and 
demographic gap prevails, it will be difficult to reach 
agreements on meaningful joint border programs. He sees 
more chance of 6reating the kind of organisations existing 
in Europe as soon as Mexico's economy improves. He {1986, 
p.202) stresses that "for a border region to flourish, 
people who live in the area must not be impeded from 
crossing back and forth from one country to the other, and 
a reasonable amount of trade must be permitted to take 
place". 
Probably the most interesting example of adjacent 
borderlands and their development of transboundary co-
operation over more than a decade, lies in the 
neighbourhood of the Arava Valley, the Egyptian-Israeli 
borderlands. Sixteen years ago on March the 26th 1979 the 
Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty was signed at Camp David. The 
major thrust of the peace treaty was that Israel and Egypt 
agreed to move towards normalization of relations. The 
peace treaty includes articles concerned with their 
diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations. Furthermore, 
freedom of movement is mentioned, "neither party will 
impose discriminatory restrictions on the free movement of 
persons and vehicles from its territory to the territory of 
the other" (The Department of State, 1979, p.17). Also, the 
co-operation for development and good neighbourly relations 
as well as transportation and telecommunications was 
agreed. 
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A protocol concerning relations of the parties 
contains a paragraph where the parties agreed the 
following: " The Parties further agree that a highway will 
be constructed and maintained between Egypt, Israel and 
Jordan near Eilat, with guaranteed free and peaceful 
passage of persons, vehicles and goods between Egypt and 
Jordan, without prejudice to their sovereignty over the 
part of the highway which falls within their respective 
territory" (The Department of State, 1979, p.18). 
However, as promising as the peace treaty sounded, its 
basic message was not transboundary co-operation, it was 
normalization. "The 'normalization' as stipulated in 
Article 33 of the treaty's preamble, provides for 'full 
recognition, diplomatic, economic and cultural relations, 
termination of economic boycotts and discriminatory 
barriers to the free movement of people and goods .. ' ". 
( FMA I 19 8 5 ) . 
However, looking at what actually happened after the 
Egypt-Israel peace treaty is not very encouraging. Soon 
after the peace treaty the normalization process was 
disturbed for two reasons. Firstly, because of the 
Israeli's handling of the settlement issue in the occupied 
territories. Secondly, because there was a growing 
reservation towards the Israelis by the average Egyptian; 
with the boycott by the other Arab states, Egypt was very 
isolated and the Israeli tourists did not bring enough 
money to compensate for the rich Arabs. Altogether, as far 
as telecommunication, and air-links, as well as diplomatic 
relations were concerned things worked out, but no 
transboundary co-operation in the sense of joint projects 
was developed. 
Shamir (1988, p.202) remarked: "The opening of the 
borders between the two countries was an exhilarating 
experience for a society that for thirty years had been 
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living in quasi 
after Camp David 
siege". However, the reality a decade 
was that oil, the biggest trade i tern 
between the two countries, became less and less important 
as a trade item because the oil price on the world market 
was cheaper than the one agreed between the Israelis and 
Egypt. Israel could purchase oil for a much lower price on 
the world oil market. 
The transboundary flow 
disappointing for the Israelis. 
of tourism was 
Between 1980-87 
also 
300,000 
Israelis travelled to Egypt, which is an average of about 
3 5, 000 year, whereas only 2, 000 to 3, 000 visitors from 
Egypt visited Israel per year (Shamir, 1988, p.202). That 
there has not been transboundary co-operation in the past 
16 years has to be seen in the terms of political situation 
in the Middle East over this period. " There is little 
doubt that uncertainty about the future of political 
relations, which stems from lack of progress on the 
Autonomy issue and the refusal of other Arab countries to 
join in the peace process, inhibits further expansion of 
Egyptian-Israeli economic relations and prevents them from 
reaching what might be termed their 'natural level'" (Arad, 
1983,p.135). 
However, with the peace treaty between Israel and 
Jordan as well as further progress in the overall peace 
development 1n the Middle East, Egypt seems to be 
interested in joint transboundary projects. In their 
brochure for the Casablanca Summit, transboundary co-
operation with Israel on transportation and tourism are 
high on the agenda. For example, they suggest (Government 
of Egypt, 1994, p.51) the expansion and development of Ras 
Al-Naqb Airport to become a multinational airport. The 
airport is situated in the Sinai close to Eilat and Aqaba. 
It would, therefore, serve future tourism markets in Egypt, 
Israel, Jordan, and Palestine. There is no doubt that a 
mutual interest of transboundary co-operation is shared by 
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the Egyptians. There might not have been transboundary co-
operation in the past, but there will be in the future. 
The transformation from an alienated borderland such 
as the Arava Valley, to a co-existent or even integrated 
borderland is going to be painful. The opening of the Inner 
German frontier, for example, is one of the most recent 
cases where this happened. Sealed for fifty years the 
frontier was suddenly opened. The positive effects were 
that the rail links and infrastructure were rebuilt, the 
negative effect was that the traffic increased. As Jones 
(1994a,p.265) remarked, "this led to an enormous upsurge in 
road traffic onto systems which had been developed for more 
modest local needs" . This case could well happen in the 
Arava Valley. Other impacts are the increase of tourism, 
the extra demand of housing, and the improvement of the 
infrastructure. In the German case there was a large 
increase in employment within the frontier districts and an 
upsurge in economic activity. But on the other hand, there 
was increasing congestion, additional environmental 
problems and rising costs of goods and housing accomodation 
(Jones, 1994a, p.270). 
Jones and Wild (1994a, p.262) remarked that in the 
case of the removal of a political boundary such as the 
Inner-German boundary, there is an absence of substantive 
case studies to draw upon. They try to identify the 
economic and social impacts of the opening of the border 
on the localities and communities of the frontier zone. 
After studying the socio-economic gradients across the 
Inner-German states, Jones (1994b,p.233/234) reached the 
hypothesis "that the removal of the frontier did not 
generate positive short-term economic impacts on the 
majority of districts on the western side, to overcome the 
cumulative negative effects of retardation and stagnation 
caused by four decades of existence as a relatively 
unfavoured border zone". 
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What is going to happen when the boundary in the Arava 
Valley becomes permeable ? Authors like Asiwaju (19~1) 
believe that the European Convention for Transboundary Co-
operation, which formalises and legalises transboundary 
co-operation is the ideal model, but this remains to be 
seen. Even if that model is recommended for Africa by 
Asiwaju and by Hansen for the US-Mexico borderlands, it has 
to be accepted that every continent, and in particular 
every borderland, is unique. 
Transboundary co-operation cannot to be started by 
imposing a model. The beginning of transboundary co-
operation should start off with transboundary co-operation 
concerning the natural resources. There are many examples 
in the world where countries co-operate successfully in 
these matters without having conventions. One very 
interesting example is the Mekong River Basin. In 1957 the 
Mekong Committee was established to co-ordinate the Mekong 
River Basin which is shared by Cambodia, Laos, South 
Vietnam and Thailand. Transboundary co-operation in this 
case developed over the decades and is working and the 
future looks promising. The reason why it is working is 
probably because there has not been any open conflict, and 
as Chomchai (1995, p.253) remarked, "whatever differences 
in the attitudes of riparian countries to the Mekong river 
there may have been, one overriding need is common to all. 
This is for the basic data which is indispensable for 
rational planning and the operation of water resources 
projects". The riparian countries have to co-operate if 
they do not want to lose or damage their water resources. 
Another example of joint management of natural 
resources is the Australia-Indonesia Zone of Co-operation 
which was created by the Australia- Indonesia treaty in 
1989. This off-shore Zone of Co-operation covers three 
areas: "Area A is the zone of joint development of the oil 
and gas reserves, whilst Areas B and C are under the sole 
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jurisdiction of Australia and Indonesia". A similar 
agreement could be created for the Dead Sea. The Sea could 
be the zone for co-operation whereas the Works itself stay 
under the jurisdiction of Israel and Jordan. There is 
little doubt that shared natural resources leave no 
alternative than to co-operate. Therefore, they are the 
basis for any further transboundary co-operation. 
However, transboundary co-operation should happen at 
a regional level and not be imposed by governments, sitting 
in the core areas. Politicians should also acknowledge that 
it takes time to develop. It took time in Europe, it took 
time in North America, and will take time in the Arava 
Valley. The people there need to be involved, and they need 
to have the will to co-operate, as well as the politicians. 
The European Outline Convention was drawn up because people 
living in the borderlands took the initiative and asked the 
politicians for support. However, whether the local people 
in the Arava are going to take the initiative has to be 
questioned. The Arava Valley was only settled in the last 
forty years. Unlike most borderlands in the world, there 
are no historical or family ties between the two sets of 
borderlanders. Therefore, the transboundary interaction 
between the two borderlands might only be occasional trips 
for shopping or a day out. 
The aim of transboundary co-operation in the Arava 
Valley should be to improve the living conditions of the 
people in the borderlands. Its aim should be that both 
sides are gaining from it. Both sides should be winners, or 
one side should at least not lose all the games. 
Governments need to be prepared to sacrifice their national 
interests in the interests of long-term collaboration. In 
the case of the Arava Valley only the following decades 
will prove if there will be fruitful transboundary co-
operation. 
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